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Abstract
Revenue management has been applied in service industries for more than thirty years. Since
then, revenue management has been transferred to other industries like manufacturing or e-
fulfillment. Short-term revenue management decisions are taken based on other, longer-term
decisions such as decisions about actual capacity, segment-based prices or the price fences in
place. While optimization approaches have been developed for each of these planning tasks in
isolation, existing approaches typically do not consider interactions between planning tasks.
This thesis considers coordinated planning in revenue management, that is the interaction
of revenue management decisions with other planning tasks.
First, we provide an overview of both the literature on coordinated decision making in
the context of revenue management in different industries, and the literature on existing
frameworks, which aim to structure the planning tasks around revenue management. We
find that the planning tasks relevant to revenue management differ across the industries
considered. Moreover, planning tasks are relevant on different hierarchical levels in different
industries. We discuss an approach for an industry-independent framework.
Based on the relevant planning tasks identified, we investigate the long-term performance
of revenue management and therefore the integration of revenue management and customer
relationship management. We present a stochastic dynamic programming approach, where
the firm’s allocation decision impacts future customer demands by influencing the repurchase
probabilities of customers, depending on whether their request has been accepted or rejected.
We show that a protection level policy is not necessarily optimal in a two-period setting.
In a numerical study, we find that the value of looking ahead in time is low on average but
may be substantial in some scenarios. However, the benefit from regular demand updates is
considerably higher than the additional value of looking ahead in time on average.
Lastly, we investigate the interaction of revenue management and fencing. We account
for the trade-off between price-driven demand leakage on the one hand and costs for fencing
on the other hand. We show that fencing decisions have an impact on the optimal capacity
allocation, but that this is not the case vice versa as the fencing decision does not depend on
the allocation decision. Taking both decisions sequentially is therefore optimal. We extend
our approach in order to account for additional stock-out-based demand substitution. Then,
both decisions depend on each other and firms should take both decisions simultaneously.
iv
Contents
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract iv
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Goals and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Decisions Related to Revenue Management - An Overview and Framework 6
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Quantity-Based Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1.1 Single-Resource Capacity Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1.2 Network Capacity Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1.3 Overbooking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2 Price-Based Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2.1 Dynamic Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2.2 Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Coordination of Revenue Management with Related Planning Tasks - A Review 18
2.3.1 Quantity-Based Revenue Management for Service Industries . . . . . 19
2.3.1.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Quantity-Based Revenue Management in Manufacturing . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Price-Based Revenue Management in Retail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
v
2.3.3.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.4 Revenue Management in E-fulfillment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.4.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.4.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.5 Industry-Independent Planning Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.5.1 Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.5.2 Customer Relationship Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Planning Frameworks for Revenue Management - A Review . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Supply Chain Planning Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.1 The Supply Chain Planning Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.2 The Retail Demand and Supply Chain Planning Framework . . . . . 39
2.5.3 The E-fulfillment Planning Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 A Framework for Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.1 Main Findings from the Literature Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.2 Comparison of Revenue Management Frameworks with the Literature
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6.3 Comparison of Supply Chain Planning Frameworks with the Literature
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6.4 A Generalized Framework for Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 Revenue Management and Customer Relationship Management: Coordi-
nating Short-term and Long-term Performance 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.1 Customer Perceptions of Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.2 Customer Perceptions of Denied Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.3 Basic Theories on the Effects of Customer Perceptions on Customer
Loyalty and Firm Profitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.4 Revenue Management with Endogenous Customer Behavior . . . . . 59
3.2.5 Interface of Revenue Management and Customer Relationship Man-
agement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model for Long-Term Optimal Alloca-
tion Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.2 Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.3 Optimal Allocation Policy in Booking Period T . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Two-Period Setting: Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.1 Marginal Analysis of the Allocation Decision: Trade-offs and Implica-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
vi
3.4.2 Partitioned Allocation Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Numerical Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.1 Study Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5.1.1 Modeling Customer Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5.1.2 Allocation Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.1.3 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.2 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5.2.1 Part A: T = 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5.2.2 Part B: T = 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4 Coordinating Fencing and Capacity Allocation 99
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2 A Review of Fencing in Revenue Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.1 Price Differentiation, Segmentation and Fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.2.2 Product Line Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2.3 Substitution in Inventory Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2.4 Segmentation and Substitution in Revenue Management . . . . . . . 109
4.3 Price-Driven Demand Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.1 Demand Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3.2 Fencing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3.3 An Integrated Fencing and Capacity Allocation Model . . . . . . . . 112
4.3.4 Analysis: Partitioned Allocation Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.4.1 Allocation Planning under Exogenous Fences . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.4.2 Optimal Fences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3.5 Analysis: Nested Allocation Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.3.5.1 Allocation Planning under Exogenous Fences . . . . . . . . 122
4.3.5.2 Optimal Fences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4 Additional Stock-Out-Based Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.4.1 Demand Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.4.2 Fencing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4.3 An Integrated Fencing and Capacity Allocation Model . . . . . . . . 127
4.4.4 Analysis: Partitioned Allocation Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.4.4.1 Allocation Planning under Exogenous Fences . . . . . . . . 128
4.4.4.2 Optimal Fences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.4.5 Analysis: Nested Allocation Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.5 Numerical Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5.1 Price-Driven Demand Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5.2 Additional Stock-Out-Based Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
vii
5 Conclusions and Further Research 148
5.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2 Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Bibliography 153
Curriculum Vitae 171
viii
List of Figures
2.1 Classification of revenue management techniques (according to Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Littlewood’s model: marginal analysis (adapted from Klein and Steinhardt,
2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Hotel revenue management application (adapted from Vinod, 2004) . . . . . 34
2.4 The pricing and revenue optimization process (adapted from Philips, 2005) . 34
2.5 Planning tasks in revenue management (adapted from Klein and Steinhardt,
2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Decision sets in revenue management (adapted from Ng et al., 2008) . . . . . 36
2.7 Framework for (relationship-based) capacity control (adapted from von Martens,
2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8 Sequential airline planning (adapted from Cizaire, 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.9 The supply chain planning matrix (Fleischmann et al., 2008) . . . . . . . . . 38
2.10 The retail demand and supply chain planning framework (adapted from Hu¨bner
et al., 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.11 The e-fulfillment planning framework (adapted from Agatz et al., 2008) . . . 40
2.12 A framework for quantity-based revenue management applications . . . . . . 49
2.13 A framework for price-based revenue management applications . . . . . . . . 50
3.1 The value chain (adapted from Gupta and Lehmann, 2008) . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Transition process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Marginal analysis and trade-offs (T = 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Accepted Class 2 requests under a non-monotone allocation policy . . . . . . 73
3.5 Optimization process and coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.6 Average protection levels over time (Part A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.7 Average protection levels over time (Part B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.8 Allocation policy for a1 = 0 and r1 = 0.2 (left) and r1 = 0.4 (right) . . . . . . 95
4.1 The process of market segmentation and price fencing (according to Zhang
and Bell, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2 Pricing and revenue management (according to Cizaire, 2011) . . . . . . . . 106
4.3 Optimal decisions for different parameter scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
ix
List of Tables
2.1 The three levels of revenue management decisions (according to Philips, 2005) 35
2.2 Planning tasks across all industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Planning frameworks in literature: Overview of characteristics . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 Experimental design for the numerical study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Spread of optimality gaps (Part A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3 Computation times (Part A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Average protection levels (Part A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 Average accepted customer requests (Part A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.6 Average parameter-dependent optimality gaps (Part A) . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.7 Average parameter-dependent protection levels and optimality gaps (Part A) 90
3.8 Spread of performance gaps (Part B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.9 Average parameter-dependent performance gaps (Part B) . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.10 Average protection levels (Part B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.11 Average parameter-dependent protection levels (Part B) . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.12 Average parameter-dependent protection levels for a1 = 0 (Part B) . . . . . . 96
4.1 The firm’s optimal allocation and fencing decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.2 Events with regard to stock-out-based demand substitution . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3 Bounds for the optimal fencing decisions under stock-out-based demand sub-
stitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4 The reference case under price-driven demand leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5 Optimal decisions for different scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6 Value of price differentiation depending on customer heterogeneity . . . . . . 139
4.7 Value of price differentiation depending on K0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.8 The reference case under additional stock-out-based substitution . . . . . . . 141
4.9 Comparison of the results for the reference case with and without stock-out-
based substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.10 Value of price differentiation depending on customer heterogeneity under
stock-out-based demand substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.11 Value of price differentiation depending on K0 under stock-out-based demand
substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
x
4.12 Value of simultaneous decision making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.13 Value of price differentiation depending on α1 and α2 under stock-out-based
demand substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Revenue management has been applied in service industries (such as airlines, car rental and
hotels) for more than thirty years, but it has widened its scope since then. On the one hand,
revenue management does not focus solely on capacity allocation, on the other hand, the
concept of revenue management has already been - partly due to advances in technology and
the internet - transferred to non-traditional industries such as e-fulfillment or manufacturing
(Ng et al., 2008). At its core, revenue management deals with service differentiation when
a firm faces demand for its limited capacity from heterogeneous customers. Heterogene-
ity stems from, for example, different levels of willingness-to-pay or the different strategic
importance of customers to a firm. Typical revenue management approaches include the
allocation of capacity to several customer classes, overbooking, or dynamic pricing. Having
been applied for decades, the basic techniques are well known, and several extensions of the
basic models exist in literature.
Revenue management aims for short-term demand fulfillment. Short-term revenue man-
agement decisions are taken based on other longer-term decisions such as decisions about
actual capacity, segment-based prices or the price fences in place. These longer-term deci-
sions may affect revenue management decisions. While optimization approaches have been
developed for each of these planning tasks in isolation, the existing approaches typically do
not consider interactions between planning tasks. Revenue management decisions are, how-
ever, ”highly interdependent with decisions made in other key areas of (airline) planning”
(McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). Cizaire (2011) also stresses the importance of accounting for
these interdependencies both between pricing and revenue management in particular, and
with other planning tasks. From a different perspective, Weber et al. (2003) also find that
each decision is treated separately in revenue management support systems. Optimizing
each decision separately and hence taking decisions sequentially is not necessarily optimal
from either a mathematical point of view or from a system perspective. In order to consider
the complex decision hierarchy as a whole, as well as the interdependencies involved, all
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system components should be taken into account (Weber et al., 2003).
As well as the interaction of revenue management with pricing decisions, several other
planning tasks, which interact with short-term revenue management decisions, have been
identified in the literature. Consider the following examples:
• Next to segmenting customers according to demographic variables (such as age, income
etc.) airlines started to introduce frequent flyer programs twenty years ago1. Since
then, airlines have collected a great deal of information about their customers, but the
revenue management systems in place rarely consider the customer specific information
but manage availability according to the segment-based product prices (Noone et al.,
2003). In general, this purely short-term orientation is not necessarily optimal in the
long run. Considering customer relationships is crucial for the long-term performance
of revenue management (see, e.g., Ovchinnikov et al., 2014).
• According to the Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report 2012, large U.S. carriers
(such as American Airlines or United) offer seats at a variety of prices within a booking
period. In general, the airlines aim to maximize their profits with these complicated
fare structures. In order to retain customer segments and to mitigate price-driven
demand leakage, the firms design price fences (e.g. fare restrictions). The efficiency
of the price fences in place is therefore crucial for the success of revenue management
(see also Hanks et al., 2002; Kimes, 2002; Zhang and Bell, 2012).
• Airline schedule planning itself already consists of several decisions2 which cannot be
made simultaneously due to the resulting problem complexity. The scheduling prob-
lems are thus solved sequentially (Barnhart and Cohn, 2004). In particular, schedule
planning is based on very simplistic assumptions regarding the revenues of an airline
and therefore barely mirror the interaction of revenue management and the actual
scheduling decisions. The schedules resulting from pure cost-minimizing models may
differ significantly from the schedules resulting from an integrated model, which is not
based on average fares but better reflects the actual complexity of the pricing systems
in place.
In this thesis, we consider coordinated planning in revenue management, that is we in-
vestigate the interaction of revenue management decisions with other planning tasks. The
research goals of this project are formulated in Section 1.2, and Section 1.3 provides the
outline of the thesis.
1Lufthansa started the Miles-and-More program in 1993 (Lufthansa, 2013).
2According to Barnhart and Cohn (2004) airline schedule planning can be split into schedule design, fleet
assignment, aircraft maintenance routing, and crew scheduling.
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1.2 Research Goals and Methodology
As shown in the examples above, revenue management decisions are related to other also
longer-term planning tasks. This thesis is concerned with decisions related to revenue man-
agement, and their interaction with revenue management. Revenue management considers,
for example, short-term capacity allocation or (dynamic) pricing decisions (e.g. Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b). These short-term revenue management decisions are related to other
planning tasks both short-term and medium-term. Research has focused primarily on rev-
enue management techniques, in particular their refinement, or on modeling customer behav-
ior more realistically. Thus, the basic underlying models are well established. However, the
interaction of short-term revenue management decisions with planning tasks in other decision
hierarchies has not been a focus in literature so far. There are, to the best of our knowledge,
only a few research contributions which investigate coordinated decision making across deci-
sion hierarchies in a revenue management setting. Although the number of contributions in
the field of revenue management has been growing quickly, an extensive framework, which
contains and structures the various planning tasks related to revenue management across
different industries, is still lacking. Current frameworks focus on traditional applications for
standardized services. It is thus the goal of this thesis to contribute to this broader view of
revenue management. In general, the thesis aims to:
• contribute to the body of quantitative models in the field of revenue management,
• generalize the industry-dependent interrelations of planning tasks on different decision
hierarchies in revenue management, and
• contribute to a better understanding of revenue management decision making and its
interrelation with other planning tasks.
In order to achieve these objectives, this thesis centers on particular research questions.
In a first step, we want to achieve a systematic and better understanding of planning tasks
that are interrelated with short-term revenue management decisions.
RQ1: Which planning tasks have an impact on short-term revenue management decisions
across different industries?
Based on an overview of other relevant planning tasks in the context of revenue manage-
ment, we investigate the interrelationships of short-term revenue management decisions with
two other planning tasks in terms of quantitative models. This allows for an analysis of the
firm’s trade-offs when taking two decisions simultaneously, compared to sequential decision
making.
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RQ2: How can other planning hierarchies and tasks be captured in quantitative revenue man-
agement models in order to support coordinated decision making?
RQ3: How do short-term revenue management decisions change when interrelated planning
tasks are considered additionally?
To answer RQ1, we provide an overview of both the quantitative literature on coordinated
decision making in the context of revenue management in different industries, as well as the
literature on existing frameworks, which aim to structure the planning tasks around revenue
management. We also contrast the literature on coordinated decision making in the context
of revenue management with planning frameworks for the different industries from supply
chain management literature. Based on this literature study, we discuss how far the relevant
interrelated planning tasks in the different industries can be generalized and captured in an
industry-independent framework for revenue management.
To answer RQ2 and RQ3, we present two distinct quantitative revenue management
models where the firm accounts for additional longer-term planning tasks. In particular, we
investigate the interaction of revenue management with customer relationship management,
as well as with fencing decisions.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 gives
an overview of literature which combines other planning tasks on different planning hierar-
chies with short-term revenue management decisions. Based on this overview, we develop
a generalized framework of planning tasks across different industries related to short-term
revenue management decisions.
In the following two chapters we investigate the interaction of revenue management de-
cisions with medium-term planning tasks. Chapter 3 deals with the long-term performance
of revenue management and therefore the integration of revenue management and customer
relationship management. Previous empirical research has investigated the way customers
adapt their behavior depending on product availability in previous periods. This kind of
endogenous customer behavior is not yet accounted for in quantitative revenue management
research. We thus present a multi-periodic quantity-based stochastic dynamic programming
approach which incorporates endogenous customer behavior over time. In a first step, we
present the model formulation with general effects on customer demand. Customer behavior
is class-wise aggregated and depends on the firm’s actual allocation decision, as this decision
directly impacts product availability for the respective customer classes. Within the sub-
sequent numerical study, we specify the general demand model. We compare the optimal
allocation strategy with several myopic allocation heuristics. Depending on customer reac-
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tions towards acceptance or rejection, different allocation strategies are shown to be optimal
over time. The value of applying the optimal dynamic allocation strategy relative to simpli-
fying heuristics also depends on these customer characteristics.
Chapter 4 investigates the interaction of revenue management and fencing. Price fences
aim to tailor a firm’s products to the preferences of its customer segments. In particular,
they prevent customers with a high willingness-to-pay from buying lower priced products.
We investigate a single period setting with two customer classes where part of the low-value
demand arises from customers with high willingness-to-pay. The amount of price-driven
demand leakage depends both on the price difference and on the effort a firm puts into de-
signing and controlling the price fences. This effort comes at a cost. We therefore investigate
the trade-off between price-driven demand leakage on the one hand and costs for fencing on
the other hand. We build on a model proposed by Zhang and Bell (2012) for a newsvendor
setting without capacity restrictions. We find that fencing decisions have an impact on the
optimal capacity allocation between the two customer classes, but that this is not the case
vice versa as the fencing decision does not depend on the allocation decision. Taking both
decisions sequentially is therefore optimal. We extend our approach in order to account for
additional stock-out-based demand substitution. Both decisions depend on each other and
firms should take both decisions simultaneously.
Chapter 5 summarizes our findings and provides directions for further research.
5
Chapter 2
Decisions Related to Revenue
Management - An Overview and
Framework
2.1 Introduction
The concept of revenue management originates from service industries such as airlines, hotels
or car rental services (see, e.g., Philips, 2005). Facing (at least in the short term) a fixed
capacity (or supply), revenue management makes use of customer heterogeneity in order
to maximize the firm’s (expected) profit from this capacity. Customers differ with regard
to their willingness-to-pay, their profitability or their preferences. By applying revenue
management techniques, a firm actively manages demand either by protecting capacity for
higher-value customers or through differentiated pricing (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
Nowadays, revenue management is also applied in other industries like such as manu-
facturing, retail or e-fulfillment (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). While the main idea, to
make use of customer heterogeneity, is the same, the approaches differ, for example with
regard to the fixed capacity considered or from where the benefit through revenue manage-
ment actually stems. For airlines (as for hotels or the car rental business), costs are sunk as
variable costs for the actual service are considerably less than the fixed costs for the firm’s
capacity. In these cases, maximizing profit is equivalent to maximizing revenue. This is
not the case in other industries. In manufacturing, customers differ with regard to their
strategic importance. Here, a firm typically focuses on long-term customer relationships
rather than on short-term sales. Moreover, the costs of fulfilling an order are much more
complex to determine, as they additionally depend on the operational production schedule
as well as how the firm fulfills demand. For example, customer requests can be served from
stock or from future available production in make-to-stock settings. In brick-and-mortar
retail, the revenue management approaches applied are price-based. E-fulfillment settings
differ from the traditional revenue management applications in another way. Here, revenue
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management is not only about revenues but also about delivery costs. Applying revenue
management results in cost savings by managing demand for delivery time windows based
on heterogeneous delivery preferences instead of directly increasing revenues (Agatz, 2009).
Accepting or rejecting customer orders is at the core of short-term revenue manage-
ment. Revenue management is therefore typically categorized as an operational planning
task within the sales department of a firm in common supply chain management planning
frameworks (see, e.g., Fleischmann et al., 2008). However, revenue management decisions
depend on other short-term and longer-term planning tasks. Decisions with a longer-term
planning horizon are, for example, those about available capacity, customer segmentation or
product prices. Revenue management decisions either depend on or interact with other plan-
ning tasks (Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). In different industries, different planning tasks are
particularly relevant and affect the firm’s revenue management decisions. The integration
of longer-term planning tasks with short-term revenue management decisions has already
been identified as a research gap by several authors (see, e.g., McGill and van Ryzin, 1999;
Pinchuk, 2002; Barnhart et al., 2003; Sherali et al., 2005).
Several authors have examined the interaction of revenue management with other plan-
ning tasks. Examples are the papers by Sen and Zhang (1999), Zhang et al. (2010) and
Kocabiykoglu et al. (2011). Sen and Zhang (1999) consider coordinated decisions both about
the firm’s capacity and on a protection level. Zhang et al. (2010) investigate coordinated
decisions on fencing and on order quantities for two customer segments. Kocabiykoglu et al.
(2011) investigate coordinated pricing and capacity allocation decisions. Several other pa-
pers have focused on the interaction of revenue management with planning tasks in specific
industries. Barnhart and Cohn (2004) and Barnhart et al. (2009) consider the interaction of
airline scheduling decisions with revenue management. Approaches for make-to-stock man-
ufacturing settings consider optimal capacity allocation and replenishment decisions (see,
e.g., Kleijn and Dekker, 1999; Melchiors et al., 2000; de Ve´ricourt et al., 2002; Deshpande
et al., 2003; Arslan et al., 2007). However, a literature overview focusing on the interaction
of revenue management with other planning tasks across different industries does not yet
exist, to the best of our knowledge. In existing overviews, the focus is instead on specific
revenue management techniques or industries, rather than on the interaction of different
planning tasks.
Frameworks, which structure a firm’s planning tasks and consider revenue management,
are available in two streams of literature: supply chain planning literature and revenue man-
agement literature. Current supply chain planning frameworks aim to give an overview of
the planning tasks in different planning hierarchies. The supply chain planning matrix by
Fleischmann et al. (2008) is one of the state-of-the-art supply chain planning frameworks,
but it focuses strongly on a manufacturing context. Neither the traditional or non-traditional
industries applying revenue management, or the respective relevant planning tasks are there-
fore satisfactorily represented within this framework. In particular, the longer-term planning
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tasks affecting the firm’s short-term revenue management decisions differ among different
industries. Comparable frameworks exist for other supply chain settings such as retail or e-
fulfillment. In the field of revenue management research, several authors present frameworks
accounting for decisions that are strongly related to short-term revenue management. As
well as their relatively narrow perspective on revenue management, they particularly neglect
longer-term and operations-related decisions in most of the cases. Tactical and strategic
planning tasks are considered in few cases, and most of the frameworks focus strongly on
airline applications.
We build on the major drawbacks discussed above. We aim to investigate the currently
available literature on a firm’s decisions related to revenue management and compare these
decisions across different industries. We focus on the interaction of different planning tasks
with revenue management decisions. In order to structure the relevant planning tasks across
industries, we give an overview of current revenue management and supply chain planning
frameworks. This allows a comparison of current frameworks to currently available research
in order to identify research gaps. We also aim to investigate how far it is possible to create
a framework for revenue management and related planning tasks that is applicable across
different industries.
This chapter thus results in the following contributions:
• We give an overview of other planning tasks considered in revenue management liter-
ature. We consider both traditional and non-traditional revenue management applica-
tions and industries and focus on the interaction of short-term revenue management
decisions with other planning tasks, both short-term and longer-term.
• We give an overview of existing frameworks for planning tasks related to revenue
management. They have either a narrow focus on revenue management or are industry-
specific in many cases. Therefore, we compare these frameworks to frameworks from
traditional supply chain management.
• Based on the comparison and consolidation of planning tasks related to revenue man-
agement in different industries, as well as industry-specific supply chain planning frame-
works, we propose a general framework applicable across different industries.
Section 2.2 provides an introduction to revenue management as well as an overview of
alternative formulations of Littlewood’s standard model. The different model formulations
serve as a modeling basis in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. We therefore intention-
ally take a broader perspective in order to provide a conceptual basis for our research. In
Section 2.3 we provide an overview of the available literature, combining short-term revenue
management decisions with other planning tasks. Additionally, Sections 2.4 and 2.5 provide
overviews of already existing frameworks from both revenue management and supply chain
planning literature. All frameworks presented account for revenue management as one of
the firm’s planning tasks. Sections 2.3 - 2.5 build on Speck (2014). Based on the overviews
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in Sections 2.3 - 2.5, we discuss and propose a general revenue management framework,
which structures all the observed integrated decisions across different industries in Section
2.6. In our discussion, we first summarize the main findings from the literature overview.
Then, we contrast the revenue management frameworks with these findings from the lit-
erature overview. This allows to evaluate their strenghts and weaknesses. Afterwards, we
also compare the supply chain planning frameworks with the literature overview in order to
identify potential other planning tasks which might be relevant for revenue management de-
cisions. Based on the previous comparisons, we propose a generalized framework for revenue
management and related planning tasks. Finally, Section 2.7 summarizes our findings.
2.2 Revenue Management
According to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), revenue management refers to ”demand man-
agement decisions as well as the methodologies and systems to make them”. Revenue man-
agement can be thought of as a complement to supply chain management (Talluri and van
Ryzin, 2004b). Essentially, revenue management is based on service differentiation. Thus, a
firm offers its capacity to different customer classes under different terms at different prices in
order to maximize the (expected) profit from its given limited supply (Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004b; Philips, 2005). In different streams of literature, revenue management is alternatively
denoted as yield management, demand management or demand fulfillment.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 can be considered as the origin of revenue manage-
ment applications to date (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). From that time, the major U.S.
American airlines started to offer part of their capacity at very low prices, based on the fact
that the marginal costs incurred for a seat are almost equal to zero. However, the airlines
had to ensure that customers with high willingness-to-pay did not request the low-priced
seats. Therefore, they introduced a combination of fare restrictions and capacity allocations
(Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b; Philips, 2005; Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). Traditionally,
the main applications of revenue management are in the airline and hotel industry, but
the general idea has been transferred to several other industries. Examples include appli-
cations in make-to-stock and make-to-order manufacturing, retail, and e-fulfillment. These
non-traditional applications differ to some extent from traditional airline applications.
Several authors provide indications regarding the impact of introducing revenue manage-
ment on a firm’s profit. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) estimate that revenues increase by
4 - 5% by applying revenue management. Klein and Steinhardt (2008) report on benefits
around 2 - 5% for traditional passenger airlines (see also Hanks et al., 1992; Smith et al.,
1992). Friend and Walker (2001) note that retailers may achieve a 5 - 15% increase in
gross margins from assortment and pricing optimization. Based on two consultancy studies,
Philips (2005) shows the high leverage of pricing in improving a firm’s profitability compared
to improvements affecting the firm’s variable or fixed costs. Pricing is often the ”area that
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can be improved the most with the least investment” (Philips, 2005).
The following business conditions are considered the main drivers for the applicability of
revenue management (for extensive overviews see e.g. Kimes, 1989; Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004b; Philips, 2005; Klein and Steinhardt, 2008):
• Customer heterogeneity
Due to customer heterogeneity, a firm can segment its customers and offer relatively
standardized products at different prices to the customer classes. If customers do not
exhibit different willingness-to-pay for (basically) the same product or service, the firm
cannot benefit from price or service differentiation and thus revenue management.
• Demand uncertainty
With increasing demand uncertainty, the benefit of sophisticated demand management
decisions increases as the risk to make bad decisions increases.
• Production inflexibility
When facing relatively fixed and inflexible capacities, different customer segments with
different willingness-to-pay compete for this capacity. A firm can then benefit from
deciding about the availability of the capacity for the different customer segments.
This is not the case if capacities are flexible. In this case, a firm can easily increase
its capacity (or supply) in order to meet, for example, higher than expected demand.
The fact that services cannot be stored adds additional complexity and inflexibility.
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) additionally list other conditions such as the availability of
data systems or the appropriate management culture. These conditions are supportive and
focus less on the products offered or the customer interface.
Literature differs with regard to revenue management techniques depending on a firm’s
decision variables. A firm either decides on allocations for the different customer segments
or dynamically adjusts prices. Which of these techniques is applied essentially depends on
the extent to which the firm is able to use it in order to manage demand. The applica-
tion of the different techniques varies across and within industries (Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004b). The different approaches can be clustered into two streams according to Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004b): Quantity-based and price-based revenue management. Quantity-
based revenue management comprises single-resource and network capacity control as well
as overbooking, while dynamic pricing and auctions are referred to as price-based revenue
management. Figure 2.1 summarizes the different approaches. The different revenue man-
agement techniques are briefly introduced below as they form the theoretical basis of the
chapters in the remainder of this thesis.
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Quantity-based  
revenue management 
Price-based  
revenue management 
Revenue management 
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Single-ressource 
capacity control 
Overbooking Dynamic pricing Auctions 
Figure 2.1: Classification of revenue management techniques (according to Talluri and van
Ryzin, 2004b)
2.2.1 Quantity-Based Revenue Management
By making use of quantity-based approaches, the firm differentiates the availability of the
product (or service) across different customer classes (see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b;
Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). The price for each product is predetermined and constant
within the booking horizon. The firm allocates total available capacity to the different prod-
ucts and thus to the customer classes. If customers always attend, the allocation planning
problems can be further sub-divided into single-resource and network revenue management
problems. The approaches differ with regard to the number of resources considered as well
as their relationship to each other. If customers exhibit a significant probability of not
attending, the firm typically overbooks its capacity in order to increase its utilization.
2.2.1.1 Single-Resource Capacity Control
Single-resource capacity control aims to manage demand for a single resource by optimally
allocating this resource to different customer classes in order to maximize the firm’s profit. In
reality, products consist of multiple resources in most of the cases, however complex problems
for multiple resources are frequently solved as a collection of single-resource problems in
practice due to their lower complexity (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
The availability of capacity to different customer classes is managed by different types
of controls. In literature, booking limits, protection levels and bid prices are distinguished
(see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Booking limits restrict the maximum amount of
capacity available for a particular customer class at a certain time. Protection levels specify
the amount of capacity protected for a particular customer class. Both types of controls can
be partitioned or nested. Under partitioned allocations, the amount of capacity protected
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is dedicated to a particular customer class only.1 Under nested allocations, lower-value
products are also available to higher-value customer classes in case they are not entirely sold
to the lower-value customers. Bid prices are threshold prices such that a request is accepted
if its revenue exceeds the bid price and rejected otherwise.
As for the single-resource capacity control problem, the earliest model is due to Littlewood
(1972). The models in Chapter 3 and 4 build on this model. We therefore present different
model formulations and much of the notation used in these two chapters, in the remainder
of this section. First, we introduce Littlewood’s model for nested allocations as a stochas-
tic dynamic programming model, an equivalent closed-form static optimization model, and
an approach based on marginal analysis. Secondly, we introduce Littlewood’s model for
partitioned allocations. Here, we focus on the closed-form static model formulation.
Littlewood’s model constitutes a well-known approach to managing a single resource
with given capacity C (Littlewood, 1972; Belobaba, 1987b; Curry, 1990) for a single booking
period. Two customer classes i (i = 1, 2) are considered. Customer demand Di is stochastic
with pdf fi and cdf Fi. Customer orders arrive in a low-before-high order, that is the lower-
value Class 2 demand arrives prior to the higher-value Class 1 demand (see e.g. Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b). Protecting a particular amount of capacity for the higher-value customers
ensures that the capacity is not depleted due to high low-value demand. The demands of
the two customer classes are assumed to be independent random variables. The prices pi are
exogenously given and p1 > p2 holds by assumption. Thus, Class 1 customers are strictly
more valuable to the firm than the lower class customers. Customers demand single units of
capacity and orders cannot be canceled.
Littlewood’s model can be formulated in terms of a stochastic dynamic programming
model as shown, for example, by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) for the general case of n
customer classes. The demand realization di of a particular customer class i is assumed to be
known at the beginning of each stage, while the available remaining capacity C˜ denotes the
state in each stage. Thus, the stages correspond to the different customer classes. In each
stage, the firm decides about how many customer requests to accept (denoted as acci) from
the number of requests di. Given the remaining capacity after deciding on acci, the demand
of the next more profitable customer class i− 1 is realized. Based on this general setting for
n > 2, the stochastic dynamic programming approach for the case of two customer classes
can be derived as a special case. Let Vi denote the value function at the beginning of Stage
i. Once Class 2 demand has realized, the firm decides how many of the requests to accept
out of d2 requests. The firm’s optimal decision follows from
max
0≤acc2≤d2
p2 · acc2 + V1(C − acc2). (2.2.1)
C − acc2 is the remaining capacity for the higher-value customer class. The value function
1Partitioned allocations are alternatively denoted as distinct allocations (see, e.g., Belobaba, 1987a).
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entering Stage 2, V2(C), is then the expected value of this optimization with respect to D2.
Thus, the Bellman equation reads as
V2(C) = E[ max
0≤acc2≤d2
p2 · acc2 + V1(C − acc2)]. (2.2.2)
The optimal policy is obtained by backward induction starting with the lower-value Class
2 demand as there is only a single stage in the two-class model. The optimal policy is to
protect a particular amount of the total available capacity for the higher-value customer
class. Thus, a booking limit policy is optimal. In the remainder, y denotes the protection
level for the higher-value customers. A maximum amount of C − y units of capacity is then
available for the less profitable Class 2 customers. C − y denotes the booking limit. Once
the booking limit is depleted, all further Class 2 requests are rejected. The firm’s optimal
allocation policy can be implemented at the beginning of the planning horizon and prior to
any demand realizations as the protection level is independent of actual demand realizations.
The optimal protection level is nested.
As a static protection level policy is optimal, Littlewood’s model can equivalently be
formulated in terms of a static optimization problem where the firm decides about y given
both demand distributions. According to the stochastic dynamic programming approach, a
nested protection level is the optimal allocation policy. In this case, the firm’s optimization
problem reads as (see, e.g., Williamson, 1992; Philips, 2005; Kocabiykoglu et al., 2011)
max
0≤y≤C
E[pi(y)] = max
0≤y≤C
p1 · E[min (C −min (C − y,D2), D1)] + p2 · E[min (C − y,D2)].
(2.2.3)
Differentiating the expected profit with regard to y yields
dE[pi(y)]
dy
= p1 · E[Iq1>y,q2>C−y]− p2 · E[Iq2>C−y]
= p1 · P(q1 > y, q2 > C − y)− p2 · P(q2 > C − y)
= p1 · P(q1 > y) · P(q2 > C − y)− p2 · P(q2 > C − y)
= P(q2 > C − y) · (p1 · P(q1 > y)− p2)
= (1− F2(C − y)) · (p1 · (1− F1(y))− p2). (2.2.4)
The second order derivative reads as
d2E[pi(y)]
d2y
= f2(C − y) · (p1 · P(q1 > y)− p2)− p1 · (1− F2(C − y)) · f1(y). (2.2.5)
As d
2E[pi(y)]
d2y
< 0 does not necessarily hold, the expected profit function for a nested
protection level is not necessarily strictly concave in y, however it is strictly concave under
certain conditions. Let hi =
fi
1−Fi denote the hazard rate of the demand distribution of class
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i. The expected profit function is strictly concave in y, if h2(C − y) < h1(y) holds ∀y. If
customer demands follow a Poisson distribution this condition holds if E[D1] < E[D2].
Although the expected profit function is not strictly concave in general, the optimal nested
protection level is unique as the expected profit function is unimodal in y. The following
holds:
dE[pi(y)]
dy

> 0, if y < y˜,
= 0, if y = y˜,
< 0, if y > y˜.
(2.2.6)
For y < y˜, marginally increasing the protection level also marginally increases the expected
profit. For y > y˜, any further increase in the protection level results in a marginally de-
creasing expected profit. Thus, the protection level resulting from the first order condition
is the unique optimal solution which maximizes the firm’s expected profit. A unique optimal
nested protection level exists. The first order condition is necessary and sufficient.
Setting the first order derivative equal to zero yields
(1− F2(C − y)) · (p1 · (1− F1(y))− p2) = 0 (2.2.7)
as the first order optimality condition for the nested protection level. Solving the first order
optimality condition for y results in
F1(y
LW
nested) = 1−
p2
p1
⇔ yLWnested = F−11 (1−
p2
p1
) (2.2.8)
which is known as Littlewood’s rule and gives a closed-form expression for the optimal nested
protection level yLWnested in a single booking period. The firm’s optimal allocation policy is to
protect min(yLWnested, C) units of capacity for the higher-value customer class.
Alternatively, the optimal allocation policy can be obtained through a marginal analysis
(see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b; Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). Facing a Class 2
request assuming that the firm has still yˆ units of capacity left, the firm has to decide
whether to accept or reject this request. The underlying trade-off is illustrated in Figure
2.2. If the firm rejects the request, this particular unit of capacity is still available for Class
1 later in the booking period. In this case, the firm’s marginal expected revenue equals
p1 ·P(D1 ≥ yˆ) + 0 ·P(D1 < yˆ) = p1 · (1−F1(yˆ)). If the firm accepts the Class 2 request, this
particular unit of capacity is not available for Class 1 but the firm definitely earns p2. The
optimal protection level, yLWnested, results from equating the expected marginal revenues from
both alternatives.
Littlewood’s model can also be formulated for partitioned allocations. For partitioned
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Figure 2.2: Littlewood’s model: marginal analysis (adapted from Klein and Steinhardt,
2008)
allocations, the firm’s static optimization problem reads as
max
0≤y≤C
E[pi(y)] = max
0≤y≤C
p1 · E[min(y,D1)] + p2 · E[min (C − y,D2)]. (2.2.9)
The objective function differs from the objective function under a nested protection level
with regard to the Class 1 revenue. Under partitioned allocations, no capacity that is initially
reserved for Class 2 customers is available to Class 1 customers.
Differentiating E[pi(y)] with regard to y yields
dE[pi(y)]
dy
= p1 · E[Iq1>y]− p2 · E[Iq2>C−y]
= p1 · P(q1 > y)− p2 · P(q2 > C − y) (2.2.10)
as the first order derivative. The second order derivative results in
d2E[pi(y)]
d2y
= −p1 · f1(y)− p2 · f2(C − y). (2.2.11)
As d
2E[pi(y)]
d2y
< 0 holds independent of the choice of y, the expected profit function is strictly
concave in y. Thus, a unique optimal partitioned protection level exists. The first order
optimality condition is therefore necessary and sufficient for optimality.
Setting the first order derivative equal to zero yields
p1 · (1− F1(y)) = p2 · (1− F2(C − y)) (2.2.12)
as the first order optimality condition for the partitioned protection level. The optimal
protection level yLWpart is the solution to this optimality condition. In contrast to the nested
protection level, yLWpart cannot be represented as an explicit solution. The firm’s optimal
allocation policy is to protect min(yLWpart, C) units of capacity for the higher-value customer
class.
When comparing both protection levels, it is intuitive that a nested protection level is
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the optimal allocation policy in the sense that it always performs at least as well as a
partitioned protection level. Comparing the optimality conditions for both the nested and
the partitioned protection level means that the partitioned protection level is always greater
than the nested protection level for given customer demand distributions. This is due to the
higher underage costs in case of a partitioned protection level. While Class 1 customers may
be served from unsold units of the booking limit under nested allocations, this is not the
case under partitioned allocations. Unsold units of capacity that were previously protected
for the lower-value customer class are therefore lost for the firm. Despite its sub-optimality,
the partitioned protection level is frequently applied in practice (Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004b). It is also frequently used in literature as an approximation due to the properties
of the underlying optimization problem discussed above (see, e.g., Weatherford, 1997). The
strict concavity property also simplifies the analysis for extensions of the standard model.
Despite its simplifying assumptions, Littlewood’s model has been widely applied in rev-
enue management research (see, e.g., Pfeifer (1989), Brumelle et al. (1990), Belobaba and
Weatherford (1996), Weatherford (1997), Kocabiykoglu et al. (2011)). Several extensions of
Littlewood’s model exist in the literature. Belobaba (1987b) provides an extension to mul-
tiple customer classes resulting in the well-known expected-marginal-seat-revenue heuristic.
Weatherford (1997) presents an approach to coordinated pricing and allocation decisions
based on Littlewood’s model. Building on the work of Weatherford (1997), Kocabiykoglu
et al. (2011) further investigate the coordination of pricing and capacity allocation.
2.2.1.2 Network Capacity Control
Network capacity control approaches aim to manage demand for multiple resources (Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004b). In the airline example, network revenue management aims to manage
multi-leg flights (see, e.g., Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). Thus, a product2 consists of a bundle
of resources from a particular origin to a specific destination. If resources are available for
different products, the resources are interdependent as the lack of availability of a particular
resource limits sales of other products (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
Accounting for these interdependencies creates additional value for the firm as opposed
to neglecting them. Boyd and Bilegan (2003) report 2% additional revenues when applying
network revenue management techniques instead of single-resource techniques. However, ac-
cording to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), implementing network revenue management poses
significant implementation and methodological challenges for firms in different areas. Exact
optimization in particular is significantly more complex and impossible for practical purposes
compared to single-resource capacity control, where several exact optimization methods ex-
ist. Approximations such as deterministic and randomised linear programming have been
proposed (for overviews see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b; Klein and Steinhardt, 2008)
2Denoted as an origin-destination itinerary fare class combination (according to Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004b).
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in order to solve network revenue management problems efficiently.
2.2.1.3 Overbooking
If there is a considerable probability that customers will not show up, it makes sense for a firm
to overbook its capacity in order to increase the resulting load factor and not lose revenue (e.g.
Kasilingam, 1997b). While capacity allocation is essentially aimed at achieving the optimal
demand mix, overbooking is concerned with increasing a firm’s capacity utilization (Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004b). Overbooking also comes at costs that might arise from denying
passengers what they have paid for: on the one hand costs due to passenger compensation,
and on the other hand the potential loss of goodwill (see, e.g., Wangenheim and Bayo´n, 2007).
Approaches to the area of overbooking can be clustered into static and dynamic models.
Static models can be grouped into service-based and cost-based approaches, depending on
which data is available (for details see Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b; Philips, 2005; Klein
and Steinhardt, 2008).
Both Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) as well as Klein and Steinhardt (2008) provide ex-
tensive overviews on overbooking approaches under different assumptions as well as sev-
eral extensions of the basic models. An early (airline) overbooking approach is presented
by Rothenstein (1971). Specific approaches for overbooking in air cargo can be found in
Kasilingam (1997a) and Kasilingam (1997b). Liberman and Yechiali (1978) extend early
airline overbooking approaches and apply them to hotel settings.
2.2.2 Price-Based Revenue Management
When applying price-based revenue management approaches, firms vary prices dynamically
over time and the total remaining capacity is typically available to all customers. Price-based
approaches include dynamic pricing as well as auctions.
2.2.2.1 Dynamic Pricing
In contrast to quantity-based methods, demand is managed by varying prices over time
when applying price-based revenue management. Firms in certain industries apply price-
based revenue management techniques as they are easier to manage in response to changing
market conditions. For dynamic pricing applications, customer demand is explicitly modeled
as a price-dependent process (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Examples include markdown
pricing, discount pricing and price promotions (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). For a review,
we refer to Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003). Dynamic pricing has been successfully
applied both in settings with a fixed capacity (e.g., when stocks cannot be replenished) and
in settings where capacity is replenished frequently. Their review builds on that by Bitran
and Caldentey (2002), who focus primarily on fixed capacities.
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2.2.2.2 Auctions
While firms decide about the price for a particular product/service at a particular point in
time when applying dynamic pricing techniques, auctions work the other way around (Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004b). Customers offer a price they are willing to pay and a firm decides
which bid(s) to accept. In contrast to dynamic pricing, where a firm must somehow estimate
the customers’ demand, auctions allow each customer’s individual willingness-to-pay to be
uncovered virtually directly. Several types of auctions exist (for an overview see, e.g., Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004b; Webster, 2009), which are typically applied in different markets. As
auctions constitute competitive games, where multiple players compete with each other, they
are typically modeled by means of game-theoretic approaches (Webster, 2009).
2.3 Coordination of Revenue Management with Re-
lated Planning Tasks - A Review
In this section, we review literature on models which investigates the interaction of rev-
enue management decisions with other short-term or longer-term planning tasks. We fo-
cus on four industries, where revenue management is currently applied: service industries,
manufacturing, retail, and e-fulfillment. These four industries mirror both traditional and
non-traditional applications of revenue management. Moreover, this choice also mirrors the
different revenue management approaches: quantity-based revenue management is preva-
lent in the first two industries while price-based revenue management is prevalent in retail
settings. In e-fulfillment settings, both approaches are applied.
We categorize planning tasks as operations-related or marketing-related, depending on
whether they determine the firms available capacity or whether they are located at the cus-
tomer interface directly. Doing so mirrors the general objective in supply chain management:
to match supply with demand (Chopra and Meindl, 2010). In the literature overview, we
consider papers which investigate the interrelationship of revenue management with some
other planning task. In most of the papers considered, a firm takes two (interrelated) de-
cisions: A (quantity- or price-based) revenue management decision in combination with
another operations- or marketing-related decision. We also consider papers where one of
these decisions is not an explicite decision variable but is considered through approxima-
tions. This is, for example, the case in papers which consider interrelated decisions with
very different time horizons. Which of the two decisions is approximated depends on the
focus of the respective paper.
In addition to industry-specific planning tasks, forecasting and customer relationship
management are two additional industry-independent areas of planning. Forecasts are a
crucial prerequisite for many managerial decisions including revenue management decisions.
This is true independent of the industry considered. Customer relationship management
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aims to establish long-term customer relationships. This view has been prevalent in many
industries, too.
2.3.1 Quantity-Based Revenue Management for Service Indus-
tries
Quantity-based revenue management is prevalent in traditional service industries such as
airlines or hotels (see Section 2.2). Operations-related decisions considered in literature in
combination with revenue management include flight schedules, fleet assignment, available
capacity, and dynamic capacity management. Marketing-related planning tasks refer to de-
cisions on customer segmentation and fencing, prices, and the overbooking level. Approaches
differ with regard to their focus on specific applications. Traditionally, most of the literature
refer to airlines. Hotel or car-rental applications are less frequent.
2.3.1.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks
Scheduling and Fleet Assignment
In their schedule design, airlines decide which markets to serve with what frequency and
how to schedule flights to meet these frequencies (Barnhart and Cohn, 2004). Schedule
design starts around 12 months prior to the schedule’s operation and typically consists of
two steps. First, the appropriate frequencies is determined for each market. Timetables
are then developed (Lohatepanont and Barnhart, 2004). In the next step, fleet assignment
aims for the profit-maximizing assignment of a limited number of aircraft to the serviced
flight legs subject to various operational constraints (Jacobs et al., 2012). Fleet assignments
determine the available capacity on a particular flight as the basis for short-term revenue
management.
In their overview, Barnhart and Cohn (2004) additionally consider aircraft maintenance
routing and crew scheduling (see also Lohatepanont and Barnhart, 2004). These planning
tasks differ with regard to their time horizons and are interdependent. However, according
to Barnhart and Cohn (2004), an integrated model is intractable, therefore the planning de-
cisions are taken sequentially. Lohatepanont (2001) and Lohatepanont and Barnhart (2004)
investigate simultaneous decisions about schedule design and fleet assignment. Lohatepanont
and Barnhart (2004) find significant benefits compared to a sequential approach. In these
approaches, revenue management decisions are not explicitly considered but revenues are
estimated.
Schedule design and fleet assignment decisions are typically taken based on average fares
and average unconstrained demands per leg (Barnhart and Cohn, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2012).
Average fares and demands depend on the schedule offered and vice versa (Barnhart and
Cohn, 2004). Moreover, revenue management and its effects on both the fares and customer
demands are neglected (Barnhart and Cohn, 2004; Barnhart et al., 2009). Barnhart et al.
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(2009) allow for a wide class of revenue functions. Again, the firm only makes assignment
decisions while revenue management decisions are approximated by revenue functions.
Farkas (1996) investigates the impact of network effects and revenue management on cus-
tomer spill and the resulting costs in both a sequential and a simultaneous approach for
coordinated revenue management and fleet assignment. The fleet assignments in the simul-
taneous approach differ substantially from the fleet assignments in the sequential approach.
Kniker (1998) and Barnhart et al. (2002) build on the simultaneous approach of Farkas
(1996). They additionally account for passenger recapture. Kniker (1998) shows that op-
timal sequential fleet assignment decisions are also optimal in the simultaneous approach
under certain conditions. Dumas and Soumis (2008) present a stochastic extension of the
approaches by Kniker (1998) and Barnhart et al. (2002). Jacobs et al. (2008) integrate linear
approximations of the total revenue into the fleet assignment problem. Jacobs et al. (1999)
and Smith (2004) propose a different approach. Jacobs et al. (1999) embed a bid price
model into a fleet assignment model. Sandhu and Klabjan (2006) investigate an extension of
the bid-price approaches of Jacobs et al. (1999) and Smith (2004) by accounting for passen-
ger and cargo demand. The benefit from taking both decisions simultaneously is substantial.
(Medium-Term) Capacity Planning
The approaches to medium-term capacity planning are similar to the fleet assignment ap-
proaches discussed above, but they do not explicitly involve airline settings. Carroll and
Grimes (1995) consider the system-wise integration of longer-term capacity planning and
short-term revenue management. They describe the revenue management system at the car
rental company Hertz and its links to other information and decision support systems. They
stress the importance of accounting for potential interdependencies. Sen and Zhang (1999)
analytically investigate simultaneous decisions on the protection level and the initial capac-
ity based on Littlewood’s model. Taking both decisions simultaneously yields a significantly
higher expected profit compared to a sequential approach.
Dynamic Capacity Management
Where fleet assignment approaches assign capacity to legs on a medium-term basis, dynamic
capacity management approaches consider very short-term capacity reassignments. Supply
can be better matched with demand by making use of short-term demand information. Ex-
amples include same-day aircraft swaps. These decisions may be even more short-term than
actual allocation decisions. According to Peterson (1986), forecasting and the introduction
of aircraft families are crucial for short-term capacity reassignments.
Berge and Hopperstad (1993) investigate dynamic reassignments by means of simulation.
Forecasts are updated based on realized bookings. The benefit of dynamically reassigning
capacities is significant, at 1% - 5% of additional profit. Revenue management is consid-
ered in the forecasting step as, for example, boardings that are denied depend on revenue
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management. Pilla et al. (2008) and Pilla et al. (2012) investigate a two-stage approach and
approximate the expected revenues by means of multivariate adaptive regression but do not
explicitly model revenue management.
Sherali et al. (2005) consider a deterministic mixed-integer programming model for dy-
namic reassignments within an aircraft family. They do not explicitly consider different
customer classes but an aggregate customer acceptance decision.
Frank et al. (2006) simulate fleet assignment decisions and booking control decisions as
well as their interdependencies. Booking control decisions are taken by means of standard
quantity-based single-leg methods. Both the resulting revenues and the resulting load factors
increase the closer reassignments are allowed prior to departure.
In contrast to the previous approaches, de Boer (2003) integrates the effects of dynamic
capacity management into a revenue management model. She proposes modifications of the
closed-form expressions for the optimal booking limits based on Littlewood’s model. She
develops a heuristic, which accounts for future capacity changes. The heuristic outperforms
traditional expected-marginal-seat-revenue heuristics by up to 1%. Similarly, Bish et al.
(2011) determine booking limits under the possibility of swapping aircrafts. Based on two
flights, which can potentially be swapped, they derive a heuristic booking limit.
2.3.1.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks
Literature on the interaction of revenue management with marketing-related planning tasks
in service industries can be categorized into three streams: coordination of customer seg-
mentation and fencing with allocation planning, coordinated pricing and allocation planning,
and coordinated overbooking and allocation planning. These decisions are typically taken
by the marketing department because they hold the necessary knowledge about the firm’s
customers. Moreover, these decisions are highly interdependent (see, e.g., Cizaire, 2011).
Typically, customer segments are determined on a longer-term basis compared to prices and
fences, which are typically made based on the customer segmentation in place. Pricing and
fencing decisions are made on a longer-term basis compared to the quantity-based revenue
management decisions.
Customer Segmentation and Fencing
De Boer (2003) investigates the effects of imperfect customer segmentation in a setting
where customers always request the lowest available fare. A nested booking limit policy
is not necessarily optimal in contrast to a setting with perfect segmentation. If a nested
policy is not optimal, prices are either too low or the products are not sufficiently restricted.
Ignoring imperfect segmentation results in significant revenue loss.
Based on the firm’s customer segmentation, fences are imposed in order to mitigate price-
driven demand leakage (Philips, 2005; Zhang and Bell, 2012). Belobaba and Weatherford
(1996) determine optimal booking limits under exogenous customer buy-up behavior. Fiig
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et al. (2010) observe that fares in practice are becoming less restrictive, therefore they propose
to consider demand leakage directly when determining the booking limits.
Zhang and Bell (2007) explicitly consider price-driven demand leakage as well as the costs
to mitigate it. They derive the optimal prices as well as the order quantities analytically in a
two-class newsvendor setting. A sequential approach which determines the order quantities
prior to the prices performs close to optimal. Zhang et al. (2010) extend this approach by
accounting for optimal fences under lost sales. Kim and Bell (2011) extend this approach
by explicitly accounting for asymmetrical demand leakage. In both approaches, optimal
demand leakage and order quantities are independent.
Raza (2014) determines the firm’s optimal price differentiation strategy (in terms of
threshold values for the segments willingness-to-pay), the optimal prices and capacity al-
locations when facing price-driven demand leakage. Similarly to Zhang and Bell (2007), he
finds that a sequential approach yields good results.
Pricing
The literature stream on coordinated pricing and capacity allocation dates back to the
work of Weatherford (1997). The need to consider the effects of prices on customer demands
and thus on booking limits has been widely recognized (see also de Boer, 2003). All ap-
proaches consider quantity-based revenue management and in most cases do not focus on a
specific industry but are motivated by service-related problems. We therefore consider these
approaches in this section, although they could also be applied in other industries.
Weatherford (1997) analytically investigates joint pricing and capacity allocation based on
Littlewood’s model and extensions. He finds optimality gaps of around 3% - 5% compared to
sequential decisions. Feng and Xiao (2006) investigate a stochastic dynamic programming
approach where the firm decides on which customer classes to open at which price. The
optimal policy is a threshold policy based on minimum acceptable prices. Kocabiykoglu
et al. (2011) build on the approach of Weatherford (1997). They investigate the impact of
the properties of demand models on the benefit from taking both decisions simultaneously.
De Boer (2003) investigates simultaneous pricing and capacity allocations in networks in
both a single-period and a multi-period approach. She provides the optimality conditions as
well as conditions for concavity for a single period. Numerically, she determines substantial
benefits of up to 21.4% compared to the optimal benchmark pricing policy.
Kuyumcu and Popescu (2006) show that the simultaneous pricing and allocation problem
boils down to a pure pricing problem if demand is deterministic and standard regularity
assumptions on demand hold. Cizaire (2011) considers a multi-period joint pricing and
allocation problem for multiple products. She confirms the results of Kuyumcu and Popescu
(2006) with regard to deterministic demand. For stochastic demand, her approach yields
a benefit of up to 6% compared to the deterministic case and up to 7% compared to a
sequential approach. For multi-class problems, she develops several heuristics, which lead to
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better results than the optimal policy for deterministic demand.
Jacobs et al. (2010) evaluate the fit between an airline’s pricing strategy and its short-
term allocation policy. The proposed metric captures the trade-off between the allocated
capacity and the optimal price: if allocations for a customer class are too low, the price is
too high. The firm might then have to reject profitable customer requests.
In contrast to the previous approaches, Pinder (2004) investigates optimal prices and
capacity allocations in a two-class project management setting. Weber et al. (2003) con-
sider joint pricing and capacity allocations from a system perspective by analyzing the links
between a firm’s pricing system and its revenue management system. The authors propose
real-integrated systems in order to ensure good decisions.
Overbooking Level
Subramanian et al. (1999) and Gosavi and Das (2002) consider simultaneous decisions about
overbooking levels and booking limits. Gosavi and Das (2002) build on the single-leg stan-
dard model and allow for overbooking. Costs for bumping passengers due to overbooking
and customer cancellations are considered. Their approach outperforms the widely applied
standard nested expected-marginal-seat-revenue heuristics.
Ringbom and Shy (2002) investigate a two-class problem with an adjustable curtain be-
tween higher-value and lower-value passengers. The curtain can be adjusted until shortly
before departure. Boarding can be denied to lower-value passengers while higher-value pas-
sengers are guaranteed boarding. The authors determine the firm’s optimal allocation policy.
2.3.2 Quantity-Based Revenue Management in Manufacturing
Quantity-based revenue management is also applied in manufacturing. Harris and Pinder
(1995), Rehkopf and Spengler (2005) and Spengler et al. (2006) apply revenue manage-
ment in make-to-order manufacturing. Quante et al. (2009) consider revenue management
in a make-to-stock setting. Operations-related decisions consider decisions on production
or replenishment quantities and decisions on the production schedule. Marketing-related
decisions specifically related to a manufacturing context involve customer segmentation and
pricing.
2.3.2.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks
Decisions about available capacity are taken at different hierarchical levels. By determining
production schedules, firms also decide on their available capacity on a short-term basis.
Production / Replenishment Quantities
The stream on coordinated revenue management and production / replenishment decisions
is a large stream of literature, which is denoted as inventory rationing in literature (Quante
et al., 2009).
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Ha (1997a) extends the lost-sales setting of Ha (1997b) and investigates a two-class make-
to-stock setting where the firm decides on the production quantity and on the demand to
be fulfilled from each customer class in each period. If demand is not fulfilled from available
stock, it is backordered. Customers differ with regard to their costs for waiting. The optimal
policy is characterized by two parameters: a production base-stock level and a rationing level.
De Ve´ricourt et al. (2002) extend the approach to N customer classes.
Carr and Duenyas (2000) consider a two-class setting where the firm decides on order
acceptance, production quantities and on the fraction of capacity to reserve for customers
with long-term contracts. Their orders must be fulfilled and are produced on a make-to-stock
basis. Short-term Class 2 orders are more profitable than Class 1 orders and are produced on
a make-to-order basis. The benefit of considering both the order acceptance and production
decisions simultaneously is substantial. Iravani et al. (2012) build on the approach of Carr
and Duenyas (2000), however they assume full backordering of Class 1 requests instead of
lost sales. Simultaneous decisions result in an average profit increase of 8% compared to a
simple base-stock policy.
Benjaafar and El Hafsi (2006) consider the optimal production and inventory control of an
assemble-to-order production system under lost sales. The firm decides on the production
of components for the single end-product and whether customer orders are fulfilled from
on-hand inventory. The optimal policy is a base-stock production policy, as in the approach
by Ha (1997a). The optimal allocation is a rationing policy with different rationing levels
for the different customer classes. Highest-value Class 1 orders are always fulfilled if enough
on-hand inventory is available. A stationary base-stock level policy performs fairly well
compared to the optimal dynamic policy. ElHafsi (2009) builds on the approach of Benjaafar
and El Hafsi (2006) by accounting for multiple non-unitary demand classes. Cheng et al.
(2011) additionally consider failure-prone machines. Benjaafar et al. (2010) build on the
work of Ha (1997a) and Benjaafar and El Hafsi (2006) by accounting for both backorders
and lost sales. The two customer classes differ with regard to backordering and rejection
costs. An order can be fulfilled from stock, can be backordered or rejected.
Defregger and Kuhn (2007) investigate a make-to-order setting with a limited inventory
capacity. In each period, the firm decides on whether to accept or reject a potential incoming
order and on replenishments. The proposed heuristic prefers orders with a high profitability
in relation to the necessary capacity to fulfill it. The heuristic outperforms a first-come-first-
served policy by 2% - 4%. The optimal policy yields an additional average reward of 0% -
1% compared to the heuristic.
Production Scheduling
Compared to most of the service settings, a firm is relatively flexible with regard to its
available capacity in the short term in manufacturing settings. This is particularly relevant
in make-to-order settings, where the firm still has scheduling flexibility. Typically, a firm
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considers the order’s profitability, its capacity consumption and the operational feasibility
to schedule it in the current production schedule, such that the request can be fulfilled at a
certain point in time (see, e.g., Huang et al., 2011).
Two literature streams can be distinguished, which both deal with scheduling and order
acceptance decisions: in the first stream, the firm decides on order scheduling and due date
quoting to customers. In order to make a decision about order acceptance and to quote a
reliable due date, the firm must account for the importance of the customer as well as the
utilization of the production system. Scheduling and due date quoting are thus interrelated.
A second stream investigates coordinated order acceptance and order scheduling decisions.
Overviews of simultaneous order scheduling and due date quoting decisions are provided
by Keskinocak and Tayur (2004) and Slotnick (2011). Kolisch (2001) provides an overview
of order acceptance, due date quoting and scheduling in make-to-order manufacturing.
Duenyas (1995) was among the first to consider simultaneous decisions on order scheduling
and due date quoting. Customers differ with regard to their willingness-to-pay and their lead
time preferences. Due to equal processing times and equal tardiness costs across all orders,
scheduling according to the earliest due date is optimal.
Keskinocak et al. (2001) consider joint scheduling and due date quoting in a two-class set-
ting. One of the customer classes prefers a faster lead time and exhibits a higher willingness-
to-pay. They consider both immediate and delayed quotation and compare different heuris-
tics. Immediate quotation is closest to revenue management as the acceptance decision is
solely based on expectations about the profitability of future orders. Plambeck (2002) con-
siders a similar problem, however, all customer orders are accepted. As in Keskinocak et al.
(2001), customers differ with regard to their willingness-to-pay and the urgency of their or-
ders. Urgent customers are served immediately, but they pay a premium for the fast service.
Lead times quoted to the lower-value customers are proportional to queue length, including
an adjustment which accounts for the probability of an urgent order.
In contrast to Duenyas (1995), in the approach of Jalora (2006) the firm incurs holding
costs. The firm trades-off capacity utilization and holding costs. According to Jalora (2006),
an order is accepted if its opportunity cost of scheduling is smaller than its profit. The order
is produced in the period with the minimum opportunity cost of scheduling. The expected
profit increases by up to 34% compared to a first-come-first-served policy.
Guhlich et al. (2014) consider simultaneous decisions on order acceptance and due date
quoting while simultaneously considering the production schedule. In contrast to the pre-
vious approaches, both the intermediate materials and the assembly capacity are limited.
Decisions are taken online, based on a bid-price approach.
Maglaras (2006) investigates a dynamic pricing approach. The firm simultaneously de-
cides on prices and the production sequence. It is optimal to schedule orders according
to a greedy policy which minimizes holding costs. The scheduling decision is shown to be
independent of the dynamic pricing strategy and vice versa.
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2.3.2.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks
Customer Segmentation
Meyr (2008) investigates the interaction of customer segmentation and capacity allocation
based on real-world data. Customer segments are determined based on customer profitabil-
ity. Capacity allocations are determined for a varying number of customer segments following
the approach of Meyr (2009). The expected profit increases with the number of customer
segments while the marginal value of additional customer segments decreases. The model
already yields good results for a moderate number of segments. Meyr (2008) therefore
concludes that a moderate number of customer segments is sufficient. Moreover, he finds
that the appropriate segmentation model is more important than the appropriate allocation
model.
Pricing
Harris and Pinder (1995) consider simultaneous pricing and capacity allocations in an
assemble-to-order context. In contrast to Weatherford (1997), they investigate partitioned
allocations and account for holding costs incurred for the allocated quantities. Becher (2009)
formulates a joint pricing and capacity allocation model by means of fuzzy controllers.
2.3.3 Price-Based Revenue Management in Retail
Typically, retail companies manage demand through dynamic pricing (see, e.g., Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b). The main interrelated planning tasks are comparable to the relevant
decisions in the service context. Operations-related planning tasks involve decisions on initial
inventories and on capacity rationing. Decisions on the product offer or the assortment and
the selling format are considered in literature as marketing-related decisions.
2.3.3.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks
A firm’s ”capacity” in a retail environment typically consists of the available amount of
products. Two procurement modes can be distinguished: either a firm decides on an initial
inventory at the beginning of the planning horizon or they replenish within the planning
horizon (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003). The first literature stream mirrors the notion
of revenue management for seasonal products due to fixed initial available capacity. The
second stream on revenue management when products are frequently replenished is similar
to inventory rationing models in a manufacturing context. For the literature overview, we
focus on decisions about initial inventories in the remainder of this section. Elmaghraby and
Keskinocak (2003) also provide an overview of models considering replenishments within the
planning horizon.
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Initial Inventories
Smith and Achabal (1998) investigate a markdown setting where a firm decides on the
initial inventory level and the prices. Customer demand is a function of price, time and
the inventory level. Optimal prices and markdowns are higher if demand is sensitive to the
inventory level. In this case, the firm should allow leftovers instead of offering high discounts
at the end of the season (see also Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003). Urban and Baker
(1997) investigate a single markdown possibility in a newsvendor setting. Neglecting the
impact of inventory levels and prices on demand results in a substantial profit loss.
Cachon and Swinney (2009) investigate a firm’s decisions regarding initial inventory and
one price change during the selling season facing myopic, strategic and discount customers.
Both the optimal initial inventory and the optimal price discount are lower due to strategic
customer behavior. In this case, a fixed price schedule is never optimal and the optimal price
discount takes place later in the planning horizon.
Subrahmanyan and Shoemaker (1996) analyse a finite selling season without reorder pos-
sibilities where the product loses its value at the end of the season. The season is subdivided
into two periods. First, the firm decides on both the initial inventory and price. After
observing demand, the firm decides on the price in the second period. Learning is valuable
when facing demand uncertainty. An additional reorder possibility increases the expected
profit and decreases the optimal initial inventory.
Mantrala and Rao (2001) developed an integrated IT system. It first determines an
optimal price path (from a set of feasible prices) for a given initial inventory level, then
it determines the optimal initial inventory by comparing these solutions. While optimal
dynamic pricing yields the highest expected profits, a fixed price strategy outperforms au-
tomatic markdowns without consideration of demand patterns. Dynamic pricing is able to
adjust for a suboptimal initial inventory (see also Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003).
Several papers focus on the impact of the initial inventory on the optimal prices and thus
the resulting expected profit. Lin and Yao (2003) determine optimal markdown policies.
The optimal policy only accepts orders with the highest price until a certain time thresh-
old. A higher initial inventory results in higher and earlier markdowns. Bell and Zhang
(2005) investigate a newsvendor setting with dynamic pricing. Their approach is similar
to the approach by Subrahmanyan and Shoemaker (1996). Both the initial inventory and
price are determined first, and the price can be adapted after observing demand. Small de-
viations from the optimal initial inventory do not have a major impact on the expected profit.
Capacity Rationing
The literature stream on capacity rationing is related to the firm’s decision on initial in-
ventories. However, literature on capacity rationing in retail applications considers strategic
customer behavior. It may then be optimal to deliberately understock products in order to
create an incentive for customers to buy earlier in the planning horizon at higher prices.
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Liu and van Ryzin (2008) consider a firm which commits to a price path and decides on
the optimal initial inventory facing deterministic demand in a first step. The firm trades off
potential lost-sales and the additional revenue from more customers buying earlier at higher
prices. Rationing and dynamic pricing are not beneficial if customers are risk-neutral.
Gallego et al. (2008) consider a similar setting. Customers cannot observe the inventory
level and are assumed to be risk-neutral. The firm’s optimal strategy is then not to ration
inventory and to charge a single fixed price. This changes if demand is stochastic or if
not all customers are acting strategically. Then, dynamic pricing becomes valuable. In a
multi-period setting it is beneficial to convincingly announce that inventory is scarce.
Liu and van Ryzin (2011) build on the work of Liu and van Ryzin (2008) by assuming that
customers do not have rational expectations but only learn about the firm’s decisions over
time by observing past capacities. The firm’s optimal decisions result in either a capacity
rationing equilibrium or in a low-price-only equilibrium depending on customer expectations.
Rationing is only optimal if changing customer expectations is not costly.
2.3.3.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks
Due to the focus on dynamic pricing strategies, customer segmentation is not prevalent in
retail revenue management applications. However, other longer-term decisions about the
product offer, assortment planning and the selling format play a role.
Product Offer, Assortment Planning
In the approach of Gallego and van Ryzin (1997), a firm decides on which products to offer
at what prices facing deterministic demands. Demand interdependencies between the end-
products are explicitly considered. A first heuristic determines the optimal prices for a given
assortment. A second heuristic fulfills orders on a first-come-first-served basis. Maglaras and
Meissner (2006) build on the work of Gallego and van Ryzin (1997). They show that the
model can equivalently be formulated as a quantity-based problem. Based on this result,
the authors develop further heuristics for solving the joint assortment and pricing problem.
Dong et al. (2009) consider horizontal product differentiation according to product qual-
ity. Consumers choose a product based on price, availability and their quality preferences.
The retailer decides on which product versions to order and on the respective order quantities
prior to the start of the selling season and independent of the subsequent dynamic pricing
problem. The value of dynamic pricing depends on the degree of inventory scarcity. The
optimal prices are affected by the total inventory level, the inventory level of the individual
product and its quality. Small deviations from the optimal inventories do not have a major
impact on the expected profit. Akcay et al. (2010) consider a similar setting. Suh and Aydin
(2011) build on the work of Akcay et al. (2010) and Dong et al. (2009). They consider two
customer classes and assume that the initial inventories are given. The difference in the
optimal prices between the products decreases with increasing inventory levels.
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Selling Format
Retailers may provide different information about product availability. Availability informa-
tion can affect strategic customer behavior and thus the benefit from dynamic pricing.
Yin et al. (2009) investigate two inventory display formats as a means to mitigate strate-
gic customer behavior and its effects on the firm’s dynamic pricing strategy. Either the
firm displays all available units or only one unit. Displaying only one unit may increase the
perceived shortage risk. When changing display formats, the inventory level does not neces-
sarily change, as appropriate price changes are typically sufficient. If the retailer’s per-unit
cost are relatively high, profits increase by up to 20% when displaying only one unit.
Su and Zhang (2009) investigate product availability information in a newsvendor model
when customers incur costs for stock-outs at the retailer. The firm determines an observable
price and an unobservable stocking quantity. Su and Zhang (2009) study two possible selling
formats: Either the firm commits to a stocking quantity ex ante or it provides availability
guarantees to customers. Both selling formats may increase a firm’s profit.
Allon and Bassamboo (2011) investigate the impact of a firm’s ability to communicate
unverifiable information about product availability. A single retailer providing information
on its own cannot create credibility with the customers, therefore, the firm will never be able
to affect customer behavior. This result also holds for endogenous prices.
2.3.4 Revenue Management in E-fulfillment
E-fulfillment considers order fulfillment at internet retailers (see, e.g., Agatz et al., 2008). In
contrast to brick-and-mortar retail stores, an internet retailer is responsible for the delivery
of the products. Managing the delivery operations properly has been shown to have a
significant effect on customer retention (see, e.g., Boyer and Hult, 2005). Customers making
use of convenient home delivery have significant revenue potential (Goebel et al., 2012).
Agatz (2009) compares revenue management in an e-fulfillment setting with traditional
single-leg airline revenue management.Three main differences are important for the remain-
der of this section. First, the firm’s product to the customer consists of the physical products
ordered and its delivery. While the physical products can be replenished on a regular basis,
it is typically the delivery capacity which is limited, at least in the short run. Second, the
limited delivery capacity can also be managed on an operational basis by means of, for ex-
ample, routing decisions. By managing delivery demand, a firm can still influence its costs.
In service settings, all costs are typically sunk. A third difference to traditional revenue man-
agement are the revenue sources. They consist of both the margins of the physical products
and the delivery fees. Delivery fees serve as incentives for the customers. Firms can thus
either manage delivery demand by managing the availability of time slots for deliveries or
by pricing the time slots accordingly.
Operations-related planning tasks include decisions on delivery routing and scheduling as
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well as time slot management. Decisions on delivery service pricing and product bundling
are considered as marketing-related planning tasks.
2.3.4.1 Operations-Related Planning Tasks
Agatz (2009) provides an overview of the typical order fulfillment process in e-fulfillment.
After the order intake, the internet retailer plans the routes, picks the necessary products
for the order and finally delivers the order. Delivery capacity is the limited resource. Similar
to manufacturing, available capacity can also be influenced on a short-term basis.
Delivery Routing and Scheduling
Campbell and Savelsbergh (2005) study internet retailer order acceptance decisions, decisions
about the delivery time and the corresponding delivery routing. Customer preferences with
regard to delivery times are known. In a first step, they determine whether it is possible
to integrate the order into a delivery schedule and the resulting additional costs. It is then
possible to decide whether the order should be accepted or rejected. Considering both the
profitability of an order and the feasibility of scheduling yields considerable benefits. Offering
only some delivery time slots to customers and/or differentiating prices would even further
increase profits. In a similar approach, Espinoza et al. (2008) considers demand management
for on-demand air transportation services.
Azi et al. (2012) consider whether dynamically arriving delivery requests can be included
in delivery tours, and if they should be accepted or rejected. Future requests are considered
when deciding on the acceptance of an order which proves to be valuable for the firm.
Ehmke and Campbell (2014) study different approaches to the acceptance problem, which
differ with regard to the information included about the routes. The authors explicitly
consider stochastic travel times in order to account for congestion. Intuitively, they find that
dynamic acceptance rules perform best, as they benefit most from travel time information.
Cleophas and Ehmke (2014) present an iterative approach: first, the necessary delivery
capacity is estimated by means of expected future requests and used as part of a routing
problem. Customer requests are then accepted or rejected such that the total value of the
accepted requests is maximized under the delivery capacity constraint. Finally, optimal
delivery tours are generated for the accepted requests. The benefit of combining both de-
cisions depends greatly on the forecast quality and the firm’s ability to segment its customers.
Time Slot Management
Campbell and Savelsbergh (2006) build on the work of Campbell and Savelsbergh (2005). A
firm decides on which order to accept for which time slot and the incentives the firm should
provide for customers in order to choose a particular time slot. The probabilities of choosing
a specific time slot are known but depend on delivery fees. Either the firm provides incentives
for different time slots of the same length or it provides incentives for the customers to accept
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a longer time slot. Campbell and Savelsbergh (2006) report on higher profits due to lower
delivery costs and more customers finally placing an order.
Confessore et al. (2008) build on the work of Campbell and Savelsbergh (2006). The
authors develop an algorithm for quickly calculating the transportation costs associated with
a certain time window (including the routing of the order). This information is provided to
customers in order to induce them to choose a longer time window. Thus, the sum of the
provider’s transportation cost and the customer’s cost associated with a longer time window
is minimized. Longer delivery time windows can still result in lower total costs.
Agatz (2009) investigates dynamic slotting. The firm decides on which delivery time
slots, out of all available time slots, should be offered to a particular customer. In contrast
to Campbell and Savelsbergh (2005), customer preferences for different delivery time slots are
not known ex ante. The two decisions are taken sequentially, with the set of all available time
slots as an input to the dynamic slotting problem. The presented heuristics all outperform
a first-come-first-served approach.
2.3.4.2 Marketing-Related Planning Tasks
Marketing-related planning tasks refer to delivery service pricing and product bundling,
which is a valuable technique used by many e-commerce retailers.
Delivery Service Pricing
Asdemir et al. (2009) investigate pricing of delivery options. The firm trades-off its capacity
utilization and heterogeneous customer preferences. The approach is reminiscent of the ap-
proaches of Confessore et al. (2008) or Campbell and Savelsbergh (2006). The probability of
choosing a particular delivery option depends on its utility and on its price. Considering two
customer classes, the different delivery options and the influence of the available capacity
may result in lower prices for more profitable customers.
Product Bundling
Netessine et al. (2006) investigate an e-commerce retailer’s dynamic decisions about which
product to offer in a bundle and how to price the bundle in order to maximize profit.
Either emergency replenishments are possible or a stock-out results in lost sales. In the first
setting, the optimal price for the bundle depends on the availability of the additional, but
not of the original product. Under lost sales, the bundling decision depends on customer
preferences rather than availability considerations as long as sufficient inventory is available.
Simultaneous bundling and dynamic pricing is stated as a valuable extension.
Gu¨rler et al. (2009) consider a two-product setting with a fixed initial inventory. In
contrast to Netessine et al. (2006), the firm decides on the proportion of inventory to use for
bundling and on the respective prices. Products which are bundled at the beginning of the
season are not available for individual product requests. In this case, the inventory decision
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is similar to an assortment decision. If individual product prices are low, all alternatives are
offered and a high bundle price is optimal. Otherwise, the optimal bundle price is such that
only bundles are sold.
2.3.5 Industry-Independent Planning Tasks
2.3.5.1 Forecasting
According to, for example, McGill and van Ryzin (1999) and Chiang et al. (2007), forecasting
is crucial for revenue management decisions as their quality directly depends on the forecast
accuracy. The need to obtain forecasts is industry-independent, however, forecasts differ
in what they actually have to predict. In a hotel setting, demand for types of rooms at
certain points in time has to be estimated. In a cargo revenue management setting, demand
is multi-dimensional: forecasts are needed for the time, size and weight of a request. In
addition, forecasts may depend on the type of revenue management applied. Booking curves
(i.e. demand as a function of time), no-show probabilities or cancellation curves have to be
estimated for quantity-based revenue management. For price-based approaches, estimating
the demand functions and cross-price elasticities is crucial (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
Several authors have quantified the impact of accurate forecasts on the performance of
revenue management. Lee (1990) finds that a 10% increase in forecast accuracy increases
revenues by 0.5% - 3% on high demand flights. Po¨lt (1998) estimates that a 20% reduction
of the forecast error yields a 1% increase in revenue.
Forecasting is generally considered an integral part of revenue management (see, e.g.,
Klein and Steinhardt, 2008), however, forecasting is not really regarded as a separate plan-
ning decision (see, e.g., Ng and Yip, 2011). Accounting for forecasting in revenue manage-
ment models typically allows the investigation of the performance of revenue management
for given forecasts obtained in different ways. Weatherford and Kimes (2003) provide an
overview of issues regarding forecasting for revenue management in a hotel setting. For ex-
ample, a firm should determine the level of aggregation, the relevant time period for forecasts
and how to handle outliers.
Weatherford et al. (2001) investigate aggregated versus disaggregated forecasting ap-
proaches. They find that disaggregating forecasts by a combination of rate class and length
of stay dominates more aggregated forecasts. Disaggregating by rate class dominates dis-
aggregating by length of stay. Weatherford and Po¨lt (2002) investigate the general issue
of unconstraining bookings to demand in order to improve forecast accuracy in an airline
setting. More sophisticated methods should be used in order to obtain good forecasts.
Weatherford and Kimes (2003) compare different forecasting methods based on real-world
data. Standard forecasting approaches such as exponential smoothing or moving averages
provide the most robust forecasts. Neuling et al. (2004) present passenger name records as
an opportunity to improve forecast accuracy. Ng and Yip (2011) support the findings by
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Weatherford et al. (2001). They propose forecast demand per customer segment.
2.3.5.2 Customer Relationship Management
Customer relationship management focuses on the long-term value of customers to the firm
(see, e.g., Berger and Nasr, 1998). The importance of focusing on long-term customer re-
lationships in order to maximize long-term profits has been stressed for several years and
independent of industries (Noone et al., 2003). The goals of both concepts may contradict
each other: maximizing the short-term profit from a particular flight does not necessarily
maximize the firm’s long-term profits. While several papers investigate the integration of
both concepts qualitatively, only few papers present models for integrated revenue manage-
ment and customer relationship management decisions.
Typical customer relationship management decisions are decisions on spending for cus-
tomer acquisition and retention or, more generally, on the effort a firm puts into managing its
customer base (Reinartz and Venkatesan, 2008). The firm trades off the benefits of customer
relationship management with the costs of its effort.
Von Martens (2009) and von Martens and Hilbert (2011) model the firms’ decisions on
a protection level, based on Littlewood’s model and under additional consideration of a
customer’s long-term value. Customer profitability is defined as the weighted average of
the customer’s willingness-to-pay and long-term value, but the customer’s long-term value is
independent of the allocation decision when considering a lost-for-good setting. Buhl et al.
(2011) investigate a deterministic model where the repurchase probabilities depend on the
allocation decision.
Pfeifer and Ovchinnikov (2011) argue that customer relationships cannot be considered
independent due to the typically fixed capacity in revenue management settings. Customer
lifetime value is not then the maximum amount a firm should be willing to spend on the
acquisition and retention of a customer. Ovchinnikov et al. (2014) model firms’ decisions
regarding acquisition and retention spending in a stochastic dynamic programming approach
facing limited capacity. They show analytically that the incremental value of a particular
customer is less than the customer’s lifetime value. Thus, customer lifetime value is inad-
equate if capacity is limited. Spending is typically constant in models based on customer
lifetime value but changes dynamically when accounting for customers’ real incremental
values.
2.4 Planning Frameworks for Revenue Management -
A Review
Several frameworks have already been proposed which aim to structure revenue management
decisions, and their interrelationships with other short-term and longer-term planning tasks.
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Within this section, we provide an overview of existing frameworks in chronological order.
Vinod (2004) discusses the major components of revenue management applications in the
hotel industry. The components are illustrated in Figure 2.3. Hotels segment their customers
Market 
segmentation 
Inventory pooling 
Demand forecasting 
(arrivals, rooms, 
walkins, showup, 
cancellations) 
Overbooking 
controls 
Revenue mix 
controls (rate 
allocations/ 
restrictions/hurdle 
rate controls) 
Supply forecasting 
(early check-ins, late 
check-outs) 
Exception 
processing 
Performance 
measurement and 
management 
reporting 
Figure 2.3: Hotel revenue management application (adapted from Vinod, 2004)
with regard to certain attributes in order to ensure a revenue-maximizing mix of customer
segments and offered rates. They then pool their available rooms into several rate classes
so that the respective rates are relatively homogeneous while the rate classes themselves
are heterogeneous. Based on forecasts, overbooking and traditional revenue management
controls are applied in order to maximize revenue from the available rooms. Exceptions are
processed individually. Measuring the performance of the booking system yields feedback
for the different revenue management sub-systems.
Philips (2005) presents a framework for pricing-related decisions and an overview of plan-
ning tasks related to quantity-based revenue management. Philips (2005) differs regarding
pricing-related decisions between operational activities such as the analysis of different pric-
ing alternatives, their execution and finally their evaluation. Prerequisites such as market
segmentation are performed less frequently. The framework is shown in Figure 2.4.
Set goals and  
constraints 
Update market  
response 
Analyze alternatives 
Choose the best 
alternative 
Execute pricing 
Determine market 
response 
Segment market 
Monitor and 
evaluate 
performance 
The  
market 
Operational activities 
Figure 2.4: The pricing and revenue optimization process (adapted from Philips, 2005)
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As for quantity-based revenue management, Philips (2005) differentiates between strate-
gic, tactical and real time planning tasks. Decisions about market segmentation and segment-
based prices are taken on an annual or quarterly basis. Decisions about the capacity allo-
cations are taken on a weekly or daily basis while the actual order acceptance decisions are
taken in real time. Table 2.1 summarizes the decision hierarchies.
Level Description Frequency
Strategic Segment market and differentiate prices Quarterly or annually
Tactical Calculate and update booking limits Daily or weekly
Operational Determine which booking to accept / reject Real time
Table 2.1: The three levels of revenue management decisions (according to Philips, 2005)
For standardized services, Klein and Steinhardt (2008) also differentiate between strategic,
tactical and operational planning tasks. The framework is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Capacity strategy Service offering 
Capacity design Service design 
Price differentiation 
Overbooking Capacity Allocation 
Revenue Management  
(strict understanding) 
operational 
tactical 
strategic 
Revenue Management  
(wide understanding) 
Forecasting 
Marketing 
Production Management 
Figure 2.5: Planning tasks in revenue management (adapted from Klein and Steinhardt,
2008)
On a strategic level, the interdependent decisions on the firm’s capacity and its service
offering are mainly taken in the marketing and production departments. The service offering
refers to the depth and width of the services offered. Within the capacity strategy the firm
decides on the total available capacity and its configuration (e.g. the types and number
of aircrafts). Depending on the financial effort for adapting capacity, this decision can be
strategic (e.g. airlines) or tactical (e.g. car rental).
The tactical capacity design and service design decisions correspond to the planning tasks
on the strategic level. Capacity design decisions determine the actual usage of the available
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capacity, for example by fleet assignment. Service design decisions further differentiate and
develop the service offering. One example is schedule design. Price differentiation decisions
assign prices to the services offered to the different customer segments. Price fences are
meant to prevent demand leakage between the customer segments.
The main operational planning tasks are overbooking and capacity allocation. These
short-term revenue management decisions are taken in the marketing or sales department.
As all of the planning tasks are based on forecasts, forecasting is considered a supporting
tool.
Ng et al. (2008) consider revenue management as an end-to-end solution from the firm’s
supply to customer demand. The authors propose a revenue management system which
comprises four decision sets and various components, as shown in Figure 2.6. The value set
Sensitivity  
Set 
Allocation & 
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Value Set Segmentation Set 
Attributes 
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s 
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itivity Set 
Figure 2.6: Decision sets in revenue management (adapted from Ng et al., 2008)
covers the interrelation of the benefits required from a product and the respective product
attributes in order to provide these benefits. Within the segmentation set, the firm matches
the benefits required with the prices for different customer segments. The required bene-
fits support customer segmentation (see also Ng, 2006). Customer demand properties differ
across the customer segments (referred to as sensitivity set). Firms decide about the alloca-
tion of their total capacity to the different customer segments based on demand forecasts,
which are considered within the allocation and forecasting set.
The framework proposed by von Martens (2009) considers traditional transaction-based
revenue management but also its adaption in order to consider aspects from customer re-
lationship management. The framework is illustrated in Figure 2.7. The analysis of the
firm’s environment, the decision of the firm’s objective and the development of its strategy
are considered to be strategic planning tasks. Among other planning tasks, service design
and pricing decisions are considered on a tactical basis. von Martens (2009) focuses on
revenue management decisions, and in particular (relationship-based) booking control, and
forecasting with regard to operational planning tasks.
Cizaire (2011) focuses on the interaction between airline pricing and seat capacity allo-
cation. The corresponding framework, including other interrelated decisions, is shown in
Figure 2.8. While the first three planning tasks determine the airline’s operations and thus
the available seat capacity on each origin-destination combination, pricing and revenue man-
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Analysis 
Adaptation 
Environment analysis 
Forecasting 
Optimization 
Trans- 
action- 
based  
control 
Service design 
Figure 2.7: Framework for (relationship-based) capacity control (adapted from von Martens,
2009)
agement aim to maximize revenues from this capacity (Cizaire, 2011). The hierarchical order
represents the different time horizons of the decisions.
Fleet planning 
Route evaluation 
Schedule development 
Pricing 
Revenue management 
Airline operations 
 
  determines the airline‘s  
 total available seat inventory 
Airline demand management 
 
  maximizes the airline‘s profit  
 from the total available seat inventory 
Figure 2.8: Sequential airline planning (adapted from Cizaire, 2011)
2.5 Supply Chain Planning Frameworks
In order to discuss the applicability of a common framework for revenue management and
its related planning tasks across all considered industries, we give an additional overview of
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general supply chain planning frameworks for these industries. As discussed in the litera-
ture overview in Section 2.3, also operations-related decisions are interrelated with revenue
management decisions. In contrast to the previous revenue management frameworks, supply
chain planning frameworks focus particularly on operations-related decisions. Therefore, we
additionally consider these frameworks.
2.5.1 The Supply Chain Planning Matrix
The supply chain planning matrix derived by Fleischmann et al. (2008) structures planning
tasks in a manufacturing business-to-business setting. The planning tasks along the good’s
flow are structured according to their time horizon and the supply chain processes. The
supply chain planning matrix is illustrated in Figure 2.9.
Long-term planning tasks refer to the product program and strategic sales planning, the
physical distribution structure, plant location and the production system and the materials
program and supplier selection. Mid-term planning tasks are on, for example, mid-term sales
planning, distribution planning and capacity planning. Short-term planning tasks consider,
for example, short-term sales planning, warehouse replenishment, transport planning and
lot-sizing. These planning tasks arise in almost every manufacturing context to some extent,
while their importance differs for particular supply chains (Fleischmann et al., 2008).
short-
term 
mid-
term 
long-
term 
Procurement Production Distribution Sales 
- Personnel planning 
- Material  requirements  
   planning 
- Contracts 
- Master production  
  scheduling 
- Capacity planning 
- Lot sizing 
- Machine scheduling 
- Shop floor control 
- Replenishment 
- Transport planning 
- Distribution planning 
- Short-term sales  
   planning 
- Materials program 
- Supplier selection 
- Cooperations 
- Plant location 
- Production system 
- Physical distribution structure - Product program 
- Strategic sales planning 
- Personnel planning 
- Ordering materials 
- Mid-term sales  
   planning  
Figure 2.9: The supply chain planning matrix (Fleischmann et al., 2008)
Demand management is considered in terms of short-term sales planning. Demand ful-
fillment refers to demand management in make-to-stock settings (Fleischmann and Meyr,
2004) and involves planning tasks at and downstream of the decoupling point3 (Quante
et al., 2009). Customer orders are fulfilled from stock, which is still available to promise.
If enough stock is available, an order is accepted, otherwise, it is rejected or delivered later
(Fleischmann et al., 2008). Demand fulfillment and revenue management are similar (Quante
et al., 2009). While replenishments are considered in demand fulfillment, they are not con-
3See Hoekstra and Romme (1992) for a definition of the decoupling point.
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sidered in service applications as capacity cannot be stored. Quante et al. (2009) provide
a framework for structuring different kinds of demand and supply management approaches
according to the underlying decision variables.
2.5.2 The Retail Demand and Supply Chain Planning Framework
Both Hu¨bner and Kuhn (2012) and Hu¨bner et al. (2013) stress the importance of structuring
retail planning tasks and of considering their interactions. Hu¨bner et al. (2013) provide
an overview of planning tasks in a (grocery) retail supply chain. They match available
literature on planning tasks in a retail supply chain with the supply chain planning matrix
by Fleischmann et al. (2008). The resulting framework is illustrated in Figure 2.10. The
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Figure 2.10: The retail demand and supply chain planning framework (adapted from Hu¨bner
et al., 2013)
framework differs from the supply chain planning matrix with regard to the horizontal axis.
While Fleischmann et al. (2008) considers the production of goods, Hu¨bner et al. (2013)
consider decisions related to warehousing as no goods are produced. The framework’s focus
is on brick-and-mortar retail rather than e-fulfillment settings. Outlet and instore planning
tasks play an important role as sales decisions. Compared to the manufacturing context,
retail operations have a stronger focus on goods distribution and in-store logistics. The
customer interface is also more prevalent in retail supply chains due to the direct contact
with consumers and the more downstream location of the decoupling point. Forecasting and
sales planning are thus more important in retail (Hu¨bner et al., 2013).
Short-term sales planning entails forecasts and adjusts inventory levels and prices (Hu¨bner
et al., 2013). Forecasts are specified on a daily to weekly basis. For perishable products,
the short-term alignment of inventory levels and prices impacts consideration of mark-down
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pricing in order to sell them before the expiry date (see, for example, Federgruen and Heching,
1999).
2.5.3 The E-fulfillment Planning Framework
E-fulfillment refers to the internet retail business (Agatz, 2009). Agatz et al. (2008) ad-
dress issues in e-fulfillment settings by providing an overview of the relevant planning tasks
compared to other industries. They also build their framework and literature review on the
supply chain planning matrix. The supply chain processes correspond to the processes in
the above retail framework except for the fact that the goods’ distribution in retail equals
the delivery of goods in e-fulfillment. That the stages are to a large extent identical is rather
intuitive, as e-fulfillment is a particular type of retail business. On the vertical axis, plan-
ning tasks are structured according to their planning horizon. The resulting framework is
illustrated in Figure 2.11.
short-
term 
mid-
term 
long-
term 
Procurement Warehousing Delivery Sales 
- Inventory management (lot sizing, safety stocks) 
- Capacity management 
- Transport planning 
- Delivery service design 
- Order promising 
--Revenue management  
- Storage location 
- Transshipment facilities 
- Warehouse design 
- Physical distribution structure - Product program 
- Pricing 
- Forecasting 
Figure 2.11: The e-fulfillment planning framework (adapted from Agatz et al., 2008)
E-fulfillment differs from brick-and-mortar retailing with regard to the actual product
being offered. While stores offer only goods, delivery is part of the actual product offering
in e-fulfillment. Delivery is an important determinant of customer satisfaction (Boyer and
Hult, 2005). Due to the importance of delivery services, marketing and operations planning
tasks are even more strongly interlinked than in retail (Agatz et al., 2008). Agatz et al.
(2008) discuss the relevant planning tasks in two categories: sales and delivery planning,
and warehousing and procurement.
Compared to the previous frameworks for manufacturing and retail, Agatz et al. (2008)
explicitly consider revenue management. Revenue management in e-fulfillment differs from
traditional revenue management as (delivery) costs also play an important role (Campbell
and Savelsbergh, 2005). Delivery costs and thus the profitability of an order depend on order
characteristics such as the location and the preferred delivery time window. This is another
reason for considering the sales and delivery stages in a single category. The impact of
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demand management on the delivery costs is typically large compared to the low (grocery)
retail margins (Agatz, 2009). Revenue management in e-fulfillment therefore focuses on
managing demand for delivery time windows in order to maximize the expected profit from
selling and delivering the requested goods.
2.6 A Framework for Revenue Management
In this section, we aim to derive a generalized framework for revenue management and in-
terrelated operations-related and marketing-related planning tasks. First, we summarize the
main findings from the literature overview in Section 2.3. Second, we discuss the properties
of the revenue management frameworks available in literature and reviewed in Section 2.4.
Third, we compare the planning tasks considered in the supply chain planning frameworks
with the planning tasks considered in literature in order to identify potential research gaps.
Finally, we propose a generalized framework for revenue management and related planning
tasks.
2.6.1 Main Findings from the Literature Overview
In this section, we summarize the main findings from the literature overview in Section 2.3
and compare the planning tasks considered in literature across the different industries. Table
2.2 shows the respective planning tasks on different hierarchical planning levels identified
within the literature overview, for all considered industries.
Comparing the planning tasks considered across the four industries demonstrates that
other planning tasks are relevant in different contexts. From an abstract point of view,
operations-related decisions determine the firm’s available capacity and marketing-related
decisions manage a firm’s interface with its customers. However, taking a closer look at the
respective relevant decisions, they differ across the industries considered. While scheduling
decisions are relevant in the manufacturing and e-fulfillment context, they are not relevant
in a traditional retail context. Due to the relevance of short-term scheduling decisions,
manufacturing and e-fulfillment settings are similar (Agatz, 2009).
Moreover, the same planning tasks are relevant on different hierarchical planning levels in
different industries. As an example, again consider scheduling decisions. While scheduling
decisions are taken on a short-term basis in both manufacturing and e-fulfillment, scheduling
decisions are considered on a strategic level in traditional service industries. Another plan-
ning task which arises in different hierarchical levels is the decision about prices. Pricing
decisions are taken on a medium-term basis, based on the firm’s customer segmentation,
whenever quantity-based revenue management is prevalent. However, as soon as price-based
revenue management is prevalent, they are taken on a short-term basis.
In order to benefit from customer heterogeneity by means of quantity-based revenue man-
agement, firms typically segment their customer base into several customer classes. However,
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customer segmentation and its interaction with short-term revenue management decisions
has only been explicitly investigated by Meyr (2008). Approaches investigating how firms
should determine their fences are related but take the respective fencing decisions for a given
number of customer classes. An integrated approach considering simultaneous decisions on
the number of customer segments and the respective allocations does not yet exist. The firm
does not necessarily benefit from additional customer classes when accounting for additional
costs, for example, for managing the resulting complexity or through additional demand
substitution between the customer classes.
Another area where research is rather limited is research on the interaction of revenue
management with product bundling. Product bundling is particularly promising in the field
of online retailing (Netessine et al., 2006) and is thus regularly applied. Little research exists
in this field, however. This is probably due to the focus on limited delivery capacity instead
of the available product quantities when additionally accounting for revenue management.
Although decisions on replenishments can be considered similar to a traditional retail context,
product bundling (and potentially other planning tasks) can be taken on an even shorter-
term basis by internet retailers as opposed to traditional retailers. Through the internet,
these decisions can be taken online in real-time and thus dynamically for each customer
request. Click histories of customers are also available which supports product bundling
decisions.
2.6.2 Comparison of Revenue Management Frameworks with the
Literature Overview
In the following analysis and discussion of the revenue management frameworks, we focus
on several aspects: whether the frameworks refer to specific industries, whether different
departments as decision makers are represented, whether the frameworks account for different
time horizons of different planning tasks, and the extent to which the frameworks cover the
planning tasks discussed in the literature overview in Section 2.3 and illustrated in Table
2.2.
All revenue management frameworks reviewed more or less refer to standardized ser-
vices and thus traditional applications of revenue management. Only one of the frame-
works of Philips (2005) considers dynamic pricing explicitly. All other frameworks focus on
quantity-based revenue management. However, none of the frameworks accounts for short-
term operations-related decisions, such as scheduling decisions, and thus do not apply to
manufacturing or e-fulfillment.
Decision hierarchies are considered in almost all frameworks. While Klein and Steinhardt
(2008) account for them explicitly, the other frameworks consider the hierarchical levels
implicitly through the sequence of planning tasks.
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Except for the framework of Klein and Steinhardt (2008), the frameworks do not explic-
itly distinguish between operations- and marketing-related decisions. While Vinod (2004),
Philips (2005) and Ng et al. (2008) do not consider operations-related decisions at all, von
Martens (2009) and Cizaire (2011) do so. However, they do not consider the firm’s related
decisions in different hierarchical levels.
Most of the frameworks take a rather narrow perspective on short-term revenue man-
agement decisions in combination with, at most, medium-term marketing-related decisions.
Exceptions are the frameworks by Klein and Steinhardt (2008), von Martens (2009) and
Cizaire (2011). They also consider a long-term perspective, but their scope is different. von
Martens (2009) does not discuss actual long-term planning tasks while Klein and Steinhardt
(2008) and Cizaire (2011) account for them explicitly. These frameworks cover all deci-
sion hierarchies but to a different extent. The framework by Klein and Steinhardt (2008)
considers the longer-term decisions in more detail.
Customer relationship management as a marketing-related area of planning is not con-
sidered explicitly in any of the frameworks. It is only implicitly considered in the framework
of von Martens (2009) through the adaption of transaction-based revenue management de-
cisions.
To summarize, there are several approaches in the literature which aim to provide a frame-
work for revenue management and related planning tasks. However, none of the frameworks
completely mirrors the notion of McGill and van Ryzin (1999) and integrates the current
state of literature as provided in Section 2.3. In particular, most of the frameworks neither
consider operations-related planning tasks nor do they consider marketing-related planning
tasks such as customer relationship management. Table 2.3 gives an overview of the pre-
sented approaches and summarizes the previous discussion and evaluation of the existing
frameworks.
Framework Industry Departments Hierarchy Literature
coverage
Vinod (2004) hotels no (yes) low
Philips (2005) services no (yes) low
Klein and Steinhardt (2008) services yes yes medium
Ng et al. (2008) services no no low
von Martens (2009) services no (yes) medium
Cizaire (2011) airlines (yes) (yes) medium
Table 2.3: Planning frameworks in literature: Overview of characteristics
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2.6.3 Comparison of Supply Chain Planning Frameworks with the
Literature Overview
Comparing the above supply chain planning frameworks with the summary of the literature
overview in Table 2.2 allows a comparison of planning tasks considered in literature with
actual planning tasks, and thus potential research gaps in revenue management literature.
As discussed above, supply chain planning frameworks have a broad focus on several supply
chain processes and particularly consider relevant operations-related planning tasks. We first
discuss general differences in the results from the literature overview and the supply chain
planning frameworks. We then discuss similarities and differences for each industry in more
detail.
In contrast to the supply chain planning frameworks, we do not explicitly further split
the operations-related decisions according to different departments of the firm as we wanted
to keep the literature overview general.
Long-term planning tasks are relevant in general, as shown in the frameworks. However,
the interaction of long-term planning tasks with short-term revenue management has only
rarely been considered. Somehow, this is intuitive as long-term decisions only affect short-
term decisions indirectly by their effects on medium-term decisions. One exception is research
into services as shown in Table 2.2. Here, interactions of long-term and short-term planning
tasks are considered. In this case, however, research does not really consider two planning
tasks but only considers approximations for short-term revenue management decisions and
their impact on customer demands when taking long-term decisions. In general, research on
simultaneous decisions focuses on medium- and short-term planning tasks.
In the following, we compare the findings from the literature overview with the sup-
ply chain planning frameworks for each industry in more detail. Comparing the planning
tasks for manufacturing in Table 2.2 with the supply chain planning matrix in Figure 2.9
demonstrates that both procurement and distribution decisions have not yet been a focus
in combination with revenue management. While procurement decisions are partly con-
sidered through inventory models, distribution decisions have not yet been addressed at
all. One reason for this might be their different focus: while supply chain planning frame-
works identify the relevant planning tasks in general, research on the interaction of revenue
management with other planning tasks is restricted by only considering limited capacities.
Otherwise, revenue management is not applicable. Typically, either the end-product, in-
termediate product(s) or the production capacity is limited in a manufacturing context,
depending on whether a make-to-stock, assemble-to-order or make-to-order setting is con-
sidered. Procurement and distribution decisions hardly affect these possibly scarce capacities
and might therefore not be in the focus when considering decisions related to revenue man-
agement. All other medium- and short-term planning tasks considered in the supply chain
planning matrix correspond to planning tasks discussed in the literature overview.
In retail settings, warehousing operations and the distribution of goods are not considered
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in the literature overview in the retail context. Again, this is intuitive. The limited resource
is typically the available amount of products. This is determined on a medium-term basis.
Marketing-related decisions affect the product offer. By deciding on, for example, the selling
format, the retailer may limit the available capacity of a particular product artificially.
The planning tasks investigated in interaction with revenue management match the general
supply chain planning tasks discussed by Hu¨bner et al. (2013). In contrast to the supply
chain planning frameworks for a manufacturing and e-fulfillment context, Hu¨bner et al.
(2013) consider the interaction of a firm’s sales decisions with customer behavior.
In e-fulfillment, the focus of both the available frameworks and the available literature
is on distribution decisions. Their importance as part of the actual product offer is the
main difference from a traditional retail context. Therefore, for example, actual product
procurement decisions are not considered. They also arise in the context of e-fulfillment
but are very similar to retail settings. Revenue management in e-fulfillment is two-fold:
demand for delivery time windows can be managed by either pricing them appropriately or
by managing their availability for specific customers. In contrast, only one particular type
of revenue management is prevalent in the other industries considered.
While forecasting is considered in the supply chain planning frameworks as part of the
sales planning, customer relationship management is not considered in most of the supply
chain planning frameworks. Only the retail framework potentially accounts for customer
relationship management, due to the interaction of sales planning tasks with customer be-
havior.
To summarize, the relevant supply chain planning tasks have also been considered in
literature in terms of their interaction with short-term revenue management decisions. More
planning tasks are considered in the above supply chain planning frameworks compared to
the planning tasks in the literature overview. There are two reasons for this. First, the
literature overview focuses on limited resources only, meaning planning tasks which are not
related to these resources are not considered. Second, long-term planning tasks are not
directly interlinked to short-term revenue management decisions, and therefore, they are
only rarely considered in terms of interaction with revenue management.
2.6.4 A Generalized Framework for Revenue Management
In this section we propose a generalized framework for revenue management. The framework
builds on the findings from the previous sections and hence on the literature overview as
well as the revenue management and supply chain planning frameworks reviewed before.
The different industries differ regarding the type of revenue management applied. While
quantity-based revenue management is prevalent in a service and manufacturing context,
price-based revenue management is prevalent in a retail context. This difference affects the
relevant related planning tasks. While pricing and customer segmentation is relevant as a
basis for quantity-based revenue management, pricing is the short-term revenue manage-
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ment decision itself in industries where price-based revenue management is prevalent. When
comparing the discussed frameworks for revenue management, this may be a reason why
they either consider quantity-based or price-based revenue management and not both types
of revenue management simultaneously.
As shown and already discussed above in Section 2.3, operations-related decisions deter-
mine a firm’s available capacity. We have seen in the literature overview that the actual
decisions about a firm’s available capacity are taken by different departments in different
industries. This is because the potentially limited capacities across industries differ. For
example, in a manufacturing context production quantities or production schedules are de-
termined by the production department while delivery routes are determined by the distri-
bution planning department in an e-fulfillment context. Decisions about available capacity
are taken on different hierarchical levels in different industries. Depending on the industry,
the respective capacities are fixed either on a medium-term or on a short-term basis. In an
airline context, aircraft are typically assigned to particular flights on a medium-term basis
while short-term production schedules have to be considered in a manufacturing context in
order to determine the available capacity. Due to the strong focus in literature on revenue
management applications for standardized services, the frameworks for revenue management
also focus on these applications and thus a single industry application. However, the above
observation also explains to some extent why the discussed revenue management frameworks
focus on one industry application only.
In general, not every planning task is relevant in every industry context. This is related
to the previously discussed differences of operations-related planning tasks across industries.
As discussed, when comparing the results from the literature overview with the supply
chain planning frameworks, planning tasks from some planning areas are also irrelevant with
regard to revenue management. Which planning tasks are irrelevant depends on the industry
considered. While distribution decisions are related to revenue management in e-fulfillment,
they are more or less irrelevant for revenue management in a traditional retail context. This
is because the firm’s limited capacity actually results from planning tasks in different areas
and thus differs across industries.
In order to cover research on the interaction of revenue management with other planning
tasks, the industry-independent planning tasks regarding forecasting and customer relation-
ship management should be included. While forecasting is considered in existing frameworks,
customer relationship management is not. This is probably due to the typically short-term
orientation of revenue management.
Due to the different relevant planning tasks in different industries, the development of a
general framework for revenue management faces the following trade-off: while all industries
should be considered with the respective relevant planning tasks, a general framework should
at the same time offer a high degree of generalizability. Being too industry-specific results
in a low generalizability due to the differences in the relevant planning tasks. Being too
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general, however, possibly results in relatively abstract categories of planning tasks.
As discussed above, the supply chain planning frameworks further split the operations-
related decisions in order to assign them to different departments of the firm. The industries
differ with regard to which department actually decides on the limited capacity as the basis
for revenue management. Considering a firm’s departments thus explicitly stresses the dif-
ferences of the industries. However, this contradicts the idea of a general framework across
different industries. Omitting a firm’s departments is in line with the framework of Klein
and Steinhardt (2008).
Forecasting is necessary at every hierarchical level. For example, forecasts are necessary
as a basis for determining a firm’s total available capacity on a long-term basis or for deter-
mining fleet assignments in order to match supply with demand on single legs. Customer
relationship management also entails longer-term and short-term features.
Most of the previously discussed issues complicate the applicability of a single framework
covering both price-based and quantity-based revenue management and the related planning
tasks across all industries. We therefore distinguish between quantity-based and price-based
applications in the following.
First, we consider quantity-based revenue management applications. Comparing the
medium-term marketing-related planning tasks illustrated in Table 2.2 across the differ-
ent quantity-based applications demonstrates that they are rather similar. Decisions about
customer segmentation, assortment planning or the selling format determine which products
are offered in which way. Thus, they can all be summarized as decisions about a firm’s
service offering, in general. On a short-term basis, (quantity-based) revenue management
decisions are taken.
Medium-term operations-related decisions determine a firm’s capacity and are denoted as
medium-term capacity planning. Comparing the medium-term operations-related planning
tasks in Table 2.2 across the quantity-based applications demonstrates that they are also
rather similar. Deciding on the production capacity or replenishment quantities in a manu-
facturing context is comparable to the fleet assignments in the airline context: all of these
decisions determine the firm’s available capacity on a medium-term basis.
On a short-term basis, capacity may be more or less flexible, depending on the particular
industry. While dynamic capacity management allows for short-term adjustments of the
available capacity in the service context, scheduling decisions in the manufacturing or e-
fulfillment context work similarly. In general terms, these decisions can be summarized
under short-term capacity planning as they determine a firm’s available capacity on a short-
term basis. Short-term capacity planning has not yet been considered within a revenue
management planning framework so far.
While the different planning tasks can be summarized into the rather general categories
above, they differ in the actual modeling approaches as do, for example, the relevant costs
across the different industries.
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Considering the rather general categories of planning tasks allows for a generic revenue
management framework for quantity-based applications as illustrated in Figure 2.12.
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Figure 2.12: A framework for quantity-based revenue management applications
Comparing the above framework to the frameworks discussed in Section 2.4 yields that it
is similar to the framework of Klein and Steinhardt (2008) in many facets. Our framework
thus builds on the framework of Klein and Steinhardt (2008). However, in contrast to the
framework of Klein and Steinhardt (2008), the above framework does not focus on airline
applications or services in general. It represents the findings from the literature overview on
planning tasks that interact with revenue management: both short-term capacity decisions
(such as scheduling decisions) and customer relationship management are considered. These
planning tasks are not considered in the framework of Klein and Steinhardt (2008). However,
these two extensions mirror two current trends in revenue management research: revenue
management is transferred to non-traditional applications and the focus on long-term cus-
tomer relationships from marketing research also starts to affect revenue management.
In contrast to the supply chain planning frameworks, the operations-related planning
tasks are not further split into, for example, procurement or distribution decisions. As
discussed above, the various quantity-based revenue management applications differ with
regard to which type of operations-related decisions affect the firm’s capacity. Summarizing
the different areas of operations-related decisions allows a general framework to be provided.
As an analogy to the framework for quantity-based revenue management applications, it
is also possible to provide a framework for price-based revenue management on this level
of abstraction. We derive the framework for price-based revenue management applications
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from the literature overview regarding retail and (partially) e-fulfillment applications. The
resulting framework is illustrated in Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: A framework for price-based revenue management applications
The framework in Figure 2.13 differs from the framework for quantity-based revenue
management applications mainly with regard to the relevant marketing-related medium-
term planning tasks. In contrast to the proposed framework for quantity-based revenue
management, pricing is now an operational demand management decision itself.
2.7 Conclusion
After a short overview of basic revenue management concepts, we have investigated the
literature on coordinated decision-making in revenue management in this chapter. Revenue
management decisions focus on the operational level and are typically based on longer-term
decisions such as decisions on a firm’s capacity, the customer segmentation in place or a
firm’s prices. In this chapter, we focus on the interaction of revenue management decisions
with these other planning tasks.
In order to consider both quantity-based and price-based revenue management and both
traditional and non-traditional applications of revenue management, we focus on four indus-
tries: quantity-based revenue management in service applications and manufacturing, and
price-based revenue management in retail and e-fulfillment. We review existing planning
frameworks both for revenue management in general and for the industries discussed. Based
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on the existing frameworks and the literature overview, we propose a general framework
covering the observed relevant planning tasks.
Research that includes an additional planning task which is related to revenue manage-
ment is rather rare compared to research on pure revenue management decisions. More
research also exists in traditional applications such as services and retail, compared to the
non-traditional applications. To the best of our knowledge, an overview focusing on the
interplay of revenue management decisions with other planning tasks does not yet exist. Ex-
isting reviews either focus on particular revenue management applications or, for example,
demand modeling for revenue management.
From the literature overview, we find that planning tasks related to revenue management
differ across the considered industries. While capacities are determined on a medium-term
basis in the service context, the firm is more flexible on a short-term basis in manufacturing
and e-fulfillment settings. Marketing-related decisions such as pricing differ regarding their
time horizon depending on whether quantity-based or price-based revenue management is
prevalent. While pricing is a typical medium-term decision in quantity-based applications,
prices serve as the actual demand management lever on the operational level in price-based
revenue management applications. Comparing the planning tasks investigated with supply
chain planning frameworks for the considered industries demonstrates that the planning
tasks identified in the frameworks have also been considered with regard to their interaction
with revenue management.
In addition, we review existing revenue management frameworks. In contrast to the supply
chain planning frameworks, they focus only on revenue management and directly related
planning tasks. The revenue management frameworks discussed focus strongly on quantity-
based approaches for standardized services and neither consider dynamic pricing nor apply
to manufacturing or e-fulfillment. Operations-related (in particular short-term operations-
related decisions) and longer-term planning tasks are not considered in most cases. Decisions
from the field of customer relationship management have not yet been considered in these
revenue management frameworks, however, literature has already addressed the interaction
of revenue management with customer relationship management.
Based on the findings from the literature overview and both the revenue management
and supply chain planning frameworks, we discuss and provide a general framework for
revenue management and related planning tasks across different industries. In general, the
trade-off is between generalizability and the details considered from the different industries.
The marketing-related decisions differ significantly depending on whether quantity-based
or price-based revenue management is applied. Within the framework, we only consider
operations-related decisions in general on different hierarchical levels instead of accounting
for different operations departments. We distinguish between quantity-based and price-based
applications.
The resulting general framework builds on the framework of Klein and Steinhardt (2008)
51
but differs from existing approaches in two main issues: we account for current research
into the interaction of revenue management with customer relationship management and we
consider short-term operations-related decisions. Customer relationship management affects
other marketing-related decisions such as segmentation or pricing, and thus also revenue
management decisions. Other criteria next to short-term profitability should be considered.
Existing frameworks have not yet explicitly considered customer relationship management.
The same is true for short-term operations-related planning tasks. They are particularly
relevant in manufacturing and e-fulfillment applications, which have not yet been a focus.
In this chapter, we consider four different revenue management applications. More ap-
plications do exist (see, e.g., the overview by Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Within our
framework, the decision categories are very general. The identified decision categories do
not necessarily have to apply to industries not considered here. Whether the frameworks
also apply to other industries should be investigated as a new direction of research. This
is true in particular for non-traditional revenue management applications to which revenue
management ideas are transferred and adapted.
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Chapter 3
Revenue Management and Customer
Relationship Management:
Coordinating Short-term and
Long-term Performance
3.1 Introduction
Revenue management is concerned with demand management decisions on a transactional
basis (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b) while, for example, customer relationship management
proposes to focus on long-term customer relationships instead of maximizing short-term prof-
its. Empirical research suggests that customers adapt their purchase behavior according to
the service they have experienced from a firm in the past. Consequently, short-term alloca-
tion decisions in a revenue management setting might also affect future customer behavior.
Our work deals with these intertemporal demand interdependencies and investigates how
a firm should allocate capacity to customer classes when customers adapt their repurchase
probabilities depending on whether their order has been accepted or denied.
Revenue management originates from, and gains great success in, service industries, such
as the airline, hotel and car rental businesses (see Section 2.2) but has also been recognized as
advantageous in other industries, including manufacturing and retailing. Customer relation-
ship management, which originates from marketing research, proposes a focus on long-term
customer relationships. Differential resource allocation to customers with different economic
values for the firm in order to maximize the customers’ values (Reinartz and Venkatesan,
2008) plays a key role in both approaches. Both concepts differ with regard to their ob-
jectives. While revenue management yields optimal short-term allocation decisions, which
maximize revenues within a booking horizon, customer relationship management aims to es-
tablish profitable long-term customer relationships. As the long-term orientation has gained
significant importance within the marketing and management literature, some earlier papers
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in the field of revenue management have already identified the need for the integration of
both concepts (Belobaba, 2002; Esse, 2003; Noone et al., 2003; Shoemaker, 2003).
Another aspect that is relevant regarding the integration of a long-term perspective into
revenue management decisions, is the customers’ perceived fairness of revenue management
techniques. Empirical research investigates how far customer satisfaction and thus loyalty
is affected by applying revenue management (i.e., in particular by denying customer re-
quests). Customer loyalty has proved to be a key driver for profitable long-term customer
relationships and consequently constitutes an important objective in customer relationship
management. In general, results indicate that short-term allocation decisions might affect
(due to being perceived as unfair) customer satisfaction and loyalty and therefore also cus-
tomer relationships in the long run (see, e.g., Suzuki, 2004; Wangenheim and Bayo´n, 2007).
These findings imply that customer demand should be considered interdependent over time.
Future customer demand thus also depends on current allocation decisions. Both revenue
management and customer relationship management therefore interact. In the field of in-
ventory management, several authors have already studied models where the effects of poor
customer service on customer demand in subsequent periods are incorporated (e.g., Adelman
and Mersereau, 2013; Olsen and Parker, 2008). These papers are based on the findings of em-
pirical research regarding customer reactions towards physical stock-outs. Stock-outs cause
customers (amongst others) to switch brand or store (see, e.g., Campo et al., 2000). Ac-
cordingly, stock-outs might have severe impacts in the long-run (e.g., Anderson et al., 2006).
In general, there are few analytical contributions, including intertemporal demand effects
caused by customer service. The papers particularly focus on inventory-related problems
and not on issues related to revenue management.
In this chapter, we focus on the interaction between the short-term and the long-term
performance of revenue management, assuming that revenue management decisions affect
future customer demand. We therefore investigate how intertemporal demand effects, caused
by accepting or denying customer requests, can be captured in a standard revenue manage-
ment model in order to support optimal decision making from a long-term perspective. Our
approach is intentionally generic and not tailored to a specific setting or application of rev-
enue management (e.g., airline or hotel revenue management). Our approach is relevant to
several industries. Industries which typically apply revenue management have also started
to introduce customer relationship management programs aimed at long-term customer re-
lationships. These firms thus manage capacity through revenue management in the short
run and at the same time actively manage relationships with their customers independent of
revenue management. We investigate how short-term revenue management decisions should
change due to the intertemporal demand effects considered. We are particularly interested
in the value of considering the effects with regard to the expected profit and how the actual
allocation decisions of the firm change.
In order to do so, we present a quantity-based two-class stochastic dynamic programming
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model which accounts for the intertemporal effects of a firm’s allocation decisions about
customer demand. In particular, we build on the well-known static stochastic two-class rev-
enue management model by Littlewood (1972) and extend it for multiple booking horizons
in order to account for intertemporal demand effects. The model demonstrates optimal ca-
pacity allocations in the long run by considering two trade-offs: the trade-off between the
heterogeneous customer classes within a booking period and the trade-off between the de-
mands of the customer classes across subsequent booking periods. We analytically derive
a heuristic for a partitioned protection level, which accounts for part of the intertemporal
demand effects. In addition, we compare the optimal allocation policy with both the derived
heuristic and other allocation heuristics based on Littlewood’s model within a detailed nu-
merical study. We find that the derived heuristic performs close to optimal in most of the
scenarios. However, even heuristics which merely update customer demand perform fairly
well. In general, updating customer demand forecasts is particularly relevant when facing
intertemporal dependent demands.
To summarize, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We give an overview of both empirical and analytical research on perceived customer
service and its long-term effects.
• Based on the results of previous research, we present a two-class stochastic dynamic
programming model which maximizes the expected profit within a planning horizon
consisting of multiple booking periods. Subsequent booking periods are linked by
intertemporal effects on customer demand caused by accepting and rejecting customer
requests. The model presented differs from existing approaches in two ways:
- While the existing approaches at the interface of revenue management and cus-
tomer relationship management determine allocations based on the customer’s
value (determined as a weighted average of the customer’s willingness-to-pay and
the customer lifetime value), the firm makes its decisions based on short-term
contributions (i.e. the customer’s willingness-to-pay) as in the standard model.
However, it anticipates the effects of allocation decisions on customer demands in
subsequent periods.
- The approaches of anticipating customers’ reactions towards service in the field
of inventory management track relationships with single customers. In contrast,
we focus on aggregate effects on the level of customer classes.
• We analytically derive an allocation heuristic which accounts for the intertemporal
effects on the demand of high-value customers.
• Within a numerical study, we compare the optimal allocation policy to several allo-
cation heuristics. We evaluate the value of anticipating the intertemporal demand
effects, and investigate the impact of several parameters on the allocation decisions.
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We find that applying the optimal allocation policy on average yields an additional
3.85% of expected profit compared to applying a static protection level throughout
the entire planning horizon and 0.57% of expected revenue compared to applying Lit-
tlewood’s rule reactively in every booking period. Thus, updating demand forecasts
(and the protection level) is particularly important. Our heuristic approach performs
close to optimal in almost all scenarios. As for the impact of different parameters,
we show that the intertemporal demand effects of higher-value Class 1 customers are
particularly important and have the strongest influence on both the difference in the
allocation decisions and the profit gaps. The protection level increases over time (with
the capacity as the natural boundary) under all considered dynamic allocation policies,
as soon as Class 1 customers react positively towards their requests being accepted.
The allocation policies differ regarding how quickly they adapt the protection level.
Thus, a considerable share of the total profit gap results from the first several booking
periods, in which the allocation decisions differ the most.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We review the related literature in
Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we present a two-class stochastic dynamic programming model
which incorporates intertemporal effects of allocation decisions on customer demand based
on the stochastic dynamic formulation of Littlewood’s model. For a planning horizon of two
booking periods, we discuss the underlying trade-offs and derive a closed-form expression
for a heuristic partitioned protection level under simplifying assumptions in Section 3.4. In
Section 3.5 we present a particular approach for modeling demand interdependencies, discuss
several myopic allocation heuristics and present the results of the numerical study. Section
3.6 summarizes our findings.
3.2 Literature
This chapter builds on several streams of literature related to revenue management and long-
term customer behavior in general. General overviews of revenue management are given in
the books of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) and Philips (2005) (see also Section 2.2). In
the following, we investigate five streams of literature which are particularly relevant for
our modeling approach. First, we give a short overview of empirical research on customer
perceptions of revenue management. Second, we review both empirical and quantitative
literature on customer perceptions of denied service. Third, we introduce basic findings from
marketing research which theoretically link the perception of short-term service failures to
long-term customer behavior. Fourth, we review a stream of literature, which focuses on
revenue management with endogenous customer behavior. Fifth, and closest to our work,
we investigate research into the interface of revenue management and customer relationship
management.
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3.2.1 Customer Perceptions of Revenue Management
Empirical research into revenue management mainly investigates customer perceptions of
different revenue management techniques. The focus is on the perceived fairness of allocation
decisions (i.e., inventory control and overbooking) and pricing decisions (e.g., Kimes, 2002;
Kimes and Wirtz, 2003; Choi and Mattila, 2004, 2006; Wirtz and Kimes, 2007). Wirtz et al.
(2003) give an overview of potential conflicts arising from applying revenue management
in customer oriented firms. The authors argue that revenue management techniques might
influence customer satisfaction negatively and thus harm the firm’s success in the long run.
Accordingly, a firm should, for example, give special treatment to loyal customers.
Wangenheim and Bayo´n (2007) and Suzuki (2004) both investigate the behavioral conse-
quences of overbooking and the customer treatment (denial, downgrade or upgrade) offered
by an airline. Within a longitudinal analysis, in contrast to Suzuki (2004), Wangenheim
and Bayo´n (2007) find support for significantly negative effects of downgrading and denied
boarding, resulting in reduced future transactions and revenues from these customers. When
comparing the effects across customer segments, the authors find significantly stronger nega-
tive effects for high-value customers while Suzuki (2004) only finds weakly significant effects
for leisure travelers. According to Wangenheim and Bayo´n (2007) the results clearly show
the need to consider the consequences of the allocation strategy applied. Regarding seat allo-
cation, Lindenmeier and Tscheulin (2008) study the impact of inventory control and denied
boarding on customer satisfaction. Denied boarding is shown to have a negative impact on
customer satisfaction for both leisure and business travelers (Hwang and Wen, 2009). The
negative effect is significantly stronger for business travelers, supporting the findings from
Wangenheim and Bayo´n (2007).
We build on these results by integrating the empirically observed effects of customer
acceptance and rejection into a quantitative model. We allow for effects in either direction
and explicitly account for the heterogeneity of effects across customer classes.
3.2.2 Customer Perceptions of Denied Service
Empirical findings with regard to the effects of denied service due to revenue management are
supported by findings in other fields of research. Considering physical stock-outs under the
assumption that denied service due to revenue management is comparable to physical stock-
outs, research also finds that customers (depending on product and consumer characteristics
and situational factors) may react negatively in terms of switching store or product (see, e.g.,
Campo et al., 2000). Anderson et al. (2006) find that stock-outs have both short-term and
long-term effects. While order cancellation rates increase significantly in the short-term, the
authors also find significantly lower repurchase probabilities (and thus decreasing customer
loyalty) and revenues in the long run.
Several authors have already incorporated the effects of poor service in terms of physical
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stock-outs on customer demand in subsequent periods in quantitative models (see, e.g.,
Adelman and Mersereau, 2013; Olsen and Parker, 2008; Liu et al., 2007; Gaur and Park, 2007;
Gans, 2002; Hall and Porteus, 2000). These papers mainly consider inventory management
problems in a competitive setting, where competing firms are explicitly modeled (except
from Adelman and Mersereau (2013)). As a consequence of bad service, customers defect to
a competitor within these settings.
Conceptually, our approach integrates the empirically observed effects of poor customer
service under the reasonable assumption that customers also perceive denied requests as poor
service. Regarding the modeling approach, as per Adelman and Mersereau (2013), we do not
model competition (and thus customer switching behavior) explicitly. On the other hand,
unlike Adelman and Mersereau (2013), we do not model individual but aggregate (i.e., class-
wise) customer behavior. Nevertheless, with the assumption that rejecting a customer due
to revenue management techniques has an effect on future customer demand, our approach
is consistent with the approaches in this stream of research.
3.2.3 Basic Theories on the Effects of Customer Perceptions on
Customer Loyalty and Firm Profitability
The third stream of literature conceptually links s firm’s decisions to long-term customer
behavior and thus the firm’s profitability. In principle, all a firm’s decisions can potentially
have an effect on customer behavior. Customer satisfaction plays a key role in marketing
research. Research has investigated its antecedents and its effects on customer behavior for
decades (see, e.g., Homburg and Giering, 2001; Homburg and Stock-Homburg, 2008).
By taking particular management decisions, the firm affects customer mindsets, triggers
customer (dis)satisfaction and thus customer behavior. Customer behavior refers both to
actual buying decisions in the short run and customer loyalty in the long run. The link
between customer satisfaction and customer loyalty has often been investigated in literature
(for an overview see, e.g., Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). As a central result, research in this
field finds a positive relationship between customer satisfaction and customer loyalty, both
based on customer intentions and observed customer behavior (see, e.g., Bolton and Lemon,
1999; Mittal and Kamakura, 2001).
According to Gupta et al. (2004) and Gupta and Lehmann (2008), customer retention
is crucial for financial success in the firm’s markets and thus finally its value in terms of
shareholder value (see also Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Kumar, 1999). Figure 3.1 sum-
marizes the firm’s resulting value chain (see Homburg and Bucerius (2006) for a comparable
illustration). Marketing research, and particularly customer relationship management, both
investigate the links between the different steps in Figure 3.1 and the entire value chain.
Revenue management however is less long-term oriented and traditionally investigates only
the link between the firm’s decisions and the resulting market success.
Accounting for the effects of short-term allocation decisions on customer behavior in sub-
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Figure 3.1: The value chain (adapted from Gupta and Lehmann, 2008)
sequent booking periods, reflects the value chain discussed above. According to the value
chain of Gupta and Lehmann (2008), firms should consider the effect of their decisions on cus-
tomer behavior, which affects the long-term profitability in terms of the share-holder value.
Maximizing the expected profit over several booking periods accounting for the decisions’
effects, mirrors this underlying notion.
In particular, we build on the link between customer satisfaction resulting from the firm’s
capacity allocation decisions, and customer loyalty investigated in this stream of research.
Within the above value chain, customer satisfaction is formed by the customer’s attitude
towards the firm’s action and affects the customer’s activity, which determines whether a
customer is, for example, a loyal customer or not. The findings in this stream support the
assumption that customer demands in subsequent booking periods are interdependent.
3.2.4 Revenue Management with Endogenous Customer Behavior
We also contribute to the stream of research on revenue management facing endogenous
customer behavior. In contrast to typical consumer modeling in operations management,
customer demand is not exogenously given but depends on the firm’s decisions when modeled
as endogenous (e.g., Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003; Shen and Su, 2007). Most of this
research addresses endogenous behavior within one booking period, for example, in terms
of strategic customer behavior or the integration of customer choice models into revenue
management models (for an overview see Shen and Su, 2007).
Customers behave strategically if they optimally adapt their behavior in response to a
firm’s pricing or allocation decisions (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Su (2007) investigates
a dynamic pricing problem, where a firm sells a finite inventory to customers who exhibit
heterogeneous willingness-to-pay and different degrees of impatience. Both aspects affect
the firm’s optimal policy. For example, markdown pricing is particularly beneficial if high-
value customers are proportionally less patient. Yin et al. (2009) investigate the impact of
inventory display formats on the performance of optimal markdown pricing. They find that
a firm may benefit from only displaying one unit of the product instead of all units available
due to a higher perceived shortage risk from the customer’s point of view. Jerath et al.
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(2010) investigate last-minute selling and opaque selling in a competitive environment when
facing strategic customer behavior. Direct last-minute selling is beneficial when customers
have high valuations and when there is little service differentiation in the market. Otherwise,
opaque selling dominates.
Liu and van Ryzin (2011) investigate a multi-period setting, where each period consists
of two sub-periods: a full-price and a markdown-price period. Customers learn about the
firm’s capacities over time and adapt their purchase decisions over time according to their
expectations about product availability. Depending on a threshold value with regard to the
customer expectations, either rationing is optimal or the firm sells the entire capacity at a
low price.
Li et al. (2014) empirically investigate the existence of strategic customer behavior in
the airline market. For two data sets, they find that 5.2% - 19.2% of the customers behave
strategically. These customers request capacity either at the beginning of the booking period
or at the end. By comparing markets, they find that strategic customer behavior does not
necessarily hurt revenues.
By integrating customer reactions towards their order being accepted or rejected, we
borrow the notion of the richer modeling of customer behavior from this stream of research.
In particular, customers adapt their purchasing behavior over time depending on the firm’s
allocation decision.
3.2.5 Interface of Revenue Management and Customer Relation-
ship Management
This chapter combines both the short-term (transactional) view of revenue management and
the long-term (relational) view of customer relationship management. While both concepts
are based on customer heterogeneity, they differ with regard to their objectives. Revenue
management decides (based on the customers’ willingness-to-pay) about customer accep-
tance or rejection in the short term in order to maximize the expected profit from a particular
booking period. In contrast, customer relationship management models typically decide on
customer acquisition and retention by means of long-term oriented customer values such as,
for example, customer lifetime value. Based on qualitative propositions regarding the inte-
gration of both concepts (see, e.g., Belobaba, 2002; Esse, 2003; Noone et al., 2003; Shoemaker,
2003), von Martens and Hilbert (2011) present, to the best of our knowledge, a first analyti-
cal approach involving an integrated quantity-based revenue management model where they
incorporate a long-term perspective by substituting the segment price (or willingness-to-pay
respectively) by a convex combination of the segment price and the customer lifetime value.
The effects of customer acceptance and/or rejection on customer repurchase probabilities
are not accounted for in their approach as the authors model a lost-for-good setting. Reject-
ing a particular customer’s order thus not only causes the loss of the current revenue but
also the loss of this customer’s total long-term value. As an extension, Buhl et al. (2011)
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present a deterministic linear approach where the authors explicitly incorporated determin-
istic repurchase probabilities depending on whether individual customers had been denied
capacity.
In a different approach, Ovchinnikov et al. (2014) formulates a stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming model. His approach closely follows typical approaches in customer relationship
management, as the firm decides about customer retention and acquisition spending facing
a fixed service capacity. However, the actual operational acceptance and rejection decisions,
and their influence on customer retention (as in the approach of von Martens and Hilbert
(2011)) are not considered.
By explicitly accounting for the long-term expected profit over several booking periods,
our approach is in line with previous approaches focusing on the interface of revenue man-
agement and customer relationship management. Compared to the approach of von Martens
and Hilbert (2011), allocation decisions in our approach are taken based on segment-based
prices (or willingness-to-pay respectively) as in standard revenue management models and
not by means of the customer lifetime value. While Buhl et al. (2011) follow a deterministic
linear approach, we investigate a stochastic dynamic setting. We allow for general types of
effects on customer demand caused by order acceptance and/or rejection.
3.3 A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model for Long-
Term Optimal Allocation Decisions
The model presented in the remainder of this section is based on the well-known static,
stochastic two-class capacity allocation model of Littlewood (1972), which was introduced in
Section 2.2.1.1. In particular, it builds on the stochastic dynamic programming formulation
of Littlewood’s model. We extend this basic model to a multi-period setting, incorporating
effects of the firm’s allocation decision on customer demands in subsequent booking periods.
Consequently, customer demands are interdependent across booking periods. We intention-
ally choose the simplest available and most well understood stochastic allocation model as a
starting point in order to gain insights into how accounting for intertemporal demand effects
affects the optimal allocation policy in a generic setting.
3.3.1 Assumptions
In order to consider the effects of customer order acceptance and rejection on future customer
demand within the above setting, we model several subsequent booking periods (t = 1, ..., T )
within the firm’s finite planning horizon T . Each of the single booking periods builds on
Littlewood’s model. We make the following assumptions.
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Assumption 1: Assumptions of Littlewood’s model hold in each booking period
We assume that the assumptions underlying Littlewood’s model (see Section 2.2.1.1) hold
in each booking period within the multi-period setting. In particular, we consider two cus-
tomer classes, with Class 2 demand arriving prior to Class 1 demand. In addition, by this
assumption, customer demand distributions within each booking period are assumed to be
independent. Although the assumptions of Littlewood’s model constitute a simplified view
of customer demand only, they are referred to and often applied in the literature.
Assumption 2: Capacity is exogenous and constant throughout the planning horizon
Capacity is assumed to remain constant over the entire planning horizon T . When consid-
ering, for example, an airline setting, flight schedules are planned on a strategic or tactical
level and can hardly be adjusted in the relevant time period in the setting considered in this
chapter (e.g., several subsequent booking periods). As the presented multi-period setting
can be interpreted as a sequence of booking periods for single-leg flights in an airline context,
this assumption seems to be realistic for moderate values of T not exceeding the length of a
pre-determined flight schedule.
Assumption 3: Prices are exogenous and constant throughout the planning horizon
In order to investigate the impact of customer acceptance and rejection (and thus of allo-
cation decisions), we assume that a firm does not make use of pricing in order to manage
customer demand but manages demand only by means of capacity allocation. In particular,
prices are assumed to be static and therefore constant over the entire planning horizon.
Assumption 4: Customer acceptance and rejection affect future customer demand
Based on the findings discussed in the literature review, we assume that a customer’s future
purchase behavior depends on whether their current capacity request is accepted or rejected.
In the context of capacity allocation, a firm’s actual allocation policy affects the number
of customer orders of both classes that can be accepted or have to be rejected within a
booking period. Thus, the firm’s allocation policy potentially influences the future customer
demand of both customer classes. Customers might adapt their own repurchase behavior
and/or influence other customers (re)purchase behavior through word-of-mouth. Again,
this assumption is in line with the findings reported in the literature review in Section 3.2.
Accounting for customer reactions to acceptance and rejection separately is additionally
backed by prospect theory, which argues that customers value perceived losses and gains
differently (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). In analogy to Littlewood’s model, Dti
(i.e., the random demand of customer class i in booking horizon t) follows a cdf F ti . We
assume that the demand distribution F t+1i in booking horizon t+ 1 depends on the previous
demand distribution F ti , customer demand d
t
i in t and the number of accepted requests acc
t
i
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of Class i in t. Therefore,
F t+1i = gi(F
t
i , d
t
i, acc
t
i) (∀i, t = 1, ..., T − 1) (3.3.1)
reflects the interdependence of customer demands in subsequent booking periods for contin-
uous and differentiable functions gi. As both the actual customer demand and the accepted
requests in booking period t are considered, this approach also accounts for the rejected
requests in booking period t. Note that this definition is very generic and allows for many
different specific approaches of modeling the intertemporal demand effects. We make addi-
tional simplifying assumptions on gi when deriving a heuristic protection level analytically.
Within the numerical study, we present a particular approach for modeling the above inter-
relation of demand distributions in subsequent booking periods.
3.3.2 Stochastic Dynamic Programming Formulation
The firm’s goal is to maximize the total expected profit over the planning horizon T (∈ N)
consisting of T booking periods (t = 1, ..., T ). In each of the booking periods, the firm
faces an allocation problem as considered in Littlewood’s model. However, compared to
Littlewood’s model (as presented in Section 2.2.1.1), the firm faces not only the trade-off
between the different customer classes within a single booking period but also an additional
trade-off over subsequent booking periods. The additional trade-off arises from the fact that
customer demands are interrelated over time in the multi-period setting considered. Thus,
the firm must also account for the effect of its allocation decisions on customer demands in
subsequent booking periods. The firm’s allocation decision in a particular booking period
t should consequently not be myopic (i.e., optimal within a particular booking period) but
should maximize the total expected profit until the end of the planning horizon T in order
to anticipate the intertemporal demand effects.
In order to determine the optimal allocation policy in this setting, we formulate the
firm’s optimization problem in terms of a stochastic dynamic programming model. Note
that it would also be possible to formulate the optimization problem analogous to the second
approach presented in Section 2.2.1.1 by assuming a protection level policy. Doing so directly
specifies the type of allocation policy, and a closed-form model representation is possible.
Due to the trade-offs mentioned above, it is however not clear whether a protection level
policy is optimal at all. We discuss the potential effects and implications of a firm’s allocation
decision within Section 3.4.
Compared to the stochastic dynamic formulation of Littlewood’s model for a single-period
setting (see Section 2.2.1.1), single booking periods (rather than the different customer
classes) correspond to the stages of the model. Customer demands (and therefore the allo-
cation decisions) are interdependent over time, due to the trade-offs faced by the firm. The
stochastic dynamic programming model can be solved for the optimal allocation policy by
63
backward induction, starting from the end of the planning horizon.
Parameterization of the State Space
Let St denote the state space in booking period t comprising all admissible states st in t.
In general, the state space is specified such that the parameters are known in each booking
period t (as they correspond to the model’s stages) and such that the information is sufficient
for the firm to make its decisions (Howard, 1971). The demand distributions of both customer
classes are exogenously given in the single-period model formulation. Specifying the state
space by the remaining capacity for a particular customer class is therefore sufficient in
the single-period multi-class setting. In addition, Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) show for
Littlewood’s single-period two-class problem that a model formulation where the firm makes
its decision based on a particular demand realization d2 is equivalent to the model formulation
where the firm does not explicitly account for particular Class 2 demand realization but only
the Class 2 demand distribution.
As for the parameterization of the state space in the multi-period setting, we build on the
model formulation of the single-period setting. The remaining capacity entering a particular
booking period t always corresponds to the available capacity C, which differs from the single-
period multi-class approach discussed by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b). The capacity is
independent of the firm’s decision and not necessary in order to specify the state space.
In contrast to the single-period setting, both customer demand distributions F ti (and thus
the random customer demands Dti) are endogenous and required by the firm to take the
allocation decision. Without knowing the demand distributions, the firm cannot quantify the
impact of alternative allocation decisions. In order to closely stick to the model formulation
from Section 2.2.1.1, we additionally account for the demand realization dt2 of the low-value
customer class as part of the state space. From this it follows that demand uncertainty with
regard to Class 2 has already been resolved prior to the firm’s decision in each stage. As in
the single-period setting, this is not necessary, but is more intuitive from our point of view.
Consequently, a particular state st in t is parameterized by
st = (F t1, F
t
2, d
t
2) (∀t) (3.3.2)
in the remainder of this chapter.
Under the chosen parameterization of the state space, the optimal allocation decision in
booking period t is determined for each possible demand realization dt2 separately. It thus
explicitly accounts for the possibility that the firm’s decision depends on Class 2 demand
realization. In general, this is the case, if a booking limit policy is not necessarily optimal.
The chosen parameterization is also more intuitive as it explicitly mirrors the notion that
individual customers react towards whether their request has been accepted or denied.
Alternatively, the state space could be parameterized solely by the demand distributions
F t1 and F
t
2 of both customer classes. If the firm still makes its decision for each Class 2
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demand realization, the two parameterizations are equivalent. In this case, they only differ
with regard to consideration of the probabilities for the demand realizations dt2. While they
are considered in booking period t− 1 in terms of the expected revenue to go in the chosen
parameterization, the probabilities are directly considered in booking period t under the
alternative parameterization.
The computational effort for solving the model is consequently also independent of the
parameterization of the state space in this case as all possible Class 2 demand realizations
must be considered anyway. As common for stochastic dynamic models, this optimization
problem becomes computationally expensive very quickly, depending on the number of book-
ing periods considered. While the number of states equals the number of Class 2 demand
realizations in the first period, the size of the state space has already significantly increased
in the second booking period. The model has to be evaluated for all combinations of de-
mand distributions and possible Class 2 demand realizations. The size of the state space
(i.e., the potential demand distributions that have to be considered in each stage) affects the
computation time, thus the longer the planning horizon, the larger the state space and the
longer the necessary computation time.
Decisions
Based on a particular state st = (F t1, F
t
2, d
t
2), the firm decides how many Class 2 requests
(out of dt2 requests) to accept in booking period t. Thus, the firm only takes a single al-
location decision in each booking period. This decision is the same as in the single-period
setting. The firm’s decision variable is denoted by acct2 in the remainder of the chapter
and denotes the requests from Class 2 customers accepted in booking period t. The set of
admissible decisions in a booking period t depends on the current state st and is denoted by
At(st) = 0, 1, ...,min(dt2, C) (s
t ∈ St, t < T ). The firm can either accept dt2 (if dt2 < C) or
C (if dt2 ≥ C) customer requests at most. The remaining capacity C − acct2 is subsequently
available for Class 1 customers on a first-come-first-served basis. Acceptance of Class 1 de-
mand is not a decision for the firm. Given a Class 1 demand realization dt1 and the remaining
capacity C − acct2, it is always beneficial for the firm to accept as many Class 1 requests as
possible (i.e., acct1 = min(d
t
1, C−acct2)). Therefore, the number of accepted Class 1 requests
results directly from the firm’s allocation decision acct2 in combination with Class 1 demand
realizations dt1.
Transitions
In the single-period multi-class setting, the firm’s allocation decisions affect the available
capacity for each customer class. In the multi-period setting considered, the firm’s decision
additionally affects customer demands in subsequent booking periods. In particular, the
demand distributions are interrelated over time. Based on the fact that the firm only takes
a single allocation decision acct2 in each booking period t, the transition of the demand
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distributions over time in Equation (3.3.1) can be further specified and stated as
F t+1i = gi(F
t
i , d
t
i, acc
t
2) (∀i, t = 1, ..., T − 1). (3.3.3)
Compared to Equation (3.3.1), Equation (3.3.3) mirrors the fact that the firm only decides
how many Class 2 requests to accept in each booking horizon t.
Given the above definitions of both the state space and the intertemporal demand effects,
the transition occurs as follows. Assume that the firm faces a particular state st = (F t1, F
t
2, d
t
2)
in booking horizon t. By taking a particular allocation decision acct2, the firm will end up
in state st+1 = (F t+11 , F
t+1
2 , d
t+1
2 ) = (g1(F
t
1, d
t
1, acc
t
2), g2(F
t
2, d
t
2, acc
t
2), d
t+1
2 ) in booking period
t+ 1, where dt+12 is drawn from F
t+1
2 .
To summarize, the firm decides about acct2 for given d
t
2. The decision acc
t
2 also determines
the number of rejected Class 2 requests. The number of rejected Class 2 customers results
from max(0, dt2−acct2). The resulting demand distribution F t+12 in booking horizon t+1 thus
follows from acct2. Given the remaining capacity C − acct2, Class 1 demand realizes based on
F t1. Its realization d
t
1 determines the number of accepted and rejected Class 1 requests. As
Class 1 customer requests are accepted on a first-come-first-served basis, min(dt1, C − acct2)
Class 1 requests are accepted while max(0, dt1− (C−acct2)) requests are rejected. Depending
on dt1, different Class 1 demand distributions F
t+1
1 result in booking period t+ 1. Figure 3.2
illustrates the transition process.
Profit
The expected revenue rt(st, acct2) in a particular booking period t given the current state s
t
depending on the allocation decision acct2 can be expressed as
rt(st, acct2) = p2 · acct2 + p1 · EDt1(st)[min(Dt1(st), C − acct2)]. (3.3.4)
By accepting acct2 Class 2 requests, the firm collects a revenue of p2 · acct2 from Class 2. The
second term in the above expected revenue formula determines the expected revenue from
Class 1, given the remaining capacity C − acct2.
In order to maximize the total expected profit over the entire planning horizon, the
firm makes an allocation decision in each booking period t. Let V t(st) denote the total
expected profit to go in a particular state st, from booking period t until the end of the
planning horizon. The corresponding Bellman equation, which summarizes the above model
ingredients, can be expressed as
V t(st) = max
acct2∈At(st)
[rt(st, acct2) + EDt+12 (st+1),Dt1(st)[V
t+1(st+1)]] (∀t) (3.3.5)
with boundary conditions V T = rT (sT , accT2 ) (∀sT ). The optimal decision for a particular
state st in each booking period maximizes the sum of the expected current and the expected
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Figure 3.2: Transition process
future revenue.
Thus, for each admissible state st in booking period t, the firm chooses the allocation
decision acct2 which maximizes the sum of the current expected revenue r
t(st, acct2) and the
expected revenue to go until the end of the planning horizon. The above model can be solved
by backward induction starting from booking period T .
3.3.3 Optimal Allocation Policy in Booking Period T
Intuitively, as the planning horizon ends in booking period T , the allocation decision in T
has no influence on customer demands in further booking periods and therefore corresponds
to the single-period setting. Consequently, Littlewood’s rule yields the optimal allocation
decision in booking period T in each admissible state sT . The optimal allocation decision
accT2 at the end of the planning horizon therefore satisfies
F T1 (C − accT2 ) = 1−
p2
p1
(∀sT ) (3.3.6)
in case of a nested protection level.
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3.4 Two-Period Setting: Analysis
In order to derive insight into properties of the stochastic dynamic programming model and
the allocation policy, we restrict our analysis to two booking periods (i.e., T = 2) in the
remainder of this section. We aim to investigate the impact of considering the effect of
a firm’s allocation decisions on both the current booking period and on a future booking
period. The firm takes an allocation decision in each of the two booking periods, however,
the allocation decision in the second booking period is known beforehand. As discussed in
Section 3.3.3, the firm applies Littlewood’s rule in each admissible state s2. The resulting
state s2 depends on the firm’s decision in the first booking period. Therefore, the allocation
decision in the second booking period directly results from the allocation decision in the
first period. Thus, the allocation decision in the first booking period is the only allocation
decision to consider in terms of model analysis in the two-period setting. A protection level
policy is not necessarily optimal as the allocation decision might depend on the current state
as we will discuss below. First, we investigate the trade-offs faced by the firm and provide
a marginal analysis analogous to the marginal approach for Littlewood’s model (see Section
2.2.1.1) in Section 3.4.1. Second, we analytically derive a heuristic approach for a partitioned
protection level in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Marginal Analysis of the Allocation Decision: Trade-offs and
Implications
Analogous to the marginal approach for Littlewood’s rule (see Figure 2.2), the two-period
setting can be investigated by marginal analysis. In line with the single-period setting, we
consider a Class 2 request assuming a remaining capacity of yˆ units. The firm can either
accept or reject this particular request. The firm decides by comparing the marginal expected
revenues from both alternatives. In addition to the marginal revenues p1 and p2 in the first
booking period, the marginal effects on the expected revenue in the second booking period
have to be considered. In the following, ∆+i (∆
−
i ) denotes the non-negative (non-positive)
expected marginal impact on the revenue from Class i in the second booking period caused
by accepting (rejecting) a request from customer Class i in the first booking period.
If the firm rejects the Class 2 request, the marginal revenue depends on whether the unit
can be sold to Class 1 at the higher price p1 or not. If it is not sold, the firm does not obtain
any revenue from this particular unit of capacity. If it is sold later in the booking period,
the firm obtains a revenue of p1 from customer Class 1. In this case, the firm benefits from
an additional marginal effect ∆+1 on the Class 1 revenue in the subsequent booking period.
Independent of whether the unit can be sold or not, rejecting the Class 2 request has an
expected marginal effect ∆−2 on the Class 2 revenue in the subsequent booking period.
If the firm accepts the Class 2 request, they obtain a revenue of p2 as in the standard
model. In addition, accepting the request has an expected marginal effect ∆+2 on the Class
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2 revenue in the subsequent booking period. However, this unit of capacity could have
potentially been sold to Class 1. This is the case with probability P(D1 > yˆ). The firm then
additionally incurs an expected marginal effect ∆−1 on the Class 1 revenue in T = 2 as an
additional Class 1 request must be rejected. Figure 3.3 illustrates the resulting decision tree.
Accept a  
class 2 request?  
(ŷ empty units)  
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
Sell unit later? 
p2 
0 
p1 
P(D1 < ŷ) = F1(ŷ) 
P(D1 ≥ ŷ) = 1 - F1(ŷ) 
 
∆2
+ 
∆2
- 
∆2
- ∆1
+ 
no 
yes 
Sell unit later? 
P(D1 < ŷ) = F1(ŷ) 
P(D1 ≥ ŷ) = 1 - F1(ŷ) 
 p2 ∆2
+ ∆1
- 
Figure 3.3: Marginal analysis and trade-offs (T = 2)
The decision tree in Figure 3.3 differs from Figure 2.2 in two aspects: the pay-offs in
general, and the marginal pay-off in case of accepting a Class 2 request.
1. In the single-period setting, the firm’s allocation decision is only based on p1 and p2.
Thus, only pay-offs in the current booking period are relevant. This is not the case in
the investigated two-period setting. Here, the additionally induced expected marginal
pay-offs caused by the decision’s marginal impact on customer demand in T = 2 are
also relevant.
2. In the single-period setting, accepting a Class 2 request yields a revenue of p2 in the
current booking period. This is also the case in the considered two-period setting.
However, accepting a Class 2 request also induces potentially positive effects on Class
2 demand in T = 2. In addition, it also plays a role whether this particular unit of
capacity could have been sold to Class 1 instead. If so, accepting the Class 2 request
might affect Class 1 demand in T = 2 if an additional Class 1 request must be rejected
in the first booking period because this unit has been sold to Class 2. This is irrelevant
when only one booking period is considered.
The above decision tree demonstrates the following optimality condition:
p2 + ∆
+
2 + (1− F 11 (yˆ)) ·∆−1 = (1− F 11 (yˆ)) · p1 + ∆−2 + (1− F 11 (yˆ)) ·∆+1 . (3.4.1)
The firm is indifferent between the expected marginal revenue in case of accepting the request
and the expected marginal revenue in case of rejecting the request. Resolving this condition
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for yˆ yields
F 11 (yˆ) = 1−
p2 + ∆
+
2 −∆−2
p1 + ∆
+
1 −∆−1
. (3.4.2)
Thus, the allocation decision depends on all marginal pay-offs (both in the current and the
future booking period). For ∆+i = −∆−i = ∆i, this expression further simplifies to
F 11 (yˆ) = 1−
p2 + 2 ·∆2
p1 + 2 ·∆1 . (3.4.3)
If the expected marginal effects ∆+i and ∆
−
i are constant (and thus independent of the
firm’s allocation decision), the above conditions in Equations (3.4.2) and (3.4.3) yield an
optimal booking limit policy, analogous to Littlewood’s standard model. This follows from
the fact that only the left-hand side depends on yˆ. The resulting protection level may deviate
from Littlewood’s rule in absolute terms depending on the relationship between the prices
and the marginal demand effects.
Next, we investigate the impact of the different parameters on the optimal protection
level resulting in this case. Let cf = 1− p2+2·∆2
p1+2·∆1 denote the above critical fractile for ease of
notation. As F 11 increases in its argument,
dcf
dp2
< 0 and dcf
d∆2
< 0, the resulting protection level
decreases in p2 and ∆2. As F
1
1 increases in its argument,
dcf
dp1
> 0 and dcf
d∆1
> 0, the resulting
protection level increases in p1 and ∆1. Thus, the more profitable Class 1 customers are for
the firm both in the current and future booking period, the more capacity should be reserved
for them. In turn, the more profitable Class 2 customers are for the firm, the higher their
booking limit should be. The impact of p1 and p2 are equivalent to Littlewood’s standard
model. The impact of the marginal effects ∆1 and ∆2 is intuitive.
The above representation of the critical fractile for constant expected marginal effects also
allows for comparing the resulting protection level to Littlewood’s rule. Littlewood’s rule
for nested allocations is given in Equation (2.2.8). Relating both critical fractile solutions
demonstrates that the firm should reserve more capacity for Class 1 customers compared to
Littlewood’s rule if
1− p2 + 2 ·∆2
p1 + 2 ·∆1 > 1−
p2
p1
⇔ ∆1
∆2
>
p1
p2
. (3.4.4)
The firm should thus reserve more capacity for Class 1 customers in the first booking period
if the future revenue ratio (i.e., ∆1
∆2
) of an additionally reserved unit of capacity is greater
than the current revenue ratio (i.e., p1
p2
). Accordingly, the resulting optimal protection level
is less than the protection level resulting from Littlewood’s rule, if the future revenue ratio
is less than the current revenue ratio.
In the above analysis, the marginal intertemporal effects ∆+i and ∆
−
i (i = 1, 2) are as-
sumed to be constant. Then, a booking limit policy is optimal. However, it is not necessarily
the case that the marginal effects are constant and independent of the firm’s allocation deci-
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sion. In general, they are not constant but depend on the number of accepted and rejected
requests in the first booking period and therefore on the firm’s allocation decision yˆ in the
first booking period. This is what we consider next.
To this end, we further specify the marginal effects. In the remainder, ∆Di denotes
the marginal effect on the demand of customer Class i in T = 2. This allows for explicit
expressions to be given for the marginal effects on the firm’s allocation policy on the expected
profit in T = 2 when these effects depend on the firm’s allocation policy in t = 1. For ease
of analysis, we assume that the firm’s allocation decision only affects the expected demands
in the second booking period. Thus, demand uncertainty is not affected and the resulting
demand distributions in T = 2 result from shifting the demand distributions from the first
booking period.
First, we consider the marginal effect ∆2 on the Class 2 revenue in T = 2. Again, we
consider yˆ units of available capacity in t = 1. The allocation decision in t = 1 only has a
marginal effect on the Class 2 revenue in T = 2, if the firm can gain additional revenue by
its allocation decision. Accordingly, the firm’s allocation decision affects Class 2 revenue in
T = 2 only if the resulting Class 2 demand in T = 2 is less than the available booking limit
in T = 2. This yields
∆2 = p2 ·∆D2 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) ≤ C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)]) (3.4.5)
as an expression for the marginal effect on the Class 2 revenue in T = 2. The firm gains
p2 for each additional unit of Class 2 demand ∆D2 , if the resulting Class 2 demand is less
than or equal to the available booking limit in the second booking period. Class 2 demand
in T = 2 equals D22 = D
1
2 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) as C − yˆ Class 2 requests have already been
accepted. Littlewood’s rule is optimal in the second booking period. Due to the simplifying
assumptions, the protection level in T = 2 follows from shifting the Littlewood protection
level y1,LW by the effects on Class 1 demand, i.e. y2,LW = y1,LW + ∆D1 · min(yˆ, D11). As
a protection level policy is optimal in T = 2, the firm can at most sell C − y2,LW units
of capacity to Class 2. If Class 2 demand is greater than the available capacity anyway,
accepting an additional Class 2 request in the first booking period will not have an effect on
the firm’s revenue in the second booking period.
As for the marginal effect ∆1, the logic is the same. Again, the firm’s allocation decision
will only have a marginal impact on the firm’s revenue, if the firm can fulfill additional Class
1 requests in T = 2. Therefore,
∆1 =p1 ·∆D1 − p2 ·∆D1 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) > C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)])
=(p1 − p2 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) > C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)])) ·∆D1
=(p1 − p2) ·∆D1
+ p2 ·∆D1 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) ≤ C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)]) (3.4.6)
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yields an expression for the marginal effect of accepting an additional Class 1 request in t = 1
on the firm’s revenue in T = 2. As demand distributions and thus the optimal protection
level are shifted depending on the firm’s decision, the firm will gain additional expected
revenue of p1 ·∆D1 . However, the firm loses Class 2 revenue if the resulting Class 2 demand
in T = 2 is greater than the resulting booking limit.
The above expressions for the marginal impacts on the firm’s revenue in T = 2 themselves
depend on the allocation decision in the first booking period. Both sides of the above
optimality condition in Equation (3.4.2) therefore depend on the actual allocation decision
unless ∆D1 = ∆D2 = 0. In this case, Equation (3.4.3) demonstrates Littlewood’s rule, as the
current allocation decision does not affect future demands. While F 11 (yˆ) is increasing in yˆ,
it is not even clear if the right hand-side of the optimality condition is monotonic in yˆ and
if a booking limit policy is generally optimal in the considered setting.
In order to investigate the monotonicity properties, we first consider the properties of the
probability term involved in the expressions for ∆1 and ∆2. Rearranging terms yields
P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) ≤ C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)])
= P(D12 ≤ C − y1,LW −∆D2 · (C − yˆ)−∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)). (3.4.7)
The above probability is increasing in yˆ if D11 ≤ yˆ. If D11 > yˆ, it depends on the relation of
∆D1 and ∆D2 whether the above probability is increasing or decreasing in yˆ. If ∆D2 > ∆D1 ,
the above probability is increasing in yˆ, while it is decreasing in yˆ if ∆D2 < ∆D1 . For
∆D2 = ∆D1 , the above probability is independent of yˆ.
Substituting ∆1 and ∆2 in Equation 3.4.3, under the assumption that both the negative
and positive marginal impact of the allocation decision on the revenue in T = 2 are the
same, results in
F 11 (yˆ) = 1−
p2 + 2 · p2 ·∆D2 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) ≤ C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)])
p1 + 2 ·∆D1 · [p1 − p2 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) > C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)])]
(3.4.8)
as the optimality condition for the firm’s allocation decision. The impact of yˆ on the right
hand-side (i.e., whether it is increasing or decreasing in yˆ) depends on the relationship of its
impact on the numerator and the denominator. No general statement can be made regarding
general monotonicity properties as both the numerator and the denominator increase in yˆ
based on the properties of the probability terms involved. Therefore, the overall impact of
the firm’s allocation decision on the right-hand side in Equation (3.4.8) is not clear and thus
it is not clear either whether a booking limit policy is optimal, in general.
In contrast to Littlewood’s standard model, the firm accounts for both current revenues
and the impact of current decisions on future revenues. In order to discuss and explain the
drivers of a non-monotonic allocation policy, we consider the firm’s trade-off with regard to
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each individual Class 2 request in the first booking period. At the beginning of the booking
period, the firm will typically accept each Class 2 request. With an increasing number of
Class 2 requests, the expected marginal revenue from accepting a Class 2 request however
is decreasing while the expected marginal revenue from rejecting the request is increasing.
Thus, the firm starts to reject Class 2 requests at some level dˆ12. As more Class 2 requests
arrive, the expected marginal revenue from rejecting these requests again increases with
every further Class 2 request. At some particular Class 2 request d˜12, the expected marginal
revenue from accepting this requests is again greater than or equal to the expected marginal
revenue from rejecting it. Thus, the firm will accept d˜12 again. When applying a booking
limit policy, the firm would not accept any further Class 2 requests after having rejected the
first Class 2 request. Figure 3.4 shows the resulting number of accepted requests for dˆ12 = 15
and d˜12 = 21.
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Figure 3.4: Accepted Class 2 requests under a non-monotone allocation policy
While the theoretical result that a booking limit policy is not necessarily optimal when
accounting for potential effects on future demand is derived under the assumption that the
demand distributions in T = 2 result from shifting the demand distributions in t = 1, this
assumption does not hold in our numerical study in Section 3.5.
In order to provide some further insight, we consider two simplified cases in the following.
First, we assume ∆D1 = 0. Then, the firm’s allocation decision does not affect Class 1
revenue in T = 2. In this case, Equation (3.4.8) simplifies to
F 11 (yˆ) = 1−
p2 + 2 · p2 ·∆D2 · P(D12 + ∆D2 · (C − yˆ) ≤ C − y1,LW )
p1
. (3.4.9)
The right hand-side of the above condition is decreasing in yˆ as the fraction is increasing
in yˆ while the left hand-side is increasing in yˆ. Therefore, a booking limit policy is optimal
in this case. As in the standard setting, the optimal protection level increases in p1 and
decreases in p2. Under the assumption that accepting an additional Class 2 request results
in a non-negative marginal effect, the numerator is greater than p2. The resulting protection
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level is therefore less than or equal to Littlewood’s rule.
Next, we assume ∆D2 = 0. The optimality condition in Equation (3.4.8) then simplifies
to
F 11 (yˆ) = 1−
p2
p1 + 2 · ((p1 − p2) ·∆D1 + p2 ·∆D1 · P(D12 ≤ C − [y1,LW + ∆D1 ·min(yˆ, D11)]))
.
(3.4.10)
The fraction on the right hand-side of the above optimality condition is decreasing in yˆ
while the left hand-side is increasing in yˆ. Again, a protection level policy is optimal. As
the denominator is larger than p1, the resulting protection level is greater than or equal to
Littlewood’s rule.
To summarize, the firm faces two trade-offs in the setting considered. As in the standard
model, the firm trades-off the two customer classes within a single booking period. The
second trade-off arises from the impact of the firm’s decision on the customer demands in
subsequent booking periods. A critical fractile solution can be derived by marginal analysis.
If the expected marginal revenue effects are constant, a booking limit policy is optimal as
in the standard model. However, analyzing the critical fractile solution is rather complex
if the marginal revenue effects depend on the firm’s allocation decision. Then, both sides
of the optimality condition depend on the firm’s allocation decision. No general statement
can be made with regard to the monotonicity properties. In general, therefore, a booking
limit policy may not necessarily be optimal in the considered setting. However, a booking
limit policy is optimal if the firm’s decision only affects the demand of one of the customer
classes. Then, the firm will protect more (less) capacity than according to Littlewood’s rule
if only Class 1 (Class 2) demand is affected.
3.4.2 Partitioned Allocation Heuristic
As discussed in Section 3.3, the stochastic dynamic model formulation is rather complex and
computationally expensive. As the marginal effects of the firm’s allocation decision on the
profit in T = 2 themselves depend on the allocation decision, deriving a simple booking limit
as the optimal allocation decision as in Littlewood’s model is also not necessarily optimal as
discussed in Section 3.4.1.
In the following, we aim to derive a closed-form allocation heuristic, which is easy to
implement on the one hand but still accounts for the effects on customer demand in the
subsequent booking periods on the other hand. In order to derive such a closed-form solution
for a protection level, we analyse the above two-period setting under several additional
simplifications, which allow for the derivation of a closed-form solution. We evaluate the
quality of the resulting heuristic numerically in Section 3.5.
We derive the heuristic decision rule based on the stochastic dynamic approach for the
two-period setting. For two booking periods, the total expected profit given a particular
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state s1 reads as
V 1(s1) = max
0≤acc12≤min(d12,C)
[r1(s1, acc12) + ED22(s2),D11(s1)[V
2(s2)]], (3.4.11)
where the firm decides how many Class 2 customers to accept in the first booking period
(i.e., acc12).
In order to derive a heuristic allocation policy, we consider the following simplifications.
Simplification 1: The firm uses a booking limit policy in each booking period t
This simplification excludes non-monotonic allocation policies as discussed in the previous
section and ensures that the resulting allocation policy can be easily implemented. The firm
decides on a protection level yt in each booking period.
Simplification 2: Class 2 demand exceeds any booking limit in each booking period t
This simplification states that all available units of capacity can always be sold to Class 2.
Class 1 requests will never be fulfilled from the booking limit available for Class 2 customers,
thus the resulting protection level is a partitioned protection level. We therefore denote the
firm’s partitioned protection level in the first booking period as y1,part and the heuristic itself
as PARTITIONED. Accordingly, p2 can be considered to correspond to the salvage value in
a newsvendor setting.
Simplification 3: Additive linear demand effects shift the underlying demand distributions
This simplification controls the degree to which the allocation decision in t = 1 affects
customer demands in T = 2. We only account for marginal effects on the expected de-
mand in T = 2 and ignore potential effects on demand uncertainty in T = 2. Thus, the
demand distributions in T = 2 result from shifting the initial demand distributions, i.e.
E[D2i (d
1
i , y
1,part)] = E[D1i ] + g˜i(d
1
i , y
1,part) ∀i = 1, 2,∀d1i . The effects are assumed to be lin-
ear additive, resulting in constant marginal effects of the allocation decision on customer
demands. The optimal protection level in T = 2 according to Littlewood’s rule (see Section
3.3.3) results from shifting the Littlewood protection level y1,LW in the first booking period
by the demand effects and thus reads as
y2,LW (d11, y
1,part) = y1,LW + g˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part), ∀d11. (3.4.12)
As the firm’s allocation decision is not based on a particular Class 2 demand realization
but is a static protection level according to the first simplification, we reformulate Equation
(3.4.11). The firm maximizes its total expected profit E[pitotal(y1,part)] by deciding on y1,part.
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Under the above simplifications, the firm’s optimization problem can be stated as
max
0≤y1,part≤C
E[pitotal(y1,part)] = max
0≤y1,part≤C
E[pi1(y1,part)] + E[pi2(y1,part)], (3.4.13)
with
E[pi1(y1,part)] = p2 · (C − y1,part) + p1 · E[min(D11, y1,part)]
= p2 · (C − y1,part) + p1 · E[D11]− p1 · E[max(0, D11 − y1,part)] (3.4.14)
and
E[pi2(y1,part)]=p2 · E[C − y2,LW (d11, y1,part)]
+ p1 · E[min(D21, y2,LW (d11, y1,part))]
=p2 · E[C − y2,LW (d11, y1,part)]
+ p1 · E[D21]− p1 · E[max(0, D21 − y2,LW (d11, y1,part))]
=p2 · E[C − y2,LW (d11, y1,part)] + p1 · E[D11 + g1(d11, y1,part)]
− p1 · E[max(0, D11 + g˜1(d11, y1,part)− y1,LW − g˜1(d11, y1,part))]
=p2 · E[C − y2,LW (d11, y1,part)] + p1 · E[D11 + g˜1(d11, y1,part)]
− p1 · E[max(0, D11 − y1,LW )] (3.4.15)
The expected Class 1 demand in T = 2 depends on the firms allocation decision y1,part.
For any given pair of a protection level and a Class 1 demand realization d11 in the first
booking period, the effects on the protection level and on the expected Class 1 demand in
the second booking period are the same. Therefore, E[max(0, D21 − y2,LW (d11, y1,part))] =
E[max(0, D11 − y1,LW )] in Equation (3.4.15).
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Differentiating the total expected profit with regard to y1,part yields
dE[pitotal(y1,part)]
dy1,part
=− p2 + p1 · E[ID11>y1,part ]
+ p2 · E[−dy
2,LW (d11, y
1,part)
dy1,part
] + p1 · E[dg˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
dy1,part
]
=− p2 + p1 · P(D11 > y1,part)
+ (p1 − p2) · E[dg˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
dy1,part
]
=− p2 + p1 · P(D11 > y1,part)
+ (p1 − p2) · dg˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
dy1,part
· P(D11 > y1,part)
=P(D11 > y1,part) · [p1 + (p1 − p2) ·
dg˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
dy1,part
]− p2
=(1− F 11 (y1,part)) · [p1 + (p1 − p2) ·
dg˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
dy1,part
]− p2
(3.4.16)
as the first order derivative. In the above first order derivative,
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
denotes the
marginal effect of the firm’s allocation decision on the expected Class 1 demand in T = 2.
We make use of E[
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
] =
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
· P(D11 > y1,part) in order to rearrange terms.
Doing so reflects the third simplification and the fact that the firm’s allocation decision
only has a marginal effect on Class 1 demand in T = 2 if additional Class 1 demand can
be fulfilled by marginally increasing y1,part. This is only the case if the Class 1 demand is
greater than the protection level.
Setting the first order derivative in Equation (3.4.16) equal to zero and rearranging terms
yields
F 11 (y
1,part) = 1− p2
p1 + (p1 − p2) · dg˜1(d
1
1,y
1,part)
dy1,part
(3.4.17)
as the optimality condition for y1,part. The heuristic protection level in t = 1 based on the
simplifying assumptions made, directly follows from this optimality condition. According to
the third simplification,
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
is constant.
The analogy of the optimality equation to Littlewood’s rule (see Section 2.2.1.1) allows
a comparison of the resulting protection level y1,part with y1,LW . The relationship of both
protection levels depends on the marginal intertemporal demand effects
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
as p1 −
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p2 > 0. The following cases result:
y1,part

< y1,LW ,− p1
p1−p2 <
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
< 0,
= y1,LW ,
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
= 0,
> y1,LW ,
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
> 0.
(3.4.18)
Compared to Littlewood’s rule, the firm should thus reserve more capacity for Class 1
customers if reserving an additional unit of capacity for Class 1 customers has a non-
negative marginal effect on Class 1 demand in T = 2 (i.e. if
dg˜1(d11,y
1,part)
dy1,part
≥ 0). The term
(p1 − p2) · (1 + dg˜1(d
1
1,y
1,part)
dy1,part
) can be interpreted as the underage costs in the above critical
fractile solution in Equation (3.4.17). p1 − p2 expresses the direct marginal impact in the
first booking period while (p1−p2) · dg˜1(d
1
1,y
1,part)
dy1,part
is the marginal impact of the firm’s decision
in T = 2 under the above simplifications. The marginal effects on Class 2 demand are not
considered in the optimality equation for the heuristic protection level y1,part. They cannot
have a marginal impact in the second booking period by the second simplification.
The second order derivative with regard to y1,part equals
d2E[pitotal(y1,part)]
d2y1,part
=− f 11 (y1,part) · (p1 + (p1 − p2) ·
dg˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
dy1,part
)
+ (1− F 11 (y1,part)) · (p1 − p2) ·
d2g˜1(d
1
1, y
1,part)
d2y1,part
. (3.4.19)
The properties of the simplified expected profit function depend on the properties of the
marginal effect of y1,part on the Class 1 demand in T = 2. For non-negative marginal effects
as discussed above, the first part of the second derivative is non-positive. If the demand
effects are linear in y1,part (i.e.,
d2g˜1(d11,y
1,part)
d2y1,part
= 0) as assumed above, the total expected profit
is concave in y1,part under the stated simplifications. Thus, y1,part is the unique optimal
protection level in this case.
3.5 Numerical Study
In the following numerical study, we evaluate the performance and compare the decisions
taken according to the different allocation policies. In particular, we compare the optimal
allocation policy resulting from the stochastic dynamic programming model, the PARTI-
TIONED heuristic derived above, and other allocation heuristics discussed in the remainder
of this section. First, we present and discuss a particular approach to modeling intertemporal
demand effects gi (see Section 3.3), in order to investigate the general model above numer-
ically. Several other multi-period allocation heuristics (in addition to PARTITIONED) are
then presented. These heuristics are myopic and based on Littlewood’s model and therefore
serve as benchmarks within the numerical study. To summarize, the numerical study aims
78
to:
• compare short-term oriented allocation heuristics with the optimal allocation policy
resulting from the stochastic dynamic programming approach with regard to (a) the
resulting performance and (b) the resulting allocation decisions,
• investigate the influence of different parameters on the resulting performance (e.g.,
under which conditions our approach outperforms the other allocation heuristics and
when, on the contrary, a simpler heuristic will suffice) and on the different allocation
decisions,
• investigate the dynamics with regard to allocation decisions over time.
The numerical analysis is divided into two parts which differ with regard to the length
of the planning horizon. In the first part (Part A), we compare all considered allocation
strategies for a planning horizon of T = 4. In this part, we particularly focus on the
first two objectives of the numerical study: we compare the performance and the resulting
allocation decisions before undertaking a sensitivity analysis to show the parameters’ impact
on performance and allocation decisions. In order to investigate the dynamics of allocation
decisions over time, we extend the planning horizon to T = 10 in the second part (Part B)
of the numerical study. As the computation time increases significantly due to the longer
planning horizon, we exclude the optimal allocation policy from this part. In Part B we focus
on the impact of the planning horizon on the performance gaps by comparing the results for
T = 10 with the results in Part A and the dynamics in the allocation decisions over time.
3.5.1 Study Design
3.5.1.1 Modeling Customer Demand
Within the numerical study, we model customer demand by means of a Poisson distribution
with expected demand E[Dti ] = λ
t
i (∀i, t). It is common to assume Poisson distributions in
revenue management research (see, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) and Shen and Su
(2007)).
In order to investigate the allocation strategies numerically, the demand transition func-
tion gi must be specified. As the Poisson distribution is fully parameterized by λ
t
i, gi in this
case describes the transition from λti to λ
t+1
i . In the remainder of the numerical study, we
specify the transition by:
λt+1i = λ
t
i + ai · accti − ri · (dti − accti) (∀st, i, t = 1, ..., T − 1). (3.5.1)
While accti denotes the number of accepted customers, d
t
i − accti denotes the number
of rejected customers in customer class i given a demand realization dti. According to this
specification, the expected demand in booking period t+1 results from the expected demand
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in t and the customers’ reactions to acceptance (ai) and rejection (ri). The firm cannot accept
more requests than available, i.e. accti ≤ dti. Within this representation, the intertemporal
demand effects are assumed to be linear in the number of accepted and rejected customers.
The above representation can be interpreted as an approximation of a model which con-
siders individual customers. Instead of considering individual customers with individual
reactions towards their requests being accepted or rejected, we aggregate the customers
class-wise by assuming average reactions towards acceptance and rejection.
To this end, consider individual customers and individual repurchase probabilities as fol-
lows. Let probtij denote the purchase probability of a customer j from customer class i in
booking period t. Furthermore, assume a finite customer population Pi in either customer
class i. Then, E[Dti ] =
∑Pi
j=1 prob
t
ij is the expected demand of customer class i in book-
ing period t. Assuming a particular demand realization dti, the expected demand in the
subsequent booking period can be expressed as
E[Dt+1i ] =
accti∑
j=1
min(probtij + ∆
+
ij, 1) +
dti∑
j=accti+1
max(probtij −∆−ij, 0) +
Pi∑
j=dti+1
probtij,
(3.5.2)
where ∆ij denotes the (non-negative) changes in repurchase probability in case of acceptance
(∆+ij) or rejection (∆
−
ij) of a customer j. The first part of the above equation denotes the
total expected demand from the previously accepted customers in booking period t+ 1. As
for the repurchase probability, probtij + ∆
+
ij ≤ 1 (∀j = 1..accti) must hold. The second part
is the expected demand in t+ 1 of all customers being rejected in booking period t. As the
repurchase probability is non-negative, probtij −∆−ij ≥ 0 (∀j = accti + 1..dti) must hold. The
third part accounts for all customers who do not request a unit of capacity in booking period
t. For these customers, the repurchase probability does not change.
Assuming that all customers within Class i are homogeneous allows for consideration of
average repurchase probabilities probti and average changes in repurchase probabilities ∆i.
Equation (3.5.2) can then be rearranged as follows:
E[Dt+1i ] =min(prob
t
i + ∆
+
i , 1) · accti + max(0, probti −∆−i ) · (dti − accti)
+ probti · (Pi − dti), (3.5.3)
Rearranging terms under the further assumptions that probti + ∆
+
i < 1 and prob
t
i −∆−i > 0
yields
E[Dt+1i ] =(prob
t
i + ∆
+
i ) · accti + (probti −∆−i ) · (dti − accti) + probti · (Pi − dti)
=probti · Pi + ∆+i · accti −∆−i · (dti − accti). (3.5.4)
After replacing ∆+i = ai and ∆
−
i = ri, the above representation for the demand transition
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follows from this term. Thus, ai and ri can be interpreted as average marginal changes in
repurchase probabilities. However, the above modeling of the demand transition process is
only an approximation as it only holds for probti + ∆
+
i < 1 and prob
t
i −∆−i > 0 as discussed
above. In addition, the approximation models aggregate demand rather than individual
demand due to the assumption of homogeneity in customers within a customer class.
3.5.1.2 Allocation Heuristics
Partitioned Allocation Heuristic
Accounting for the above specification of the intertemporal demand effects, the PARTI-
TIONED heuristic (see Section 3.4.2) can be specified. For the considered protection level
policy, the transition of Class 1 demand follows as
E[D21] = E[D
1
1] + a1 ·min(D11, y1,part)− r1 ·max(0, D11 − y1,part)
= E[D11] +
a1 ·D11, if D11 ≤ y1,part,a1 · y1,part − r1 · (D11 − y1,part), else . (3.5.5)
Thus, the marginal impact of the firm’s decision on the protection level y1,part results in
dE[D21]
dy1,part
=
0, if D11 < y1,part,a1 + r1, if D11 > y1,part. (3.5.6)
If D11 ≤ y1,part, the firm’s allocation decision has no marginal impact on D21. If D11 > y1,part,
the decision’s marginal impact equals to a1 + r1. Accordingly,
F t1(y
t,part) = 1− p2
p1 + (p1 − p2) · (a1 + r1) (∀t,∀s
t) (3.5.7)
results as the optimality equation for y1,part after replacing E[
dD21(s
2)
dy1,part
|D11(s1) > y1,part] =
a1 + r1 in Equation (3.4.17).
As discussed above, PARTITIONED anticipates the effect of the firm’s allocation decision
on Class 1 demand in the subsequent booking period. The heuristic is derived under some
simplifications. To test their appropriateness, these simplifications do not hold within the
setting of our numerical study. First, the firm will implement a booking limit policy follow-
ing this approach but such a policy is not necessarily optimal as discussed above. Second,
Class 2 demand does not always exceed the booking limit. Third, the demand distributions
are not simply shifted within the numerical study. We shift the expected demand as shown
in Equation (3.5.1), however, probabilities change as we model demand using a Poisson dis-
tribution. This allows for a comparison of the performance of the heuristic with the optimal
allocation policy resulting from the stochastic dynamic programming approach and alterna-
tive short-term allocation heuristics discussed below.
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Myopic, Littlewood-Based Allocation Heuristics
As the firm decides on a protection level in each period, applying Littlewood’s rule in each
admissible state st in each booking period t is an intuitive benchmark for the optimal allo-
cation policy. Accordingly, the optimality condition results as
F t1(y
t,LW ) = 1− p2
p1
(∀t, ∀st). (3.5.8)
This heuristic mirrors a situation where the firm updates the demand forecasts regularly
at the beginning of each booking period. The firm reacts to the updated demand forecast by
setting the appropriate single-periodically optimal protection level but does not anticipate
the effects of its decisions on future demands. We therefore refer to this heuristic as REACT
in the remainder of the paper. The resulting total expected profit equals the sum of single-
periodically optimal expected profits. When applying this heuristic, the firm does not look
ahead to the future, they do not account for potential effects on future customer demand in
the allocation decisions. Thus, comparing the performance of the optimal allocation policy
with REACT demonstrates the value of looking ahead to the future.
As an additional benchmark, we consider a heuristic which completely neglects the in-
tertemporal demand effects over time. When applying this heuristic, the firm protects
yt = y1,LW = const. (∀t,∀st) units of capacity for the high-value customers in each book-
ing period, independent of the particular state. We refer to this heuristic as NEGLECT.
In general, this is the most short-sighted allocation heuristic, and it is dominated by RE-
ACT. However, comparing its performance with REACT allows quantification of the value
of regularly updating customer demand.
3.5.1.3 Experimental Design
Our numerical analysis is divided into two parts. We consider a planning horizon of T = 4
in Part A and T = 10 in Part B. While we compare all considered allocation strategies (i.e.,
the optimal allocation policy and all allocation heuristics) in Part A, Part B only considers
the allocation heuristics. As it is intractable due to the size of the state space, we omit the
optimal allocation policy in the second part. Accordingly, we compare the optimal allocation
policy with the allocation heuristics with regard to the resulting performance and the actual
allocation decisions, and investigate the impact of different parameters in Part A. While we
test the same parameters in Part B, the latter part additionally allows investigation of the
dynamics of the allocation decisions over time due to the longer planning horizon.
We consider a capacity of C = 10 units and a price for Class 2 customers of p2 = 100. We
choose the rather small value for C in order to cope with the computationally demanding
determination of the optimal allocation policy. In addition, we fix the ratio of the initial
expected customer demands, i.e.,
λ12
λ11
= 1.5. As for the remaining parameters of our model,
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Parameter description Symbol Parameter values
Capacity C 10
(Expected) demand ratio
λ12
λ11
1.5
(Expected) load factor in t = 1
λ11+λ
1
2
C 1.0, 1.5
Price earned by selling to Class 1 p1 150, 250
Price earned by selling to Class 2 p2 100
Average effect on repurchase probability in case of
accepting a request of Class i
ai 0.0, 0.2, 0.4
Average effect on repurchase probability in case of
rejecting a request of Class i
ri 0.0, 0.2, 0.4
Table 3.1: Experimental design for the numerical study
we run a full-factorial experimental design. By varying the load factor
λ11+λ
1
2
C
∈ {1, 1.5}, we
vary the initial scarcity of the resource. The degree of customer heterogeneity is accounted
for by varying p1 ∈ {150, 250}. The marginal average demand effects ai and ri, which
account for customer heterogeneity in the long run, are ∀i chosen as ai ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4} and
ri ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4}. Thus, we investigate scenarios where acceptance and/or denial result in no
effects (i.e., ai = 0 and/or ri = 0) and scenarios where both decisions cause relatively high
reactions (i.e., ai = 0.4 and/or ri = 0.4). According to Section 3.5.1.1, these parameters
can be interpreted as average changes of repurchase probabilities. Thus we choose relatively
small absolute values for these parameters. Note that the simplifying assumptions used to
derive PARTITIONED do not hold in most of the considered scenarios and therefore the
numerical results also give an indication of how well the heuristic performs under general
conditions.
Table 3.1 summarizes the experimental design. There are N = 2 · 2 · 34 = 324 parameter
combinations (denoted as scenarios in the remainder of this chapter) in total. For each
scenario, we determine the respective optimal allocation policy by backward induction and
the resulting total expected profit by forward recursion. All other allocation policies are
directly evaluated by forward recursion as the respective protection levels can be easily
determined by means of closed-form expressions. Thus, we do not simulate allocation policies
but determine the allocation decisions and resulting expected profits exactly. Figure 3.5
shows the design of the code underlying the numerical study for the optimal allocation
policy. First, we determine the expected profit resulting from Littlewood’s rule for a set of
possible combinations of demand distributions in booking period T . As Littlewood’s rule
is a static allocation policy which does not depend on demand realizations, the demand
distributions themselves are sufficient for determining the firm’s allocation decision in the
last booking period. As a booking limit policy may not be optimal in the preceding booking
periods n = T − 1, ..., 1, the optimal allocation decision is determined for each particular
demand realization dn2 (and for each combination of demand distributions) by backward
induction. In addition, we determine the expected number of customer requests accepted
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Figure 3.5: Optimization process and coding
and rejected in each of the periods.
All heuristics and the stochastic dynamic programming model have been coded in C++.
The computational tests were executed on a personal computer with an Intel Core i7 3.20GHz
processor and 32GB RAM, operated by the Microsoft Windows 7 Professional system.
3.5.2 Numerical Results
3.5.2.1 Part A: T = 4
In a first step, we investigate the performance and the resulting allocation decisions of
the three heuristic allocation strategies and the optimal allocation policy for a planning
horizon of four booking periods. First, we discuss aggregated results, then we investigate
the impact of the different parameters on the performance and the decisions of the different
allocation strategies in terms of a sensitivity analysis. Table 3.2 shows the spread of the
optimality gaps over the 324 scenarios for the three considered allocation heuristics. Next to
the respective minimum, average and maximum optimality gap, we indicate the 25%, 50%
and 75% percentile optimality gap.
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Percentile PARTITIONED REACT NEGLECT
min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
25% 0.00% 0.06% 0.57%
50% 0.00% 0.37% 2.08%
75% 0.09% 0.87% 5.98%
max 0.49% 2.44% 12.79%
average 0.06% 0.57% 3.85%
Table 3.2: Spread of optimality gaps (Part A)
From the results in Table 3.2, we note three things:
• PARTITIONED is on average very close (0.06%) to the optimal allocation policy in-
dicating that the heuristic performs very well. The heuristic dominates the other two
allocation heuristics based on Littlewood’s rule. PARTITIONED yields the optimal
allocation decisions in more than 50% of the scenarios. Its maximum optimality gap
is 0.49%. Due to its very close to optimal performance and the fact that the PARTI-
TIONED heuristic only accounts for Class 1 demand effects, it follows that accounting
for Class 1 demand effects seems to be very important for the firm’s allocation deci-
sions. This is in line with the empirical results discussed in the literature overview and
the notion of customer relationship management.
• REACT also performs close (0.57%) to optimal on average. Thus, reacting to the
demand interactions still results in a good performance. The value of looking ahead in
time is relatively low due to the small optimality gaps of REACT in most of the con-
sidered scenarios. Although very small, the optimality gap for REACT is around ten
times as large as that of PARTITIONED. The benefit of applying revenue management
itself is assumed to be only around 2-5% (see Chapter 2). REACT yields the optimal
allocation decision in less than 25% of the scenarios with a maximum optimality gap of
2.44%. This indicates that scenarios exist where only reacting to demand interactions
costs a significant share of revenue and where the value of looking ahead in time is
high. We discuss the conditions under which this is the case later.
• NEGLECT performs significantly worse on average (3.85%) compared to the other
two allocation heuristics. NEGLECT results in a optimality gap of more than 5.98%
in 25% of the scenarios. Therefore, not even reacting to changes in customer demand
has a significant impact on the firm’s profit in many scenarios. This result clearly
emphasises the importance of demand updating. The value of updating customer
demands is considerable across almost all scenarios.
As the average value of looking ahead is rather small, we additionally relate it to the
value of applying revenue management itself. In order to do so, we relate it to the average
single-period value of applying Littlewood’s rule instead of applying a first-come-first-served
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policy. For the considered scenarios, the average single-period value of applying revenue
management results in 11.91%. Related to the value of applying revenue management, the
above average optimality gap of 0.57% amounts to a relative revenue increase of about 4.79%.
Thus, the further improvement of anticipating potential effects on future customer demands
is considerable when related to the value of applying revenue management itself. Next to
this argument, an additional 0.57% of a typical total revenue (of, e.g., an airline) means a
considerable amount of money.
Table 3.3 shows the average, minimum and maximum computation times across all sce-
narios for the different allocation strategies. The indicated computation times comprise both
determination of the optimal allocation decisions and their evaluation for the optimal allo-
cation policy. For the remaining three allocation heuristics, the computation times indicated
comprise only the forward evaluation of the resulting booking limit policies. On average,
Allocation strategy Average [sec] Minimum [sec] Maximum [sec]
Optimal allocation policy 4660.61 0.72 20376.50
PARTITIONED 2391.06 0.58 10328.70
REACT 2388.40 0.50 10356.60
NEGLECT 2331.56 0.25 10133.60
Table 3.3: Computation times (Part A)
it requires 4660.61 seconds = 77.68 minutes to determine the optimal allocation policy by
backward induction and to evaluate it afterwards for the parameters to be tested. The long
computation times clearly indicate the complexity of the stochastic dynamic programming
approach and the size of the underlying state space. The allocation heuristics need around
half the time and still yield close to optimal solutions on average (see above). The compu-
tation times are that long although the available capacity only equals ten units. It would
increase considerably for larger capacities (and thus customer demands) making the prob-
lem almost intractable for settings of practical relevance and sizes at least for the optimal
allocation policy.
As discussed above, the state space considered is already rather large for the small capacity
of 10 units and the short planning horizon of T = 4. To give an idea of the size of the state
space, consider the following scenario: a1 = 0, r1 = 0.2, a2 = r2 = 0 with a load factor of 1.5.
In this case, the maximum possible expected Class 1 demand equals λˆT1 = λ
1
1+a1 ·(T−1)·C =
6. However, 6
0.2
+1 = 31 different possible values for the expected Class 1 demand may result.
As both Class 2 demand effects equal zero, the expected Class 2 demand remains constant at
the initial value of 9. However, we consider
⌊
9 +
√
9 + 1
⌋
= 13 Class 2 demand realizations.
The state space consists of 31 · 13 = 403 states and thus decisions to be taken and evaluated
in the last booking period in the considered example. This is one of the scenarios for the
smallest state space. Determining the size of the state spaces for all considered scenarios
results in an average size of the state space of more than one million states for consideration
per scenario.
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In order to explain the different performance of the considered allocation heuristics, we
analyse the actual resulting allocation decisions in the respective booking periods and the
number of accepted requests in both customer classes over time.
Table 3.4 shows the average protection levels set by the firm under the different allocation
strategies in the booking periods considered. On average the firm protects more capacity
Allocation strategy t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 T = 4
Optimal allocation policy 5.36 5.71 6.34 6.82
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.05 6.77
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.90 6.56
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Table 3.4: Average protection levels (Part A)
for Class 1 requests under the optimal allocation policy in comparison to the allocation
heuristics. This also holds for the first booking period where the allocation decisions under
each strategy are taken based on the same demand distribution parameters. Comparing
the firm’s average allocation decisions emphasizes the importance of focusing on Class 1
customers.
Average protection levels increase over time except for NEGLECT. On average, Class 1
demand increases due to increasing protection levels as more Class 1 requests can be ful-
filled. The increasing average Class 1 demand again results in an increasing protection level.
Thus, by allocating more capacity to the higher-value customer class, the firm succeeds in
increasing customer loyalty. On average, the importance of Class 1 customers increases due
to the additional intertemporal demand effects compared to the standard setting where cus-
tomers only exhibit heterogeneous willingness-to-pay. Figure 3.6 demonstrates the average
protection levels over time from Table 3.4. As shown in Figure 3.6, the gaps between the
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Figure 3.6: Average protection levels over time (Part A)
optimal protection level and the other allocation heuristics first increase and then decrease
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again. The optimality gaps are also mainly due to the differences in the protection levels
within the first periods.
Due to the differences in the protection levels, the different allocation strategies offer
different service for the customer classes. Typically, service levels for the different customer
classes are presented in order to account for this fact. However, service levels are hard
to interpret in our setting as expected demands change over time. Therefore, the service
provided for a particular customer class does not necessarily correlate with the capacity
dedicated to this customer class and thus the firm’s allocation decision. In the following, we
therefore analyse the number of accepted requests for each customer class. Table 3.5 shows
the number of accepted requests for both customer classes in all booking periods and the
sum of accepted requests over the entire planning horizon.
Customer class and allocation strategy t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 T = 4 sum
Class 1
Optimal allocation policy 4.32 4.94 5.69 6.33 21.27
PARTITIONED 4.20 4.82 5.58 6.27 20.86
REACT 4.05 4.55 5.21 5.90 19.70
NEGLECT 4.05 4.21 4.28 4.32 16.85
Class 2
Optimal allocation policy 4.11 3.70 3.12 2.70 13.64
PARTITIONED 4.42 3.92 3.25 2.72 14.30
REACT 4.81 4.43 3.83 3.22 16.29
NEGLECT 4.81 5.00 5.10 5.13 20.04
Table 3.5: Average accepted customer requests (Part A)
While the optimal allocation policy accepts more Class 1 requests in comparison with
the other allocation heuristics, it also accepts fewer Class 2 requests. Thus, it is on average
more favorable to focus on Class 1 customers compared to Class 2 customers. However, as
we will see in Section 3.5.2.2, this is not the case in all considered scenarios. Depending on
customer heterogeneity and the reactions of the customer classes towards acceptance and
rejection, this can also be the other way around in some scenarios.
In a second step, we perform a sensitivity analysis in order to investigate the impact
of particular parameters on the performance of the different allocation strategies and the
actual resulting allocation policies. This allows for the identification of scenarios where it
is particularly beneficial for the firm to allocate its capacity optimally instead of making
use of allocation heuristics. Table 3.6 summarizes the average optimality gaps for different
parameter values. The numbers give the average optimality gap if a single parameter is set
constant at a particular value and all other parameters are varied.
First, we analyse the impact of the Class 1 demand effects. As shown in Table 3.6, the
average optimality gap of PARTITIONED is almost invariant to changes in the parameters
except for varying values of a1 and r1. In these cases, both the largest average optimality
gaps and the largest spreads of average optimality gaps are observed. These parameters drive
the profitability of serving Class 1 demand. The same holds for REACT and NEGLECT.
Here, these parameters also have the greatest impact on the resulting average optimality
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Parameter Value PARTITIONED REACT NEGLECT
load factor
1 0.06% 0.53% 3.31%
1.5 0.07% 0.60% 4.38%
p1
150 0.07% 0.33% 1.99%
250 0.05% 0.81% 5.71%
a1
0 0.03% 0.20% 0.33%
0.2 0.05% 0.59% 3.01%
0.4 0.11% 0.92% 8.21%
r1
0 0.02% 0.17% 3.81%
0.2 0.08% 0.52% 3.75%
0.4 0.09% 1.00% 3.99%
a2
0 0.08% 0.59% 3.54%
0.2 0.06% 0.55% 3.93%
0.4 0.06% 0.56% 4.09%
r2
0 0.06% 0.59% 3.96%
0.2 0.06% 0.57% 3.86%
0.4 0.07% 0.54% 3.72%
Table 3.6: Average parameter-dependent optimality gaps (Part A)
gaps. Compared to PARTITIONED, the average optimality gaps are significantly larger
with a larger spread for the myopic Littlewood-based allocation heuristics.
The optimality gaps partly significantly increase in the Class 1 demand effects. This holds
in particular for the impact of a1 as varying a1 affects the performance of all three allocation
heuristics. While both a1 and r1 affect the performance of PARTITIONED and REACT,
the performance of NEGLECT is only significantly affected by a1. Analyzing the optimality
gaps for different values of a1 yields the following results:
• PARTITIONED performance decreases but is still nearly optimal, with increasing
Class 1 demand effects.
• Under high Class 1 demand effects, REACT loses revenue. This effect arises from its
delayed reaction to the demand effects.
• Two aspects of NEGLECT are noteworthy: while NEGLECT performs very close to
optimal for a1 = 0, its performance is particularly bad for a1 = 0.4.
Second, we analyse the impact of varying p1 as the parameters affecting Class 1 profitabil-
ity seem to be particularly important. While the performance of PARTITIONED is almost
invariant to variations of p1, varying p1 has a considerably influence on the optimality gaps
for REACT and NEGLECT. In particular, REACT performs significantly worse with in-
creasing price p1 due to the fact that the allocation strategy does not protect enough capacity
for Class 1 demand on average in the first booking periods. Compared to PARTITIONED,
REACT responds with some delay to the demand effects and thus loses revenue.
In contrast to the Class 1 demand effects, the Class 2 demand effects a2 and r2 do not have
a significant impact on the performance of the firm’s allocation strategies. The performance
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of both PARTITIONED and REACT in particular is almost invariant to changes in these
parameters. Only the average performance of NEGLECT is affected by a2.
Regarding the impact of the other parameters, only the impact of varying the load factor
is noteworthy. However, varying the load factor only affects the average performance of
NEGLECT. All other parameters have no noteworthy effects on the performance of the
allocation heuristics.
In order to further investigate the optimality gaps, Table 3.7 compares the firm’s aver-
age protection levels under the optimal allocation strategy and the allocation heuristics in
all booking periods for all considered values of a1 and r1. The observed protection levels
explain the optimality gaps which are also indicated in Table 3.7. The performance of the
different allocation heuristics is mainly driven by p1, a1 and r1 as discussed above. The other
parameters do not affect the performance of the allocation strategies significantly. As p1 is
already part of Littlewood’s standard model, we focus on investigating the impact of the
intertemporal demand effects a1 and r1.
Parameter Value Allocation strategy t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 T = 4 Opt. gap
a1
0
Optimal allocation policy 4.85 4.53 4.32 4.16 -
PARTITIONED 4.83 4.38 4.26 4.15 0.03%
REACT 4.50 4.36 4.22 4.09 0.20%
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 0.33%
0.2
Optimal allocation policy 5.45 5.73 6.40 7.07 -
PARTITIONED 5.08 5.24 6.07 6.98 0.05%
REACT 4.50 5.18 5.90 6.71 0.59%
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 3.01%
0.4
Optimal allocation policy 5.78 6.89 8.32 9.21 -
PARTITIONED 5.25 6.11 7.83 9.17 0.11%
REACT 4.50 5.99 7.58 8.89 0.92%
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 8.21%
r1
0
Optimal allocation policy 4.98 5.52 6.42 7.07 -
PARTITIONED 4.83 5.36 6.26 7.05 0.02%
REACT 4.50 5.36 6.21 7.00 0.17%
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 3.81%
0.2
Optimal allocation policy 5.40 5.70 6.29 6.80 -
PARTITIONED 5.08 5.22 6.04 6.77 0.08%
REACT 4.50 5.15 5.90 6.59 0.52%
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 3.75%
0.4
Optimal allocation policy 5.70 5.92 6.32 6.58 -
PARTITIONED 5.25 5.15 5.86 6.48 0.09%
REACT 4.50 5.01 5.59 6.10 1.00%
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 3.99%
Table 3.7: Average parameter-dependent protection levels and optimality gaps (Part A)
As shown above, the average optimality gaps increase with increasing Class 1 demand
effects. As shown in Table 3.7, the average optimal protection levels are greater than the
heuristic protection levels for a1 = 0.4 or r1 = 0.4. Under high Class 1 demand effects, the
firm thus particularly benefits from protecting more capacity for Class 1 customers. This
result is rather intuitive. Protecting more capacity for Class 1 customers results in higher
future Class 1 demand as more customer requests can be accepted and fewer requests have
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to be rejected.
A closer look at a1 = 0.4 shows (1) that the firm already protects almost the entire
capacity for Class 1 customers after four booking periods, and (2) the above discussed
delayed response of REACT compared to PARTITIONED. Thus, the main contribution
to the optimality gap arises from the second and third booking period as the protection
levels differ most there. This result is in line with the development of the total average
protection levels over time shown in Figure 3.6 and discussed above. In contrast to REACT,
PARTITIONED adapts the protection level faster and thus allows the acceptance of more
Class 1 requests already in early booking periods.
As shown above in Table 3.7, PARTITIONED structurally underestimates the protec-
tion level compared to the optimal allocation policy although the heuristic protection level
explicitly accounts for intertemporal Class 1 demand effects. This is due to the fact that
PARTITIONED only accounts for two periods (i.e. the effects of a current allocation decision
on the subsequent booking period) while the optimal allocation policy considers all remain-
ing booking periods until the end of the planning horizon when taking an allocation decision.
Thus, the optimal policy already anticipates the decision’s effect on multiple future booking
periods. Therefore, an even larger protection level results from the optimal allocation policy.
3.5.2.2 Part B: T = 10
As shown above for T = 4, the various allocation heuristics differ with regard to the degree
to which they respond to the demand effects. In Part B of the numerical study, we extend
the planning horizon to T = 10 booking periods in order to further investigate the allocation
decisions over time. We omit the optimal allocation policy in Part B due to being computa-
tionally intractable. The very close to optimal performance of PARTITIONED (see Section
3.5.2.1) gives additional support for omitting the optimal allocation policy.
First, we compare the allocation heuristics with regard to their performance and the
dynamics in terms of the actual allocation decisions over time. The relative performance of
REACT and NEGLECT in relation to PARTITIONED is denoted as a performance gap in
the remainder of this section. We investigate the impact of the longer planning horizon on
the relative performance of the allocation heuristics and the respective resulting protection
levels. We analyse the impact of the different parameters on the firm’s allocation decisions
in the long run.
In order to investigate the impact of the longer planning horizon on the resulting perfor-
mance gaps, we again determine the minimum, average and maximum, and the 25%, 50%
and 75% percentile performance gap with regard to PARTITIONED. The results are shown
in Table 3.8.
For a planning horizon of T = 10 booking periods, REACT performs on average 0.94%
worse than PARTITIONED. The performance gap is greater than 1.35% in only 25% of the
cases. The maximum performance gap amounts to 4.09%, which is considerable. However,
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Percentile React Neglect
min -0.05% 0.00%
25% 0.13% 1.82%
50% 0.50% 9.81%
75% 1.35% 17.06%
max 4.09% 28.50%
average 0.94% 10.53%
Table 3.8: Spread of performance gaps (Part B)
on average REACT still performs very well even with a longer planning horizon in most of
the scenarios. In a very few scenarios, REACT performs even better than PARTITIONED.
NEGLECT performs on average 10.53% worse than PARTITIONED. The performance
gap exceeds 9.81% in 50% of the scenarios and 17.06% in 25% of the scenarios. By applying
NEGLECT the firm thus loses considerable revenue in most of the scenarios.
Compared to the results for T = 4 (shown in Table 3.2), the performance gaps (and thus
both the value of looking ahead and the value of updating customer demand) increase over
time. However, the performance gap of NEGLECT increases significantly more than the
performance gap of REACT. Thus, with an increasing planning horizon, updating customer
demands becomes increasingly important. This result is rather intuitive as the absolute
demand effects increase over time while the allocation policy under NEGLECT does not
change. Thus, the error made by the allocation policy increases over time.
Table 3.9 illustrates the performance gaps depending on the problem parameters.
Parameter Value REACT NEGLECT
load factor
1 1.08% 11.40%
1.5 0.79% 9.66%
p1
150 0.81% 7.22%
250 1.07% 13.84%
a1
0 0.70% 0.94%
0.2 1.50% 12.74%
0.4 0.61% 17.90%
r1
0 0.16% 10.36%
0.2 0.79% 10.36%
0.4 1.87% 10.86%
a2
0 0.84% 9.32%
0.2 0.95% 11.01%
0.4 1.02% 11.25%
r2
0 0.98% 10.88%
0.2 0.94% 10.58%
0.4 0.88% 10.13%
Table 3.9: Average parameter-dependent performance gaps (Part B)
The impact of the different parameters on the performance gaps is in principle the same as
for T = 4. Again, the Class 1 demand effects have the strongest impact on the performance of
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the different allocation heuristics. In contrast to Part A, the impact of a1 is non-monotone
regarding the performance gap of REACT for the longer planning horizon. The largest
average performance gap results for a1 = 0.2. For even larger positive Class 1 demand effects,
the performance gap decreases again. As the factors which drive the performance gaps are
comparable to Part A, we will not discuss them further in detail for T = 10 but rather focus
on the dynamics in the actual allocation decisions over time in the remainder of this section.
Analyzing the allocation decisions explains the performance gaps and demonstrates insights
about the long-term allocation strategy under the different allocation heuristics.
Table 3.10 shows the average protection levels set by the firm under the different allocation
heuristics in all considered booking periods. On average the firm protects more capacity for
Allocation strategy t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7 t = 8 t = 9 T = 10
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.05 6.77 7.18 7.45 7.60 7.69 7.74 7.76
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.90 6.56 6.98 7.25 7.41 7.50 7.56 7.58
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Table 3.10: Average protection levels (Part B)
Class 1 requests under PARTITIONED in comparison to the other allocation heuristics. This
also holds for the first booking period where the allocation decisions under each strategy are
taken based on the same demand distribution parameters. The average protection levels in
the first four booking periods are equivalent to the average protection levels in PART A.
This would not necessarily be the case for the optimal allocation policy as the stochastic
dynamic programming approach would anticipate the longer planning horizon.
Again, the average protection levels increase over time except for NEGLECT. The de-
velopment of the average protection levels is illustrated in Figure 3.7. As for T = 4 in
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Figure 3.7: Average protection levels over time (Part B)
the previous section, the difference in the average protection levels resulting from PARTI-
TIONED and REACT decreases over time. The main difference again stems from the first
few booking periods. On average these two allocation strategies protect more than 75% of
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the available capacity for the higher-value customers at the end of the planning horizon. The
average protection levels seem to converge towards the end of the planning horizon.
In order to further investigate the impact of the different parameters on the protection
levels resulting from the allocation heuristics, Table 3.11 shows the average protection levels
for the different parameter values in each booking period.
Parameter Value Allocation
strategy
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7 t = 8 t = 9 T = 10
load factor
1
PARTITIONED 4.11 4.12 4.90 5.76 6.41 6.82 7.08 7.26 7.37 7.44
REACT 3.50 4.07 4.75 5.53 6.15 6.57 6.85 7.04 7.15 7.21
NEGLECT 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
1.5
PARTITIONED 6.00 6.36 7.21 7.77 7.96 8.07 8.12 8.12 8.11 8.09
REACT 5.50 6.27 7.05 7.59 7.82 7.92 7.96 7.97 7.96 7.94
NEGLECT 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50
p1
150
PARTITIONED 4.22 4.44 5.16 5.93 6.48 6.83 7.03 7.18 7.30 7.36
REACT 4.00 4.40 5.01 5.68 6.21 6.56 6.76 6.92 7.02 7.08
NEGLECT 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
250
PARTITIONED 5.89 6.04 6.94 7.61 7.89 8.07 8.18 8.20 8.19 8.17
REACT 5.00 5.95 6.79 7.44 7.76 7.93 8.05 8.09 8.09 8.08
NEGLECT 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
a1
0
PARTITIONED 4.83 4.38 4.26 4.15 4.04 3.94 3.85 3.75 3.67 3.58
REACT 4.50 4.36 4.22 4.09 3.96 3.84 3.72 3.61 3.51 3.41
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.2
PARTITIONED 5.08 5.24 6.07 6.98 7.72 8.44 8.96 9.32 9.56 9.71
REACT 4.50 5.18 5.90 6.71 7.41 8.04 8.55 8.92 9.17 9.33
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
PARTITIONED 5.25 6.11 7.83 9.17 9.79 9.97 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
REACT 4.50 5.99 7.58 8.89 9.58 9.86 9.95 9.98 9.99 10.00
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
r1
0
PARTITIONED 4.83 5.36 6.26 7.05 7.53 7.84 7.99 8.10 8.16 8.17
REACT 4.50 5.36 6.21 7.00 7.50 7.81 7.97 8.09 8.15 8.17
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.2
PARTITIONED 5.08 5.22 6.04 6.77 7.17 7.44 7.60 7.68 7.73 7.76
REACT 4.50 5.15 5.90 6.59 6.99 7.26 7.45 7.55 7.60 7.63
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
PARTITIONED 5.25 5.15 5.86 6.48 6.84 7.07 7.21 7.29 7.34 7.37
REACT 4.50 5.01 5.59 6.10 6.45 6.66 6.80 6.88 6.92 6.94
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
a2
0
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.07 6.80 7.23 7.50 7.67 7.77 7.83 7.85
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.92 6.61 7.06 7.34 7.51 7.63 7.69 7.72
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.2
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.05 6.76 7.17 7.44 7.58 7.67 7.72 7.74
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.90 6.55 6.97 7.22 7.38 7.47 7.52 7.53
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.04 6.74 7.15 7.41 7.55 7.64 7.68 7.70
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.88 6.52 6.92 7.18 7.33 7.42 7.46 7.48
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
r2
0
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.05 6.76 7.17 7.43 7.58 7.67 7.72 7.74
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.90 6.55 6.97 7.22 7.38 7.48 7.52 7.54
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.2
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.05 6.77 7.18 7.45 7.60 7.69 7.74 7.76
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.90 6.56 6.98 7.24 7.40 7.50 7.55 7.57
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
PARTITIONED 5.06 5.24 6.06 6.77 7.20 7.47 7.62 7.71 7.77 7.79
REACT 4.50 5.17 5.90 6.57 7.00 7.27 7.43 7.54 7.59 7.62
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Table 3.11: Average parameter-dependent protection levels (Part B)
As shown in Table 3.11, the average protection levels are constant (in case of NEGLECT )
or increase (in case of PARTITIONED and REACT ) over time for all parameter values
except for a1 = 0. Thus, a1 affects the firm’s allocation policy over time structurally.
First, we consider the impact of a1 in more detail. For a1 = 0, the average protection
level decreases over time as other parameters such as Class 2 demand effects seem to affect
the firm’s allocation policy. As a result, the average protection level decreases over time.
It seems to approach some value towards the end of the planning horizon as the average
protection level decreases at a (at least) non-increasing rate.
As soon as a1 ≥ 0.2, the positive effects on Class 1 demand dominate the potential
effects of all other parameters and thus steer the firm’s allocation policy. As soon as Class 1
customers react positively towards their requests being accepted by the firm, it is beneficial
for the firm to protect more capacity for the higher-value customers and thus to accept more
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Class 1 requests. Due to the positive reaction towards acceptance, Class 1 demand further
increases. As a result, the firm protects the total available capacity for the higher-value
customer class at the end of the planning horizon for a1 = 0.4 under both PARTITIONED
and REACT. In general, the average protection level converges faster to the available capacity
with increasing values of a1. This result explains the non-monotone impact of a1 on the
performance gap discussed above. PARTITIONED and REACT differ with regard to how
quickly they respond to the demand effects as discussed above. In line with the results for
T = 4, all other parameters have no structural impact on the firm’s average protection levels.
Secondly, for all other parameters except for a1, the average protection levels increase
over time and seem to approach some value towards the end of the planning horizon as the
average protection levels increase at a decreasing rate. In contrast to a1 = 0.4, this value is
less than the total available capacity in all of these cases.
The results so far clearly indicate the need for the firm to specify the effects of their
allocation decisions on Class 1 demand as these effects predominantly affect its allocation
policy in the long run. Only as a second-order effect do the Class 2 demand effects affect
the allocation decisions.
In order to gain insight into the factors driving the firm’s allocation policy if a1 = 0, we
vary several other parameters and present the results. Figure 3.8 illustrates the impact of r1
on the average protection level for a1 = 0. The average protection levels for r1 = 0 are not
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
r
o
te
c
ti
o
n
 l
e
v
e
l 
Booking horizon 
PARTITIONED
REACT
NEGLECT
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 l
ev
el
 
Booking horizon 
PARTITIONED
REACT
NEGLECT
Figure 3.8: Allocation policy for a1 = 0 and r1 = 0.2 (left) and r1 = 0.4 (right)
illustrated as Class 1 demand does not change throughout the planning horizon in this case.
The average protection levels are therefore constant and identical under all three allocation
heuristics. For r1 ≥ 0.2, the average protection levels decrease even further with increasing
values of r1. In both illustrated cases, PARTITIONED protects more capacity for Class 1
customers than REACT as the allocation heuristic anticipates the negative effect on Class
1 demand.
The (negative) effects on customer demand result in a decreasing Class 1 demand volume
from the first booking period as (1) some Class 1 customers are always rejected, at least
in some high demand scenarios; and (2) the Class 1 demand volume cannot be affected
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positively due to a1 = 0. The firm should therefore protect less capacity in order to accept
more Class 2 requests. In order to investigate the impact of the Class 2 demand effects in
more detail, Table 3.12 illustrates the average protection levels for a1 = 0, r1 ≥ 0.2 and
varying values of a2.
As shown in Table 3.12, the average protection levels decrease for all parameter com-
binations. The average protection levels decrease with an increasing r1 and decrease for
r1 a2 Allocation
strategy
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7 t = 8 t = 9 T = 10
0.2
0
PARTITIONED 5.00 4.39 4.28 4.17 4.07 3.98 3.89 3.81 3.73 3.66
REACT 4.50 4.37 4.25 4.13 4.01 3.90 3.80 3.71 3.62 3.54
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.2
PARTITIONED 5.00 4.39 4.27 4.14 4.01 3.88 3.75 3.63 3.51 3.39
REACT 4.50 4.37 4.23 4.09 3.93 3.79 3.64 3.50 3.36 3.22
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
PARTITIONED 5.00 4.39 4.26 4.12 3.98 3.84 3.71 3.58 3.46 3.33
REACT 4.50 4.37 4.22 4.06 3.90 3.74 3.59 3.44 3.29 3.15
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
0
PARTITIONED 5.00 4.25 4.04 3.86 3.70 3.56 3.44 3.32 3.21 3.12
REACT 4.50 4.21 3.96 3.74 3.55 3.38 3.22 3.08 2.96 2.84
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.2
PARTITIONED 5.00 4.25 4.02 3.80 3.59 3.39 3.20 3.02 2.84 2.67
REACT 4.50 4.21 3.93 3.66 3.41 3.16 2.92 2.70 2.48 2.29
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
0.4
PARTITIONED 5.00 4.25 4.00 3.77 3.54 3.33 3.12 2.93 2.74 2.57
REACT 4.50 4.21 3.91 3.62 3.34 3.07 2.82 2.58 2.37 2.17
NEGLECT 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Table 3.12: Average parameter-dependent protection levels for a1 = 0 (Part B)
increasing values of a2 for a given value of r1. The effects on the lower-value demand are
thus negative effect at the average protection level or, alternatively, result in increasing av-
erage booking limits. Thus, the firm will accept on average more Class 2 requests in these
cases. Intuitively, the more capacity is available for the lower-value customers, the more
positively they react towards their requests being accepted.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we present an approach for capacity allocation when a firm faces interde-
pendent customer demands over time. The chapter is motivated by empirical research on
customer reactions towards revenue management on the one hand and analytical research
contributions which integrate a long-term perspective into revenue management models on
the other hand. While traditional revenue management takes a transactional perspective
(i.e., focuses on short-term profit maximization), customer relationship management focuses
on customer relationships and thus on a firm’s long-term profitability. Both concepts inter-
act: a firm’s short-term allocation decisions have been shown to affect customer satisfaction
and loyalty in the long run. This chapter addresses this interaction.
We present a stochastic dynamic programming model, which builds on Littlewood’s rule,
where the firm faces stochastic demand of two customer classes and decides how many re-
quests to accept from the customer class with the lower willingness-to-pay in each booking
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period. However, we assume that the firm’s allocation decision impacts future customer
demands by influencing the repurchase probabilities of the customers, depending on whether
their request has been accepted or rejected. The firm faces a two-fold trade-off in each
booking period: on the one hand, the trade-off between the customer classes within a par-
ticular booking period and on the other hand the trade-off between customer demands in
subsequent booking periods. With regard to the modeling of the demand interdependencies,
our approach is intentionally generic allowing for multiple kinds of demand transitions over
time.
We discuss the underlying trade-offs in a two-period setting by means of marginal anal-
ysis. As the protection level in the second booking period also depends on the firm’s allo-
cation decision in the first period, a protection level policy is not necessarily optimal. We
show that a protection level policy results for specific cases where only one of the customer
classes exhibits long-term demand effects. We analytically derive a closed-form heuristic for
a protection level accounting for part of the demand interdependencies under simplifying
assumptions based on the two-period setting. The heuristic accounts for the effects on Class
1 demand and neglects Class 2 demand effects.
We test the optimal allocation policy numerically and compare it against the derived
heuristic and two other allocation heuristics based on Littlewood’s rule. We compare the
allocation policies with respect to their performance and the resulting allocation decisions.
We find that the derived heuristic performs close to optimal in almost all of the scenarios,
independent of the length of the planning horizon. The other allocation heuristics partially
result in considerably worse performance, however the average optimality gap when applying
REACT is still relatively small. The value of looking ahead in time varies across the scenarios
considered. While it is relatively low on average, it can be substantial in some scenarios.
In particular, totally neglecting the demand interdependencies performs considerably worse
in almost all of the considered scenarios. Thus, the value of updating customer demand on
a regular basis is shown to be considerable. Comparing both optimality gaps demonstrates
that the benefit from regular demand updates is considerably higher than the additional
value of looking ahead in time on average.
The results indicate that it is particularly important for a firm to protect enough capacity
for Class 1 customers as soon as these customers react positively towards their orders being
accepted. As the derived heuristic focuses on Class 1 demand, this can be considered the main
reason why it performs so well. If Class 1 customers react positively towards their request
being accepted, we find both increasing protection levels and increasing Class 1 demand
over time. Depending on the strength of the positive reaction, the firm even protects the
total available capacity in some scenarios. In this case, it is beneficial to protect even more
capacity than that resulting from applying Littlewood’s rule in each booking period (as
done by REACT ). Only if Class 1 customers do not show a positive reaction, should the
firm focus on Class 2 demand. Booking limits then increase with increasing Class 2 demand
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effects. In this case, Littlewood’s rule protects slightly too much capacity for the higher-value
customers. These numerical results support the discussion about the underlying trade-offs
in Section 3.4.1.
New directions include, for example, the setup of the numerical study and the demand
model. First, testing the allocation strategies for a larger total capacity could yield more
insight about their performance. We test the allocation policies based on C = 10 units
of capacity. This is due to the computational effort. Assuming such a small capacity also
restricts the possible impact of different allocation policies, however, as they cannot differ
much in absolute terms. Therefore, testing the performance for larger capacities could also
have an impact on the value of looking ahead to the future as the policies can differ more
strongly then.
The parameters used in the numerical study are hypothetical as we wanted to investigate
several kinds of relationships between the parameters across the customer classes. However, it
would be particularly interesting to investigate the strength of the effects (i.e., how strongly
a repurchase probability is influenced by a request being accepted or denied) empirically.
Thus, the performance of the different allocation strategies could be evaluated based on em-
pirical data rather than theoretical parameters. In particular, it might also be interesting to
see how customers react towards acceptance / denial in the long run in different industries.
Our approach allows generally for all possible kinds and functional forms of intertemporal
demand transitions, while we only account for a particular additive approach within the nu-
merical study. Therefore, investigating other approaches for the aggregation from individual
customer reactions to aggregated effects of customer classes and other modeling approaches
for the demand transitions themselves will be valuable.
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Chapter 4
Coordinating Fencing and Capacity
Allocation
4.1 Introduction
Making use of customer heterogeneity, for example, by means of differential pricing is at the
core of revenue management. In order to differentiate service among its customers, a firm
typically applies customer segmentation techniques which aim to properly identify different
customer segments and the factors which impact their demands. As such, a firm divides its
heterogeneous customer base into subsets of relatively homogeneous customers with compa-
rable preferences and/or willingness-to-pay (Wind, 1978; Rangan et al., 1992; Wedel, 2000).
As discussed in Chapter 2, customer segmentation is not an operational planning task as
it is seldom done on a day-to-day, routine basis (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). However,
the effectiveness of customer segmentation directly influences the effectiveness of short-term
demand management, and its benefits for the firm. As such, this interaction provides one
example of the interdependencies of different planning hierarchies affecting revenue manage-
ment, as discussed in Chapter 2.
Firms such as airlines or hotels typically offer a service (e.g., a seat or a night in a par-
ticular type of room) at different prices. Customers select their desired product or service
according to their preferences and their willingness-to-pay. The different prices are typically
determined for particular fare products, linked to particular individual booking restrictions,
which actually differentiate the offered products (Williamson, 1992). Commonly used re-
strictions which qualify for a cheaper fare in the airline context are, for example, a stay
over a weekend or limited refunding policies. Such conditions are denoted as price fences.
They aim to implement a profit maximizing differentiation scheme by tailoring the offered
products (or services) to the actual customer segments. Price fences are therefore typically
based on the differences in customer preferences across the customer segments (Botimer,
1996). In particular, fences are meant to prevent customers with a high willingness-to-pay
from buying the lower-priced product. As soon as the firm differentiates prices among its
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customers, customers in high-priced segments are motivated to find a way to pay a lower
price (Philips, 2005; Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). To summarize, price fences aim to pre-
serve customer segmentation and limit demand leakage (or spill-over) between the market
segments (Botimer, 1996; Zhang and Bell, 2012). Accordingly, the benefit of differential
pricing (and thus the benefit of revenue management) depends on the quality of the firm’s
customer segmentation and on the effectiveness of the price fences in place.
Customer segmentation is not updated very frequently and should be stable over time in
order to allow derivation of the appropriate strategies and concepts to manage the customer
base. As fences are based on the characteristics of the customer segments, the decision about
their specification is also not taken very frequently. Compared to the capacity allocation de-
cision, the fencing decision is located on a higher hierarchical planning level. These decisions
also affect short-term decisions in the context of revenue management as they influence the
actual materialization of demand of the different customer classes.
Consider, for example, a setting where a firm succeeds in perfectly determining its fences.
In this case, customer demand is perfectly separated and customers have no price-driven
reason for deviating from the product they prefer at the predetermined prices. This is no
longer the case if the firm fails to perfectly determine its fences. The actual demand of each
customer class therefore depends on the firm’s fences. As standard revenue management
decisions are typically based on demand forecasts for the respective customer classes, the
effectiveness of the fences in place affects a firm’s revenue management decisions. For this
reason, fences and capacity allocation should be considered jointly in order to maximize
profits (Hanks et al., 2002). In addition to price-driven substitution, customers might also
consider a different product if a stock-out occurs in a particular customer class. Additional
stock-out-based demand substitution then occurs.
Although customer segmentation and price fences are a prerequisite for revenue manage-
ment, only few papers have investigated their interrelationship with revenue management
decisions. In particular, the interrelation has not yet been considered in terms of a quan-
titative revenue management approach. Within traditional revenue management models,
customer segmentation is in most cases assumed to be perfect. Customer demand is also at
most assumed to be price-dependent (i.e., dependent on the prices of all products offered)
when assuming classical demand functions. Exceptions include studies on customer diver-
sion or product substitution. Here, customer demand also depends on the capacity available
for a particular customer class. Customer choice models additionally allow the integration
of aspects other than prices, which have an influence on customer buying decisions (Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004a,b). For example, they allow for integration of the availability or the
specification of the different fare products. Customer choice models allow for a detailed
modeling of particular fences and their impact on customer demands. However, customer
choice models consider the customer segments (and thus the underlying fences) in a partic-
ular setting as exogenous, while we explicitly consider the firm’s decision on fences. In our
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approach, we choose an aggregated modeling of the fences’ impact on customer demands
and do not consider particular types of fences in order to consider them as a firm’s decision.
We do not consider individual customers and their choice probabilities but aim to derive
structural properties of the firm’s optimal decisions.
Within this chapter, we focus on the interaction of fencing decisions and short-term
quantity-based revenue management decisions. We therefore first investigate how this inter-
dependency can be captured in a standard revenue management model in order to support
coordinated decision making. Based on this approach, we are interested in deriving the firm’s
optimal fencing and allocation decisions. Additionally, we aim to investigate the interde-
pendency of both decisions. Due to price-driven demand substitution, lower-value demand
increases. Thus, lower-value customers are likely to experience a stock-out of the lower-value
product. We therefore additionally investigate a setting with both price-driven demand leak-
age and stock-out-based demand substitution. We are particularly interested in the impact
of stock-out-based demand substitution on the firm’s optimal fencing and capacity allocation
decisions and on their interdependency. Finally, we aim to investigate the value of integrated
decision making in comparison to independent fencing and allocation decisions.
In order to do so, we present a single-period static quantity-based two-class revenue man-
agement model which incorporates demand substitution effects. In particular, we build on
the well-known model by Littlewood (1972) and additionally account for price-dependent
customer demand, including price-driven demand leakage. A firm decides on the fences in
place and on the protection level. To implement a particular fencing level, the firm incurs
costs., and so it thus trades costs for fencing against the marginal impact of demand leakage
on the expected revenue: strict fences may prevent demand leakage but result in higher costs.
Based on this approach, we investigate the interaction of fencing and capacity allocation.
We derive analytical expressions for the optimal fencing decision for both partitioned and
nested allocations, assuming strictly convex fencing costs. We find that capacity allocation
and fencing do not interact when accounting only for price-driven demand leakage. Classical
hierarchical planning is therefore optimal in this case. In a second step, we extend the pre-
vious setting by additional stock-out-based demand substitution. We derive the optimality
conditions for both the firm’s fencing and allocation decisions. We find that the interaction
of the two decisions depends on the stock-out-based substitution rates. If the stock-out-
based substitution rates are the same for both customer classes, it is optimal to take both
decisions sequentially. However, if the stock-out-based substitution rates differ between the
customer classes, both decisions interact: the fences depend on the firm’s protection level
and vice versa. Within a numerical illustration, we compare the two-class setting with a
single customer segment. Additionally, we compare the optimal coordinated decisions with
hierarchical decision making in order to investigate the value of coordinated decision making.
To summarize, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We give an overview of both qualitative and quantitative research on price differen-
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tiation and demand substitution in inventory management and revenue management.
In the first part, we take a broader perspective and provide the conceptual basis for
our approach. With regard to inventory management and revenue management, we
focus on quantitative approaches that consider price-driven demand leakage or stock-
out-based substitution.
• Based on previous approaches in standard newsvendor settings, we present a static
single-period stochastic quantity-based revenue management model. We incorporate
the fencing decisions by accounting for price-driven demand leakage and costs for fenc-
ing. Thus, we combine approaches from inventory management and revenue manage-
ment. The firm decides on the fences in place and on the protection level. In contrast to
Zhang et al. (2010), we investigate the firm’s optimal decisions analytically. For price-
driven demand leakage, we show that it is optimal to take both decisions sequentially
in a hierarchical manner.
• Based on the previous approach, we additionally account for stock-out-based demand
substitution. Again, the firm decides on the protection level and the fences in place.
We analytically investigate the firm’s optimal decisions and the underlying trade-offs.
• We provide numerical examples in order to illustrate the firm’s optimal decisions and
compare the two-class setting with a setting where the firm does not differentiate (i.e.,
serves a single customer segment).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 4.2
reviews the relevant literature on qualitative research on price fences, research on product line
design and demand substitution in the fields of inventory and revenue management. Section
4.3 presents a monopolistic single-period stochastic quantity-based revenue management
approach, based on Littlewood’s model. The approach includes price-driven demand leakage
and the firm’s decision about fences. In Section 4.4, we extend this setting with additional
stock-out-based substitution. We illustrate our results numerically in Section 4.5. Finally,
Section 4.6 concludes and summarizes opportunities for further research.
4.2 A Review of Fencing in Revenue Management
As discussed in Section 4.1, we consider a setting where the firm decides both on fences and
on the capacity allocation to different customer classes. The firm faces either only price-
driven demand leakage or both price-driven demand leakage and additional stock-out-based
demand substitution. Our approach builds on the fields of general price differentiation,
product line design, inventory management and revenue management. First, we provide an
overview of different concepts from price differentiation, customer segmentation and fencing.
Here, we take a broader perspective and provide the conceptual basis for our approach with
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regard to, for example, the concept of fences and the classification of the different decisions
in terms of taxonomies. In this first part, the focus is on qualitative basics. Subsequently,
we provide an overview of research into product line design. Third, we give an overview of
quantitative approaches from the field of inventory management. Fencing has rarely been
considered in a revenue management model. We consider inventory management problems,
due to existing approaches for modeling a firm’s fencing decision in this field. Inventory
management approaches thus serve as the basis for our modeling approach. They differ
from our approach with regard to the firm’s ”capacity”, however: while the capacity (i.e.
the available resources) is the firm’s decision in inventory models, it is given and fixed in
revenue management settings. We consider both price-driven demand leakage and stock-
out-based demand substitution. In the case of price-driven demand leakage, we discuss
approaches which integrate a firm’s fencing decision with inventory optimization. We dis-
cuss the literature on inventory management under stock-out-based demand substitution.
Finally, we discuss quantitative revenue management approaches which explicitly incorpo-
rate (price-driven or stock-out-based) demand substitution. These approaches are closest to
the setting investigated in this chapter. We discuss revenue management approaches with
both traditional demand models and under customer choice.
4.2.1 Price Differentiation, Segmentation and Fencing
In this section, we provide an overview of price differentiation, customer segmentation and
fences. These are the underlying concepts of our approaches presented in Sections 4.3 and
4.4. Additionally, we present taxonomies for structuring their interdependencies. The focus
is on fundamentals rather than on recent research findings.
Firms differentiate their prices in order to maximize their revenues (see, e.g., Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b). Traditionally, three types of price differentiation are distinguished in
literature (see, e.g., Homburg and Krohmer (2006) and Klein and Steinhardt (2008)). Un-
der first degree price differentiation, a firm charges the maximum willingness-to-pay to each
customer. Typically, first degree price differentiation cannot be implemented, as customers
do not reveal their willingness-to-pay directly. Under second degree price differentiation,
customers are grouped into segments. Typically, the firm offers different products for the
different segments and charges product-dependent prices. The customers choose their fa-
vorite product. Customer willingness-to-pay depends on the characteristics of the goods or
service (e.g., the particular departure of a flight) or on situational aspects (e.g., different
willingness-to-pay at different times). Thus, products are designed in a way such that their
characteristics fit the identified customer segments (Botimer, 1996, 2000). For example, air-
lines offer a wide variety of fare products, differing in their attributes, for a single flight.
Under third degree price differentiation, customers cannot choose their favorite product but
qualify for a particular product by observable criteria (e.g., their age or gender). Here, the
possibilities for fencing are limited.
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We then focus on second degree price differentiation. A firm loses revenue if it does
not succeed in ensuring that customers with a high willingness-to-pay buy the high-priced
product. Rate restrictions are thus imposed on the different products (Talluri and van
Ryzin, 2004b). These restrictions potentially limit the customer’s flexibility and are therefore
associated with lower prices (see, e.g., Botimer and Belobaba, 1999). According to Zhang
and Bell (2012), such “a fence is a device that should preserve market segmentation and
thus limit demand leakage between the firm’s customer segments” (see also Alderighi, 2010).
Following Philips (2005), price-driven demand leakage has the potential to eliminate the
benefit of price differentiation. Imposing the appropriate and effective fences is thus crucial
for the performance of revenue management (Hanks et al., 2002; Kimes, 2002) or service
differentiation more generally. Accounting for the interdependency of fencing decisions and
customer diversion is crucial, according to Botimer and Belobaba (1999).
Several kinds of fences can be distinguished. Fencing criteria such as the time of purchase
or reservation, the length of a stay or the days of a stay are widespread. General overviews of
different fences are given, for example, in Hanks et al. (2002), Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b),
Klein and Steinhardt (2008) and Zhang and Bell (2012). Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b)
focus particularly on the implementation of revenue management in different industries and
give an overview of examples for the fare products, including corresponding restrictions for
these industries. While Hanks et al. (2002) differentiate between physical and non-physical
fences, Zhang and Bell (2012) distinguish between fences based on the purchase pattern
(e.g., purchase time), on the product characteristics (e.g. time of usage) and on customer
characteristics (e.g. age or spending).
Typically, products are differentiated by means of a combination of several fences (Tal-
luri and van Ryzin, 2004b; Klein and Steinhardt, 2008). The resulting fare structures are
thus rather complex (Botimer, 1996). Foran (2003) reports on the call center from British
Airways, where more than half of the incoming calls were for servicing (i.e. explaining) the
complexity of the offered fares. Due to the resulting complexity, Zhang et al. (2010) assume
that fencing comes at a cost depending on the effort made in fencing.
As customer segmentation and fencing are interlinked, they should be considered jointly
(Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b). Zhang and Bell (2012) present a detailed overview and
taxonomy of both market segmentation and price fencing methods. Customer segments
are determined by descriptive methods (e.g., cluster analysis1, discriminant analysis or fi-
nite mixture models2). They are characterized by particular values for the segmentation
variables. These values are used to determine fences under the assumption that customers
behave rationally according to their stated preferences and previous behavior. Figure 4.1
illustrates this two-step process. While Zhang and Bell (2012) focus on the development of
1For technical details see Ward (1963) and MacQueen (1967). For an overview of applications of customer
segmentation see Punj and Stewart (1983) and Wedel and Kamakura (2000).
2For an overview of finite mixture models we refer to Wedel and Kamakura (2000) and McLachlan and
Peel (2000). For applications of different finite mixture models we refer to Wedel et al. (1993), Wedel and
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Figure 4.1: The process of market segmentation and price fencing (according to Zhang and
Bell, 2012)
differentiated products based on customer segmentation, Cizaire (2011) focuses on how these
decisions interact with capacity allocation. The process is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The pric-
ing decisions mirror the taxonomy by Zhang and Bell (2012). Cizaire (2011) additionally
accounts for the interaction of revenue management and pricing decisions.
In our approach, we build on the discussed qualitative basics of fences. We do not
explicitly model particular types of fences (such as the time of booking) but present a
stylized approach. Our approach builds on the general idea of fences, their definition and
the effects of imperfect fences reported in literature. Imperfect fences result in price-driven
demand leakage. We account for price-driven demand leakage in order to integrate the firm’s
fencing decision into a standard revenue management model.
4.2.2 Product Line Design
In this section, we provide an overview of product line design decisions. Product line design
involves simultaneous decisions about how many products to offer, how to differentiate them
and how to price them (Scho¨n, 2010b). Product differentiation has analogies with fenc-
ing decisions: in both cases, key attributes are used in order to design different products.
DeSarbo (1995), Jedidi et al. (1996) and Jedidi et al. (1997).
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However, product differentiation focuses on different variants of a (in most cases) physical
product (e.g., different sizes, components etc. (McBride and Zufryden, 1988)) while fences
are non-physical attributes of (in principle) the same physical product (see above).
On the one hand, the firm aims to increase product variety in order to meet the hetero-
geneous customer needs, resulting in a large variety of products and prices. On the other
hand, costs and possible substitution effects must be balanced against the potential gains
from product differentiation (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990; Hopp and Xu, 2005; Scho¨n, 2010a).
Thus, by deciding which products to offer, a firm should maximize its profit by accounting
for both revenues and costs implied by the decision on the product line design (see, e.g.,
McBride and Zufryden, 1988; Chen and Hausman, 2000). Customers may incur costs for
evaluating the different product variants. These costs stem from the perceived complexity
of the product portfolio (Kuksov and Villas-Boas, 2010).
Based on consumer preferences, early approaches in this field determine which product to
offer to the market (Green and Krieger, 1985). Due to the heterogeneous needs of different
market segments, Moorthy (1984), Green and Krieger (1985) and McBride and Zufryden
(1988) extend these approaches by deciding on the offering of a subset of potential candidate
products. They account for potential product substitution among the offered products, how-
ever, the firm does not decide on the product prices in their approaches. In a later approach,
Chen and Hausman (2000), Scho¨n (2010a) and Scho¨n (2010b) extend these approaches ac-
cording to the firm’s additional decision on the product prices and choice-based customer
106
demands. Due to the interdependencies in the demand effects and the large number of binary
decisions, product line design decisions exhibit a high complexity and can typically only be
tackled by heuristics for real-world instances (Scho¨n, 2010a). Belloni et al. (2008) therefore
present several practice-oriented heuristics for determining the product offering and pricing.
They find that several of the heuristics find optimal or near-optimal solutions.
The stream of literature on product line design decisions is related to our approach through
the notion of differentiation, however we do not investigate the choice to offer particular
product variants but determine the firm’s fencing decision for a given set of products. As in
product line design approaches, demand substitution occurs, depending on the firm’s fences.
The firm does not decide on the product prices but on the allocation of the products to the
different customer classes.
4.2.3 Substitution in Inventory Management
In this section, we discuss quantitative inventory management approaches, accounting for
different types of demand substitution. Inventory management problems are similar to rev-
enue management problems: however, while capacity is decided by the firm in inventory
management models, it is given and fixed in revenue management. We borrow particular
approaches for modeling different types of demand substitution in a revenue management
setting from this field of literature. To this end, we consider models with stochastic demands
for multiple products, which account for either price-driven or stock-out-based demand sub-
stitution. All approaches considered investigate newsvendor settings as this is closest to the
revenue management setting considered in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
If a firm faces price-dependent customer demand for multiple products, fences become
particularly relevant in order to mitigate price-driven demand leakage. As a basis for this
stream, Lau and Lau (1988) and Petruzzi and Dada (1999) investigated single-period, single-
product joint pricing and inventory problems for a monopolistic newsvendor. Customer
demand is price-dependent. For the multi-product setting, price-driven demand leakage
assumes that the prices of the different products affect the customer perceptions of the
different products and therefore their purchase behavior (Bitran and Caldentey, 2002).
Zhang and Bell (2007) investigate a monopolistic newsvendor facing demand from two
customer segments. The firm decides both about the price to charge to each customer
class and about the joint order quantity in order to satisfy aggregate customer demand.
Price-driven demand leakage is modeled such that part of the demand for the higher-value
product is lost to the lower-value product. Demand leakage is assumed to increase in the
price difference between both products. Thus, the demand for a particular product depends
on both product prices. The authors give analytical expressions for both the optimal prices
and the optimal order quantity in the deterministic case and for the optimal order quantity in
the stochastic case. They investigate the effects of demand uncertainty and demand leakage
on the expected profit by means of a numerical example. They find that the optimal price
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difference decreases in demand leakage. The same holds for the profit gain relative to a
setting without market segmentation.
Karakul and Chan (2008) and Zhang et al. (2010) investigate the problem when the firm
aims to determine distinct order quantities for the two customer classes. Zhang et al. (2010)
additionally consider the firm’s fencing decision. Fences come into play by assuming that
they affect demand leakage. The more effective the fences in place, the less price-driven
demand leakage occurs. However, this comes at a cost. A firm therefore faces a trade-
off between the resulting demand leakage and the costs for fencing. Zhang et al. (2010)
(as Zhang and Bell, 2007) provide analytical results for given fences. Optimal fences are
not investigated analytically but numerically. The paper differentiates between linear and
strictly convex fencing costs. For strictly convex fencing costs, they find inner expected
profit maxima numerically. The optimal leakage level is strictly positive and varies only
slightly with demand uncertainty. Based on these numerical examples, Zhang et al. (2010)
stress the fact that the characteristics of the fencing cost function are particularly important
for deciding whether to segment at all. Kim and Bell (2011) extend this work by allowing
customers not to buy at all. In their setting, they consider asymmetrical substitution, that
is only a share of the spilled-over customers requests the lower-priced product.
Stock-out-based demand substitution occurs if customers substitute their requested prod-
uct with another product due to a stock-out. Khouja (1999) provides an overview of several
extensions of the single-period newsvendor problem. Well-known approaches are described in
the papers by Parlar and Goyal (1984), Khouja et al. (1996) and Bassok et al. (1999), which
all consider monopolistic newsvendors. Parlar and Goyal (1984) consider a two-product
setting. They formulate the firm’s decision problem under the assumption that both the
salvage value and the penalties for lost sales are equal to zero. They show that the ex-
pected profit is strictly concave in the order quantities under certain conditions and provide
an iterative procedure in order to determine the optimal order quantities. Khouja et al.
(1996) revisit the two-product setting, however, they allow for positive salvage values and
lost sales penalties. They provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal order quantities
by Monte Carlo simulation. Bassok et al. (1999) consider the general case of N products and
N demand classes under full downward-substitution. They investigate a two-stage decision
problem: the firm determines the optimal order quantities for all products, which are then
allocated to the different customer classes. Based on the properties of the optimal policy,
they develop algorithms to efficiently determine the optimal allocations. Netessine and Rudi
(2003) consider the competitive newsvendor problem under stock-out-based substitution.
In contrast to the above newsvendor settings, we consider a revenue management setting
where the firm faces limited capacity and thus does not decide on order quantities but
on capacity allocations. However, our modeling approach builds on the above modeling
approaches in the field of inventory management. In particular, we build on the approach
by Zhang et al. (2010) for modeling price-driven demand leakage and thus the impact of
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the firm’s fencing decision on the expected profit. We also borrow the model of customer
demand under stock-out-based demand substitution in our approach from the newsvendor
problems under stock-out-based substitution discussed by, for example, Netessine and Rudi
(2003).
4.2.4 Segmentation and Substitution in Revenue Management
In this section, we discuss quantitative literature from the field of quantity-based revenue
management. While price-dependent demands, including price-based demand substitution,
are accounted for, the firm’s fencing decision is rarely explicitly addressed. First, we focus
on the interrelation of customer segmentation and revenue management. We refer to this
field, when comparing the two-class problem with a single-class problem within the numer-
ical illustration in Section 4.5. Second, we consider models for joint pricing and capacity
allocation as well as two distinct extensions. Although we do not account for prices as de-
cision variables, these models are closest to the setting presented in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 as
they investigate capacity allocation decisions and their interaction with longer-term pricing
decisions.
Meyr (2008) investigates the interrelationship of decisions on the number of customer
segments with the firm’s allocation decision. The focus is on determining the appropriate
number of customer segments. Meyr (2008) segments a given customer base by making
use of cluster analysis, based on the customers’ profitability, determines respective product
allocations and simulates customer demand arrivals in order to evaluate the decisions in
terms of expected profit. He finds that the marginal value of an additional customer segment
decreases in the number of customer segments. He concludes that a moderate number of
customer segments is sufficient in order to take advantage of service differentiation.
Several authors investigate settings where the firm decides on both prices and capacity
allocations. Belobaba and Weatherford (1996) investigate customer substitution and its im-
pact on revenue management decisions. They find that allowing for substitution is beneficial
for the firm, however, the benefit decreases with increasing number of customer classes as the
price difference to be exploited also decreases. Brumelle et al. (1990) extend the standard
setting by allowing for stochastically dependent customer demands. They give analytical
expressions for optimal booking policies and find that the optimal booking limits decrease,
compared to Littlewood’s rule, due to the dependent demands. Weatherford (1997) inves-
tigates a static single-resource revenue management setting where the firm decides on both
the allocations and the prices. He considers additive-linear customer demands, where the
expected demand depends on all prices and demand uncertainty adds to the expected de-
mand (see also the demand models in Lau and Lau (1988); Petruzzi and Dada (1999); Zhang
and Bell (2007); Zhang et al. (2010)). Kuyumcu and Popescu (2006) present a deterministic
revenue management model building on the previous approach by Weatherford (1997). Ko-
cabiykoglu et al. (2011) also build on the approach by Weatherford (1997). They compare
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sequential decision making with coordinated decision making. They find that coordinated
decision making demonstrates significantly higher revenues. However, they also propose a
hierarchical approach, which accounts for uncertainty in the pricing decision and mitigates
the effects of poorly coordinated decisions.
Demand substitution is also considered in overbooking settings and multi-period settings.
Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004) investigate an overbooking setting with substitutable prod-
ucts. They show that accounting for substitution has a small, yet significant effect on the
firm’s expected profit. Bertsimas and de Boer (2005) study a multi-period multi-product
(dynamic) pricing problem where the firm faces a limited supply of resources and has to
decide how much of which product to offer at what price in each period. They present a
stochastic dynamic approach allowing for general demand models.
Approaches accounting for demand substitution in the context of (quantity-based) revenue
management are close to the setting we investigate in the remainder of this chapter. However,
they do not explicitly account for price fences, their effects on customer demands or the effort
by the firm to implement them. Instead of considering pricing as the firm’s decision, we
consider joint fencing and capacity allocation. Our approach is based on Littlewood’s model
(which is also the basis for the work by Belobaba and Weatherford (1996), Brumelle et al.
(1990) and Weatherford (1997)). As we account for price fences based on approaches from the
field of inventory management, we combine components from both inventory management
and revenue management literature in our approach.
4.3 Price-Driven Demand Leakage
In order to investigate integrated fencing and capacity allocation, we consider a monopolistic
setting where the firm faces stochastic price-dependent demand of two customer classes i
(i = 1, 2) for its finite and exogenous capacity C. As discussed in the previous section,
the firm’s fencing decision has not yet been explicitly accounted for in quantitative revenue
management models. Thus, as a starting point, we choose the most basic model for capacity
allocation under stochastic demand and therefore build on Littlewood’s model (see Section
2.2.1.1). Despite the simplifying assumptions, Littlewood’s model has been widely applied
in literature (see, e.g., Pfeifer (1989), Brumelle et al. (1990), Belobaba and Weatherford
(1996), Weatherford (1997), Kocabiykoglu et al. (2011)). The underlying assumptions of
Littlewood’s model (see Section 2.2.1.1) are assumed to hold also in our approach. However,
we consider two decisions in our approach: the protection level and the firm’s fences. While
the protection level is a short-term decision on the operational level, fences are typically not
updated on a short-term basis. Firms typically first decide on their fences and afterwards
on the protection level based on the resulting customer demands.
The subsequent model formulation follows several steps. First, we characterize the un-
derlying demand model which incorporates price-driven demand leakage, then we discuss
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the concept of a fencing cost function and characterize a particular formulation, based on
previous literature. Thirdly, we present the firm’s resulting optimization problem for a par-
titioned and a nested protection level. We then analyse the joint fencing and allocation
problem for both types of protection levels. In order to compare our results with those of
Zhang et al. (2010), we first investigate capacity allocation for given fences. This setting
reflects a situation where the firm reacts to longer-term fencing decisions on the operational
planning level. Afterwards, we analytically investigate both optimal fencing and allocation
decisions.
4.3.1 Demand Model
In order to integrate the firm’s fencing decision into our decision problem, we build on the
demand model by Zhang et al. (2010). A share of the high-value Class 1 customers requests
the product initially offered for the lower-value Class 2 customers. This share increases with
increasing price difference p1− p2 as it consequently becomes more attractive to request the
lower-value product. Price-driven demand leakage is modeled by the leakage level γ ≥ 0.
The stochastic demand for product i is denoted as qi(γ) (∀i). For the two customer classes,
the stochastic demands are expressed as
q1(γ) = D1 − γ · (p1 − p2) (4.3.1)
and
q2(γ) = D2 + γ · (p1 − p2) (4.3.2)
where Di denotes the stochastic demand of customer class i for the corresponding product
and γ · (p1 − p2) characterizes the absolute price-driven demand leakage. qi(γ) thus is a
random variable with cdf Fi and pdf fi. Both demands are assumed to be non-negative.
Representing the firm’s fencing decision implicitly by the leakage level γ is an aggregated
modeling approach where we do not specify particular fences. The relevant product char-
acteristics, which qualify as possible fences, stem from the actual customer segmentation,
which is conducted prior to the fencing decision. In our approach, γ represents the effort of
designing the products, implementing the fences, and enforcing them.
Price-driven demand leakage is assumed to be deterministic. This is in line with the
joint pricing and capacity allocation models discussed in the literature overview. They
also assume deterministic effects of the firm’s decision variables on customer demand. In
our setting, this results in the fact that losing Class 1 demand increases Class 2 demand
by a particular amount. Specifically, we assume that all leaked Class 1 customers request
the lower-value product. Further implications and the impact of these assumptions on the
optimal decisions are discussed below.
In contrast to Zhang et al. (2010), we do not focus on a particular functional form of
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the demand function. We assume exogenous prices, that is the firm does not decide on the
product prices in our approach, and we therefore do not require a specific functional form
of the demand function and consider demand as a general random variable. However, this
modeling approach allows for many different explicit customer demand models. Different
demand models exist in literature. For example, additive linear customer demand functions3
(as assumed by Zhang et al., 2010) are amongst the most frequently applied demand functions
in literature (see also, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b; Zhang and Bell, 2007; Klein and
Steinhardt, 2008; Kim and Bell, 2011).
4.3.2 Fencing Costs
Setting up effective fences comes at a cost, which is related to the effort of designing, imple-
menting and enforcing a complex system of fares (see, e.g. Foran, 2003). At the same time,
more effective fences reduce price-driven demand leakage.
In line with Zhang et al. (2010), we model this relationship by assuming that the firm
incurs costs of K(γ), depending on its fencing decision. As discussed above, the firm’s fencing
decision is implicitly modeled by accounting for the leakage level as a decision variable.
We assume that K(γ) is non-negative, continuously differentiable and monotonically de-
creasing in γ. While Zhang et al. (2010) propose both linear and strictly convex fencing cost
functions, we focus on their representation for strictly convex fencing costs in the remainder
of this chapter. Thus, the marginal costs for fencing (and thus for mitigating price-driven
demand leakage) increase for stricter fences.
Zhang et al. (2010) represent strictly convex fencing costs by
K(γ) =
K0
γ +K1
, (4.3.3)
with K0 > 0 and K1 ≥ 0. The costs for a perfect fence amount to K0K1 . Moreover,
dK(γ)
dγ
=
− K0
(γ+K1)2
< 0 and d
2K(γ)
d2γ
= 2·K0
(γ+K1)3
> 0.
4.3.3 An Integrated Fencing and Capacity Allocation Model
We build our approach on Littlewood’s standard model (see Section 2.2.1.1). The firm
maximizes its expected revenue from selling the capacity C to two customer classes minus
the fencing costs by deciding on the leakage level γ and the protection level y. Both decisions
are static, they are taken once at the beginning of the planning horizon. We analyse the
firm’s decision problem for both a partitioned and a nested protection level.4 The firm’s
3Assuming additive linear demand functions results in Di = ai−bi ·pi+ i (∀i) where i denotes the noise
term.
4See Section 2.2.1.1 for details as well as a discussion of how both types of protection levels relate to each
other.
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optimization problem for a partitioned protection level can be stated as
max
0≤y≤C,0≤γ
E[pi(y, γ)] = p2 · E[min(C − y, q2(γ))] + p1 · E[min(y, q1(γ))]−K(γ). (4.3.4)
For a nested protection level, the resulting expected profit can be stated as
max
0≤y≤C,0≤γ
E[pi(y, γ)] = p2 · E[min(C − y, q2(γ))]
+ p1 · E[min(C −min(C − y, q2(γ)), q1(γ))]−K(γ). (4.3.5)
After having established the underlying assumptions and the firm’s optimization problems,
we now analyse the firm’s optimal decisions when facing price-driven demand leakage. In line
with the two different protection levels above, we first present the results for a partitioned
protection level. The results for a nested protection level are subsequently presented.
4.3.4 Analysis: Partitioned Allocation Planning
In this section, we investigate the firm’s optimization problem for a partitioned protection
level stated in Equation (4.3.4). First, we consider the allocation decision for given fences.
Second, we consider the simultaneous decisions about fences and the protection level.
4.3.4.1 Allocation Planning under Exogenous Fences
Investigating the firm’s allocation decision for given fences mirrors a situation where the firm
takes the fencing decision prior to the allocation decision in a hierarchical manner. Investi-
gating allocation planning for given fences is closest to the setting analytically investigated
by Zhang et al. (2010). It allows for a comparison of our result for a limited capacity with
the unconstrained setting investigated by Zhang et al. (2010).
For given fences, the firm’s allocation planning problem reduces to Littlewood’s standard
model with demands depending on the firm’s fences. The optimal partitioned protection
level yLW,part thus follows from the optimality condition
p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) = p1 · P(q1(γ) > y). (4.3.6)
The optimal allocation policy is to protect min(yLWpart(γ), C) units of capacity, as the uncon-
strained univariate maximization problem is strictly concave in y for given customer demands
(see Section 2.2.1.1). Thus, a firm protects either the optimal protection level following from
the previous optimality condition or the total available capacity.
As both customer demands depend on γ, the optimal protection level also depends on
γ. The left hand-side of the optimality condition decreases in γ while the right-hand side
increases in γ. For stricter fences, the optimal protection level must thus increase, in order
to ensure the optimality condition to hold. The inner optimal protection level decreases in
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γ. This result is relatively intuitive as stricter fences decrease price-driven demand leakage,
which leads to increasing Class 1 demand. Thus, firms should choose a higher protection
level in the case of stricter fences.
Zhang et al. (2010) find that the optimal order quantity of the higher-value product
increases with stricter fences. Our result is in line with these findings as the firm’s optimal
protection level reflects the available capacity for the higher-value customer class and also
increases with stricter fences. As for the properties of the optimal solution, the inner optimal
decisions are unique in both setting.
4.3.4.2 Optimal Fences
In the remainder of this section, we consider both the fencing and the allocation decision
simultaneously. First, we provide the first and second order derivatives with regard to the de-
cision variables, in order to investigate the properties of the firm’s decision problem. Second,
we investigate the firm’s optimal fencing and allocation decisions and their properties.
For partitioned allocations, the firm’s optimization problem is stated in Equation (4.3.4).
The first order derivative with regard to y follows as
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dy
= −p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y}] + p1 · E[I{q1(γ)>y}]
= −p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + p1 · P(q1(γ) > y). (4.3.7)
The firm’s allocation decision has a marginal impact on the firm’s expected profit only if
at least one of the customer demands exceeds the respective available capacity. On the
one hand, the firm gains p1 by reserving an additional unit of capacity for the higher-value
customers. On the other hand, it loses p2 as a previously serviced Class 2 customer is lost.
The first order derivative with regard to γ results in
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dγ
= p2 · E[dq2(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y}] + p1 · E[
dq1(γ)
dγ
· I{q1(γ)≤y}]−
dK(γ)
(dγ
= p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(γ) ≤ y)
+
K0
(γ +K1)2
(4.3.8)
This formula also has an intuitive interpretation. Fencing only affects the firm’s revenue if at
least one customer demand is lower than the respective available capacity. If q2(γ) ≤ C − y,
part of the booking limit is still unsold. In this case, additional price-driven demand leakage
increases the revenue gained from Class 2 customers. With regard to Class 1, fencing only
impacts the firm’s revenue, if q1(γ) ≤ y. If q1(γ) > y, the firm would still be able to sell
up to the protection level. As price-driven demand leakage is deterministic, the marginal
impact of fencing on customer demands is also deterministic. The terms dqi(γ)
dγ
can therefore
be taken out of the expected value expressions in the above first order derivative, which
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allows for transformation of the first order derivative as shown above.
The second order derivatives with regard to y and γ are given by
d2E[pi(y, γ)]
d2y
=− p2 · f2(C − y)− p1 · f1(y), (4.3.9)
d2E[pi(y, γ)]
d2γ
=− p2 · (p1 − p2)2 · f2(C − y)− p1 · (p1 − p2)2 · f1(y)− 2 ·K0
(γ +K1)3
=− (p1 − p2)2 · [p2 · f2(C − y) + p1 · f1(y)]− 2 ·K0
(γ +K1)3
, (4.3.10)
and
d2E[pi(y, γ)]
dydγ
=− p2 · f2(C − y) · dq2
dγ
+ p1 · f1(y) · dq1
dγ
=− p2 · (p1 − p2) · f2(C − y)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · f1(y)
=− (p1 − p2) · [p2 · f2(C − y) + p1 · f1(y)] (4.3.11)
The above second order derivatives provide some insight into the properties of the expected
profit function. As d
2E[pi(y,γ)]
d2y
< 0, the expected profit function is strictly concave in y for
given γ. Analogously, it is strictly concave in γ for given y as d
2E[pi(y,γ)]
d2γ
< 0. d
2E[pi(y,γ)]
dydγ
< 0
reflects the result from Section 4.3.4 that the protection level is decreasing in γ.
In order to investigate the properties of the firm’s optimization problem, we investigate the
determinant of the Hessian. The determinant of the Hessian, denoted as H in the remainder,
results as
detH =
d2E[pi(y, γ)]
d2y
· d
2E[pi(y, γ)]
d2γ
− (d
2E[pi(y, γ)]
dydγ
)2
=(p1 · f1(y) + p2 · f2(C − y)) · (p1 − p2)2 · 2 ·K0
(γ +K1)3
(4.3.12)
after substituting and rearranging the above second order derivatives. According to Section
4.3.1, fi(qi(γ)) > 0 holds by assumption. As (p1 ·f1(y)+p2 ·f2(C−y)) > 0, and 2·K0(γ+K1)3 > 0,
the expected profit is jointly concave in y and γ. Therefore, a unique optimal solution exists
for the firm’s unconstrained optimization problem.
However,the firm’s optimization problem, stated in Equation (4.3.4), is constrained. In
order to investigate the firm’s optimal decisions, we investigate the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions derived from the firm’s constrained optimization problem stated in Equation (4.3.4).
As the unconstrained objective function is jointly concave in y and γ and all constraints
are convex functions in the firm’s decision variables, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
necessary and sufficient for optimality. The Lagrange function for the optimization problem
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follows as
L(y, γ, λ) = p2 ·E[min(C− y, q2(γ))] + p1 ·E[min(y, q1(γ))]−K(γ)−λ · (y−C). (4.3.13)
The last term represents the boundary condition y ≤ C stated in Equation (4.3.4). The
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the following:
dL(y, γ, λ)
dy
= −p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + p1 · P(q1(γ) > y)− λ ≤ 0, (4.3.14)
dL(y, γ, λ)
dγ
=p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)
− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(γ) ≤ y) + K0
(γ +K1)2
≤ 0, (4.3.15)
dL(y, γ, λ)
dλ
= −(y − C) ≥ 0, (4.3.16)
y · [−p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + p1 · P(q1(γ) > y)− λ] = 0, (4.3.17)
γ · [p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(γ) ≤ y) + K0
(γ +K1)2
] = 0,
(4.3.18)
λ · (−(y − C)) = 0, (4.3.19)
y ≥ 0, (4.3.20)
γ ≥ 0, (4.3.21)
λ ≥ 0. (4.3.22)
Equations (4.3.14), (4.3.15) and (4.3.16) are the first order partial derivatives with regard
to the firm’s decision variables y, γ and λ. Equations (4.3.17), (4.3.18) and (4.3.19) reflect
the complementary slack with regard to the decision variables and λ. Equations (4.3.20),
(4.3.21) and (4.3.22) represent the non-negativity constraints. According to the constraints
regarding the decision variables, we have to investigate six cases. The cases result from com-
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bining y = 0, 0 < y < C and y = C with γ = 0 and γ > 0. In the following, we investigate
the firm’s optimal decisions for these six cases.
Case 1: 0 < y < C, γ > 0
First, we investigate inner optimal solutions to the joint fencing and allocation optimization
problem. For inner optimal solutions, λ = 0 follows from Equation (4.3.19) and Equations
(4.3.17) and (4.3.18) only hold if the first order partial derivatives of the expected profit
function with regard to y and γ are equal to zero. It is therefore necessary and sufficient
to investigate the first-order conditions following from Equations (4.3.14) and (4.3.15). The
optimality equations for y and γ result as
p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) = p1 · P(q1(γ) > y), (4.3.23)
and
p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(γ) ≤ y) = − K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.3.24)
Substituting Equation (4.3.23) in Equation (4.3.24) yields the optimality condition for
the firm’s fencing decision:
(p1 − p2)2 = K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.3.25)
The optimal leakage level γ∗part results from this optimality equation:
γ∗part =
√
K0
p1 − p2 −K1. (4.3.26)
Thus, the firm should define its fences such that γ∗part results as price-driven demand leakage.
γ∗part > 0 holds, iff (p1 − p2)2 < K0K21 . The corresponding optimal protection level y
LW
part(γ
∗
part)
results from Equation (4.3.23) with qi(γ
∗
part) as the demand for product i resulting from
the firm’s optimal fencing decision. Case 1 requires yLWpart(γ
∗
part) < C. This holds, iff p2 >
p1 · P(q1(γ∗part) > C).
Note that the inner optimal fencing decision γ∗part only depends on exogenous parameters
and is therefore constant for a given problem. In particular, fences depend on the parameters
of the cost function (i.e., K0 and K1) and on the revenue differential (i.e., p1 − p2). With
increasing customer heterogeneity with regard to the different willingness-to-pay, the firm
should define stricter fences in order to mitigate price-driven demand leakage as less leakage
is then optimal. This result is intuitive. For given fences, price-driven demand leakage
increases with increasing customer heterogeneity. In order to mitigate this effect, a firm
should define stricter fences. The optimal level of price-driven demand leakage increases in
K0 and decreases in K1.
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When defining its fences such that the leakage level γ∗part results, the firm incurs fencing
costs of
K(γ∗part) =
√
K0 · (p1 − p2). (4.3.27)
K(γ∗part) is strictly positive as p1 > p2 by assumption (see Section 2.2.1.1). The resulting
costs for fencing increase with increasing price difference and thus customer heterogeneity
as stricter fences are then optimal for the firm. Stricter fences come at a higher cost. As the
value of capacity allocation generally increases with increasing price difference, the increas-
ing fencing costs are a counter effect on the total expected profit.
Case 2: 0 < y < C, γ = 0
For 0 < y < C, λ = 0 follows from Equation (4.3.19).
p2 · P(q2(0) > C − y) = p1 · P(q1(0) > y). (4.3.28)
follows as the optimality condition for y from Equation (4.3.14). For γ = 0, Equation (4.3.15)
reads as
p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(0) ≤ C − y)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(0) ≤ y) ≤ −K0
K21
. (4.3.29)
Substituting Equation (4.3.28) in Equation (4.3.29) yields
(p1 − p2)2 ≥ K0
K21
(4.3.30)
as the condition for γ = 0 being the firm’s optimal fencing decision. The firm’s optimal
protection level yLWpart(0) follows from Equation (4.3.28). Analogous to Case 1, this case only
applies if yLWpart(0) < C. This condition holds, if p2 > p1 · P(q1(0) > C).
Case 3 and 4: y = 0, γ = 0 and y = 0, γ > 0
For y = 0, λ = 0 follows from Equation (4.3.19). Consequently, Equation (4.3.14) simplifies
to
−p2 · P(q2(γ) > C) + p1 · P(q1(γ) > 0) ≤ 0. (4.3.31)
As P(q1(γ) > 0) = 1, this further simplifies to
−p2 · P(q2(γ) > C) + p1 ≤ 0. (4.3.32)
As p1 > p2, Equation (4.3.32) results in a contradiction. Therefore, reserving no capacity at
all for the higher-value customers will never be an optimal decision for a firm, independent
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of the firm’s fencing decision.
Case 5: y = C, γ = 0
For y = C and γ = 0, Equation (4.3.14) simplifies to
−p2 · P(q2(0) > 0) + p1 · P(q1(0) > C)− λ = 0, (4.3.33)
as Equation (4.3.17) only holds for y = C if dL(y,γ,λ)
dy
= 0. Equation (4.3.15) yields
p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(0) ≤ 0)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(0) ≤ C) + K0
K21
≤ 0 (4.3.34)
as the condition for γ. As P(q2(0) > 0) = 1, Equations (4.3.33) and (4.3.34) can be further
simplified to
−p2 + p1 · (1− P(q1(0) ≤ C))− λ = 0, (4.3.35)
and
−p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(0) ≤ C) + K0
K21
≤ 0. (4.3.36)
As λ ≥ 0, Equation (4.3.35) holds iff p2 ≤ p1 · P(q1(0) > C). Substituting Equation (4.3.35)
in Equation (4.3.36) yields that Equation (4.3.36) holds iff K0
K21
≤ (p1 − p2)2. Then, γ = 0
and y = C are the firm’s optimal decisions.
Case 6: y = C, γ > 0
For y = C and γ > 0, both Equation (4.3.14) and Equation (4.3.15) must hold with equality
due to the slackness conditions in Equations (4.3.17) and (4.3.18). The analysis follows
identical steps to those in Case 5 for γ = 0. Equation (4.3.14) results in
λ = p1 · (1− P(q1(γ) ≤ C))− p2. (4.3.37)
Furthermore, Equation (4.3.18) yields
p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ 0)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(γ) ≤ C) + K0
(γ +K1)2
= 0. (4.3.38)
Rearranging terms and simplifying this equation results in
p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q1(γ) ≤ C) = K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.3.39)
The left hand-side increases in γ while the right hand-side decreases in γ. Thus, the unique
optimal fencing decision γ∗C is the solution of this equation. Substituting p1 · (1− P(q1(γ) ≤
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C))− p2 ≥ 0 in Equation (4.3.39) demonstrates that the optimal leakage level γ∗C is greater
than or equal to γ∗part. Thus, if a firm protects the total available capacity for the higher-
value customers anyway, it is more beneficial to allow for higher leakage by setting less strict
fences. By doing so, a firm saves costs due to the lower fencing effort. The marginal impact
of setting less strict fences on Class 1 demand can be neglected due to the high Class 1
demand. Case 6 is complementary to Case 1. Therefore, y = C and γ∗C > 0 are the firm’s
optimal decisions if the conditions p2 ≤ p1 · P(q1(γ∗part) > C) and K0K21 > (p1 − p2)
2 hold.
To summarize, Table 4.1 provides an overview of the different optimal solutions in the
cases considered. Cases 3 and 4 are not included in the overview as protecting y = 0 units
of capacity has proved never to be optimal.
Case Optimal fencing Optimal allocation Conditions
1 γ∗part =
√
K0
(p1−p2) −K1 yLWpart(γ∗part) K0K21 > (p1 − p2)
2, p2 > p1 · P(q1(γ∗part) > C)
2 0 yLWpart(0)
K0
K21
≤ (p1 − p2)2, p2 > p1 · P(q1(0) > C)
5 0 C K0
K21
≤ (p1 − p2)2, p2 ≤ p1 · P(q1(0) > C)
6 γ∗C : Equation (4.3.39) C
K0
K21
> (p1 − p2)2, p2 ≤ p1 · P(q1(γ∗part) > C)
Table 4.1: The firm’s optimal allocation and fencing decisions
The above conditions have some intuitive interpretations. If the marginal savings in
fencing costs when deviating from perfect fences (K0
K21
) are less than or equal to the marginal
revenue loss due to price-driven demand leakage, reflected by (p1 − p2)2, perfect fences are
optimal for a firm. Otherwise, firms should allow for positive price-driven demand leakage
by defining weaker fences. In this case the firm incurs higher price-driven demand leakage
but also saves fencing costs.
The firm’s allocation decision can still be characterized by Littlewood’s rule for given
fences as discussed in Section 4.3.4. Thus, the firm protects min(yLWpart(γ
∗), C) units of capac-
ity for the higher-value customer class. It is optimal for a firm to take both decisions sequen-
tially: while the firm first determines the optimal fences, the resulting customer demands
qi(γ
∗) serve as a basis for the optimal protection level. Taking both decisions simultaneously
is of no additional value for the firm.
A firm’s fencing decision is independent of the firm’s available capacity and information
on the demand distributions in Cases 1, 2 and 5. This is different in Case 6. In order
to determine the optimal leakage level γ∗C , the Class 1 demand distribution and the firm’s
capacity are necessary. However, Cases 5 and 6 generally have only a little practical relevance
as protecting the total available capacity will rarely be optimal. Class 1 demand is typically
only a share of the total available capacity, and therefore a firm would not protect the
total capacity even without price-driven demand leakage. As the optimal protection level
decreases with increasing price-driven demand leakage, the optimal protection level would
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be even lower.
As discussed above, Zhang and Bell (2012) consider an unconstrained setting but do not
provide analytical results for their setting. Investigating their approach analytically allows
a comparison of our result above with the unconstrained setting. The firm’s expected profit
in the unconstrained setting is
E[pi] = p2 · E[q2(γ)] + p1 · E[q1(γ)]−K(γ). (4.3.40)
The first order derivative with regard to γ results as
dE[pi]
dγ
= p2 · (p1 − p2)− p1 · (p1 − p2) + K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.3.41)
From Equation (4.3.41), the first order condition yields
(p1 − p2)2 = K0
(γ +K1)2
, (4.3.42)
which is identical to the first order condition above in Equation (4.3.25) for the inner optimal
solution in the constrained setting. Thus, the optimality condition in the unconstrained
setting yields the identical optimal fencing decision resulting in the identical level of price-
driven demand leakage γ∗part, at least for the inner optimal solution. In contrast to our
constrained setting, it is generally optimal to take the fencing decision independent of both
the decision on the order quantities and information on the demand distributions.
The above results for the constrained setting are mainly driven by three assumptions:
(1) price-driven demand leakage has a deterministic effect on the demands of both customer
classes, (2) all leaked Class 1 customers request the lower-value product and (3) the customer
demands themselves are independent of the allocation decision.
The first assumption simplifies the analysis. If this assumption is relaxed, and the fencing
decision has a random effect on customer demands, the firm will not be able to ensure a
leakage level with certainty by defining particular fences. Relaxing this assumption does not
change the firm’s optimal decisions qualitatively as long as price-driven demand leakage only
depends on γ and not additionally on demand realizations. This is because although being
stochastic, leaked Class 1 demand (for any possible demand realization) is a fixed amount.
The second assumption means that losing a Class 1 customer due to price-driven demand
leakage results in definitely gaining a Class 2 customer. Thus, a firm will decrease the
protection level accordingly with increasing price-driven demand leakage. However, following
the approach by Kim and Bell (2011), one could also assume that only a share of the
leaked Class 1 customers requests the lower-value product. Even under this assumption, the
properties of the expected profit function are preserved. Thus, both the structure and the
properties of the optimal decisions remain unchanged.
The main result that both decisions can be taken sequentially, at least for practical pur-
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poses, is mainly driven by the third underlying assumption, the fact that customer demands
are independent of the allocation decision. By accounting for additional stock-out-based
substitution, we relax this assumption in Section 4.4 and discuss the implications below.
4.3.5 Analysis: Nested Allocation Planning
Analogous to the previous section, we split our analysis in two steps for the nested protection
level. First, we consider the firm’s optimal allocation decision for given fences. We then
consider simultaneous decisions on fences and the protection level. In both parts, we compare
our results to the results obtained for a partitioned protection level.
4.3.5.1 Allocation Planning under Exogenous Fences
For given fences, a firm’s allocation planning problem is equivalent to Littlewood’s standard
model as in the case of partitioned allocations. Setting the protection level according to
Littlewood’s rule is therefore optimal. However, customer demands depend on γ. The
optimal protection level yLWnested according to Littlewood’s rule results from
P(q1(γ) ≤ y) = 1− p1
p2
. (4.3.43)
The firm’s optimal allocation policy is to protect y∗ = min(yLWnested(γ), C) as the unconstrained
optimization problem is unimodular in y as shown in Section 2.2.1.1.
The left hand-side of Equation (4.3.43) is increasing in γ as q1(γ) is decreasing in γ,
therefore the firm’s inner optimal protection level yLWnested(γ) decreases in γ. If y
∗ = C, then
additional demand leakage does not affect the protection level. Thus, both the partitioned
and the nested protection level are non-decreasing with stricter fences and corresponding
decreasing price-driven demand leakage.
4.3.5.2 Optimal Fences
In the following, we investigate the firm’s two-dimensional optimization problem, as stated
in Equation (4.3.5). The firm decides on both the fences and the nested protection level.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, the expected profit function is generally not concave but
unimodular in y for given demand distributions and thus for given fences. The joint opti-
mization problem is therefore not jointly concave in y and γ either. Due to the properties of
the expected profit function (in particular the missing concavity property), we focus only on
the necessary first-order conditions and discuss the underlying trade-offs. Investigating the
unconstrained optimization problem is supported by the result in Section 4.3.4 that both
approaches yield the identical inner optimal solution and by the unimodularity property
with regard to y.
122
The first order derivatives of the expected profit function in Equation (4.3.5) with regard
to y and γ result in
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dy
= −p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y}] + p1 · E[I{q1(γ)>y,q2(γ)>C−y}]
= −p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + p1 · P(q1(γ) > y, q2(γ) > C − y)
= −p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + p1 · P(q1(γ) > y) · P(q2(γ) > C − y)
= P(q2(γ) > C − y) · [p1 · P(q1(γ) > y)− p2], (4.3.44)
and
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dγ
=p2 · dq2(γ)
dγ
· E[I{q2(γ)≤C−y}] + p1 · E[−
dq2(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y,C−q2(γ)<q1(γ)}
+
dq1(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y,C−q2(γ)≥q1(γ)} +
dq1(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)>C−y,q1(γ)≤y}]
− dK(γ)
dγ
=p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)
+ p1 · [−(p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y, C − q2(γ) < q1(γ))
− (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y, C − q2(γ) ≥ q1(γ))
− (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) > C − y, q1(γ) ≤ y)] + K0
(γ +K1)2
=− (p1 − p2)2 · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)
− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) > C − y, q1(γ) ≤ y) + K0
(γ +K1)2
=− (p1 − p2)2 · P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y)
− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) > C − y) · P(q1(γ) ≤ y) + K0
(γ +K1)2
=(p1 − p2) · P(q2(γ) > C − y) · [p1 · P(q1(γ) > y)− p2]
− (p1 − p2)2 + K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.3.45)
Equation (4.3.44) is equivalent to the first order derivative in Littlewood’s standard model
except that customer demands depend on the firm’s fences. Equation (4.3.45) reflects the
marginal impact of the fencing decision on the firm’s expected profit. The terms in Equation
(4.3.45) have some interpretation. Price-driven demand leakage has a positive marginal
impact on the revenue from Class 2 demand if this demand is less than the booking limit.
Otherwise, additional price-driven demand leakage does not affect Class 2 revenues as the
quantity up to the booking limit can be sold anyway. The second term represents the impact
of price-driven demand leakage on the Class 1 revenue. The first two terms in brackets reflect
the lost Class 1 sales if q2(γ) ≤ C − y, that is when more capacity than the protection level
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is available for Class 1 customers. In case of nesting, the firm loses dq1(γ)
dγ
= −(p1− p2) Class
1 demand. The third term in brackets reflects the lost Class 1 sales if q2(γ) > C − y and
q1(γ) ≤ y. In this case, the firm loses Class 1 demand as q1(γ) ≤ y but cannot benefit as it
sells the booking limit to Class 2 anyway. Finally, the firm incurs marginal fencing costs.
The second order derivative with regard to y reads
d2E[pi(y, γ)]
d2y
=− p2 · f2(C − y)
+ p1 · [−f1(y) · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + P(q1(γ) > y) · f2(C − y)]. (4.3.46)
This term is not generally negative. As in Littlewood’s standard model, the expected profit
function is thus not generally concave in y for given γ.
The second order derivative with regard to γ results in
d2E[pi(y, γ)]
d2γ
=(p1 − p2)2 · [(p1 − p2) · f2(C − y)− p1 · f2(C − y) · P(q1(γ) ≤ y)
− p1 · f1(y) · (1− P(q2(γ) ≤ C − y))]− 2 ·K0
(γ +K1)3
. (4.3.47)
This term is also not generally negative. Therefore, the expected profit function for a nested
protection level is not concave in γ for given y, in general.
Setting Equation (4.3.44) equal to zero and solving for y yields
p1 · P(q1(γ) > y) = p2 (4.3.48)
as the optimality condition for y. Substituting this optimality condition for y into Equation
(4.3.45) yields
(p1 − p2)2 = K0
(γ +K1)2
(4.3.49)
as the optimality condition for γ and thus
γ∗nested =
√
K0
p1 − p2 −K1. (4.3.50)
The resulting optimal demand leakage is identical to the derived optimal demand leakage
for a partitioned protection level. Therefore, the resulting inner optimal fencing decision
(and its properties) are the same under both types of protection levels. Again, γ∗nested > 0
holds for K0
K21
> (p1 − p2)2. Thus, if a positive leakage level is optimal for the firm, the firm
should define the same fences independent of whether they apply a partitioned or nested
protection level. This holds as long as the resulting optimal protection level is less than the
total available capacity, yLWnested(γ
∗
nested) < C. Given the results for a partitioned protection
level, this results is rather intuitive. If the value of the protection level itself (at least as long
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as the inner optimal protection level is less than the total available capacity) does not affect
the firm’s fencing decision, the type of allocation rule should not affect the firm’s fencing
decision either. As long as the inner optimal protection level does not exceed the total
capacity, taking both decisions sequentially is also optimal for a nested protection level. As
shown in Section 2.2.1.1, the expected profit function is unimodular in y for given fences. The
inner optimal protection level is therefore unique. Littlewood’s rule follows from Equation
(4.3.44) and yields yLWnested(γ
∗
nested) as the inner optimal protection level.
The resulting locally optimal decisions yield a local maximum of the expected profit func-
tion as both second order derivatives are negative for γ∗ = γ∗nested and y
∗ = yLWnested(γ
∗
nested).
To summarize, our findings support the numerical results by Zhang et al. (2010). In
our approach, we show that the inner optimal fencing decisions are identical under both
protection levels, constant and thus independent of decisions about the protection level for
both types of protection levels. Taking both decisions simultaneously is therefore of no
additional value for the firm. The firm also takes the optimal decisions if it decides in a
hierarchical manner. Our result therefore is in contrast to the claim that both decisions
should generally be taken simultaneously by, for example, Hanks et al. (2002), and supports
traditional hierarchical planning approaches as discussed in Chapter 2.
The main result, that the fencing decision can be taken independently of the allocation
decision if the optimal protection level does not exceed the total capacity results from the
definition of the customer demands, as discussed for the case of a partitioned protection level
above. In order to account for customer demand depending on the firm’s allocation decision,
we consider additional stock-out-based substitution in the next section.
4.4 Additional Stock-Out-Based Substitution
In this section, we extend the previous setting. We still account for demand leakage due to
the difference in product prices, however, we additionally consider stock-out-based demand
substitution in case that the Class 2 product is unavailable. Compared to the previous
setting, we thus consider two additional customer types by accounting for the fact that
actual Class 2 customers might behave differently in case of a stock-out compared to leaked
Class 1 customers. Both additional customer types re-substitute in cases where the booking
limit quantity is already unavailable.
In the remainder of this section, we first present the underlying demand model with stock-
out-based demand substitution. Stock-out-based demand substitution affects the demand
model discussed in Section 4.3, which makes up the difference compared to the previous
setting. The extended demand model is presented and discussed in Section 4.4.1. Afterwards,
we give the extended models for a partitioned and nested protection level. Finally, we present
the analyses again for both a partitioned and a nested protection level.
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4.4.1 Demand Model
As described above, we account for additional stock-out based substitution in case the lower-
value product is unavailable. These substitution effects impact Class 1 demand while Class 2
demand remains unchanged compared to the previous setting (see Section 4.3.1). The Class
1 demand model follows the approach for modeling stock-out-based substitution as presented
by, for example, Netessine and Rudi (2003), Ko¨k et al. (2009) or Jiang et al. (2011).
In line with Littlewood’s model, we assume a low-before-high order arrival pattern. Due
to price-driven demand leakage, requests for the lower-value product may stem from either
initial Class 1 or Class 2 customers. Here, we assume that requests from initial Class 2 cus-
tomers are also served first in the case of a stock-out. Stock-out-based demand substitution
only occurs if the lower-value demand exceeds the booking limit. In case of a stock-out, the
substitution rates may differ between initial Class 1 and Class 2 customers. The substitution
rates are assumed to be exogenously given.
Following the previous notation and the above assumptions, Class 1 demand qs1 after
substitution results from combining the demand model in Section 4.3.1 and the approach
for modeling stock-out-based demand substitution as
qs1 =

q1(γ), for q2(γ) ≤ C − y,
q1(γ) + α1 · (q2(γ)− (C − y)), for C − y < q2(γ) ≤ C − y + γ · (p1 − p2),
q1(γ) + α1 · γ · (p1 − p2)
+α2 · (D2 − (C − y)), for q2(γ) > C − y + γ · (p1 − p2),
(4.4.1)
where αi (i = 1, 2) denotes the share of actual demand of customer class i for the lower-
price product, which cannot be satisfied from the allocated quantity and is therefore (re-)
substituted to the higher-value product. In contrast to the previous setting, effective Class
1 demand depends both on the firm’s fencing decision and the allocation decision.
If q2(γ) ≤ C − y, demand for the lower-price product can be entirely satisfied by the
available booking limit. Thus, no additional stock-out-based substitution occurs in this
case. We denote this event by NS in the remainder of this section. As soon as q2(γ) exceeds
the booking limit, stock-out-based substitution occurs. This is the case in the second and
third case in Equation (4.4.1).
If C − y < q2(γ) ≤ C − y + γ · (p1 − p2), the demand for the lower-value product exceeds
the booking limit. Thus, not all the requests can be satisfied. As Class 2 requests occur
prior to Class 1 requests due to the assumptions given in Section 2.2.1.1 (”low-before-high”
order arrivals), we assume that Class 2 requests are served first. The booking limit is thus
sufficient to satisfy demand from the actual Class 2 customers, but is not sufficient to satisfy
all leaked Class 1 demand in this case. A share of α1 of the rejected leaked initial Class
1 customers again requests the higher-value product. This event is denoted as S1 in the
remainder as only actual Class 1 customer re-substitute.
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In the third case, i.e., if q2(γ) > C− y+γ · (p1− p2), or equivalently if D2 > C− y, stock-
out based substitution occurs by both the original Class 2 customers (α2 · (D2 − (C − y)))
and the leaked Class 1 customers. In this case, the booking limit is too low even to satisfy
the original Class 2 demand. Some customers from both customer classes are therefore not
served. A share α1 of the leaked Class 1 demand (γ · (p1− p2)) re-substitutes for the Class 1
product. As customers from both customer classes engage in stock-out-based substitution,
we denote this event as S12 in the remainder. Table 4.2 summarizes the possible events with
regard to stock-out-based substitution discussed above.
Event Product 2 demand after leakage Product 1 demand after substitution
NS q2(γ) ≤ C − y q1(γ)
S1 C − y < q2(γ) ≤ C − y + γ · (p1 − p2) qS11 = q1(γ) + α1 · (q2(γ)− (C − y))
S12 q2(γ) > C − y + γ · (p1 − p2) qS121 = q1(γ) + α1 · γ · (p1 − p2) + α2 · (D2 − (C − y))
Table 4.2: Events with regard to stock-out-based demand substitution
4.4.2 Fencing Costs
In line with the previous section, we assume that a firm can influence price-driven demand
leakage by managing its fences, thereby incurring costs of K(γ). The stock-out-based substi-
tution rates αi are assumed to be exogenously given. In contrast to the fences (and therefore
the resulting price-driven demand leakage), they are not a decision variable for the firm.
Thus, we assume that the fencing costs are independent of the stock-out-based substitution
rates αi. Given these assumptions, we again consider K(γ) =
K0
γ+K1
as the relevant fencing
cost function.
4.4.3 An Integrated Fencing and Capacity Allocation Model
Under additional stock-out-based demand substitution, Class 1 demand depends on both
decisions of the firm: the fences and the protection level. A firm’s optimization problems
for partitioned and nested protection levels therefore result from replacing q1(γ) by q
s
1(y, γ)
in Equations (4.3.4) and (4.3.5), respectively. Thus
max
0≤y≤C,0≤γ
E[pi(y, γ)] = p2 ·E[min(C − y, q2(γ))] + p1 ·E[min(y, qs1(y, γ))]−K(γ) (4.4.2)
for a partitioned protection level, and
max
0≤y≤C,0≤γ
E[pi(y, γ)] = p2 · E[min(C − y, q2(γ))]
+ p1 · E[min(C −min(C − y, q2(γ)), qs1(y, γ))]−K(γ). (4.4.3)
for a nested protection level.
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Having stated the additional assumptions under stock-out-based substitution and the
firm’s optimization problem, we investigate a firm’s optimal decisions in the remainder.
Again, we first present the results for a partitioned protection level both for given fences
and simultaneous decisions on the protection level and the fences. Subsequently, we consider
the case of a nested protection level. For both types of protection levels, we investigate the
necessary first-order optimality conditions and thus the trade-offs underlying the optimal
inner solutions for the firm’s decisions.
4.4.4 Analysis: Partitioned Allocation Planning
4.4.4.1 Allocation Planning under Exogenous Fences
As in the previous section, we first consider the firm’s allocation planning problem for given
fences. We consider this setting in order to investigate the impact of both price-driven
demand leakage and stock-out-based substitution on the optimal protection level.
Differentiating Equation (4.4.2) with regard to y yields
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dy
=− p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y}] + p1 · E[
dqs1(y, γ)
dy
· I{qs1(y,γ)≤y} + I{qs1(y,γ)>y}].
(4.4.4)
The marginal effect of y on Class 1 demand can be expressed as
dqs1
dy
=

0, if q2(γ) < C − y,
α1, if C − y < q2(γ) < C − y + γ · (p1 − p2),
α2, if q2(γ) > C − y + γ · (p1 − p2).
(4.4.5)
For qs1(y, γ) as stated above in Section 4.4.1, Equation (4.4.4) results in
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dy
=− p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) + p1 · [α1 · P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) + α2 · P(S12, qS121 ≤ y)
+ P(NS, q1(γ) > y) + P(S1, qS11 > y) + P(S12, qS121 > y)] (4.4.6)
when accounting for all possible cases regarding stock-out-based substitution as illustrated
in Table 4.2 and Equation (4.4.5), respectively. Both the marginal effect on Class 2 revenue
and the marginal effect on Class 1 revenue depend on γ. However, only the marginal effect
on Class 1 revenue depends on the substitution effects α1 and α2.
Equation (4.4.6) has some interpretation. On the one hand, increasing the protection
level results in a marginal loss of p2 if q2(γ) > C − y. This is reflected by the first term
in the above first order derivative and is equivalent to Littlewood’s standard model. On
the other hand, increasing the protection level results in a marginal revenue gain. This is
reflected in the right-hand side of the above optimality condition. If qs1(y, γ) ≤ y, increas-
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ing the protection level does not increase the firm’s revenue by serving additional Class 1
requests directly. Increasing the protection level is identical to decreasing the booking limit.
Therefore, additional stock-out-based substitution might occur in this case, which affects
the firm’s revenue indirectly. If qs1(y, γ) > y, then increasing the protection level results in
additional direct revenue from Class 1. If the stock-out-based demand substitution rates
are equal to zero (i.e.,
dqs1(y,γ)
dy
= 0), Equation (4.4.6) is identical to Equation (4.3.7) in the
previous setting without consideration of stock-out-based demand substitution.
The second order derivative results from differentiating Equation (4.4.6) with regard to
y. As the resulting second order derivative is not generally negative, the expected profit
function is not necessarily strictly concave in y. A unique optimal protection level is thus
not guaranteed.
Setting the first order derivative equal to zero yields
p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y) =p1 · [α1 · P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) + α2 · P(S12, qS121 ≤ y)
+ P(NS, q1(γ) > y) + P(S1, qS11 > y) + P(S12, qS121 > y)]
(4.4.7)
as the first-order optimality condition for y. Both sides depend on γ. The left hand-side of
Equation (4.4.7) is increasing in γ. qs1(y, γ) is decreasing in γ and
dqs1(y,γ)
dy
is constant and
independent of γ in each of the cases discussed above. Thus, the right-hand side is decreasing
in γ. If the firm sets weaker fences, the resulting price-driven demand leakage increases.
Therefore, the left hand-side increases and the right-hand side decreases. Consequently, y
must decrease such that Equation (4.4.7) holds again. The local optimal protection level
thus decreases with increasing (exogenous) demand leakage as in the previous setting where
additional stock-out-based demand substitution is not considered. The stricter the firm’s
fences, the more capacity should be reserved for the higher-value customer class. This result
holds locally, for any local optimum. Recall that the problem is not concave and may
therefore have multiple local optima, in general.
Next, we investigate the impact of the substitution rates α1 and α2 on the firm’s optimal
allocation decision. In order to investigate their impact, we compare the settings with and
without stock-out-based substitution. We aim to investigate whether the protection level
under stock-out-based substitution is lower or greater than the protection level when no
stock-out-based substitution occurs. Stock-out-based substitution affects Class 1 demand
positively, and therefore qs1(y, γ) is stochastically larger than q1(γ).
Assume that the firm sets a protection level y˜ when no stock-out based substitution occurs.
In order to make a statement about the relationship of the optimal protection levels with and
without stock-out-based demand substitution, we compare the first order derivatives in both
cases. Specifically, assume that there exists a value y such that the first order derivative with
regard to the protection level at y under stock-out-based substitution (Equation (4.4.4)) is
equal to the first order derivative with regard to y without stock-out-based substitution at
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y˜ (Equation (4.3.7)). Formally, this implies that
p1 · E[dq
s
1(y, γ)
dy
· I{qs1(y,γ)≤y} + I{qs1(y,γ)>y}]− p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y}]
= p1 · E[I{q1(γ)>y˜}]− p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y˜}] (4.4.8)
holds. Rearranging terms results in
p1 · E[(I{qs1(y,γ)>y} − I{q1(γ)>y˜}) +
dqs1(y, γ)
dy
· (1− I{qs1(y,γ)>y})]
− p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y} − I{q2(γ)>C−y˜}] = 0. (4.4.9)
As
dqs1(y,γ)
dy
≥ 0 and (1− I{qs1(y,γ)>y}) ≥ 0,
dqs1(y,γ)
dy
· (1− I{qs1(y,γ)>y}) ≥ 0 holds.
By means of Equation (4.4.9), we investigate how the protection level under stock-out-
based demand substitution is related to y˜, that is whether the firm should choose the same,
a smaller or a greater protection level under stock-out-based demand substitution.
First, assume y ≤ y˜. Then, I{qs1(y˜,γ)>y˜} − I{q1>y˜} > 0 as qs1(y˜, γ) is stochastically larger
than q1(γ). Moreover, I{q2(γ)>C−y˜} − I{q2(γ)>C−y˜} ≤ 0. The left-hand side of the Equation
(4.4.9) is thus non-negative. Therefore, y ≤ y˜ yields a contradiction.
As we can exclude y ≤ y˜, the protection level under stock-out-based demand substitution
is greater than the optimal protection level without stock-out-based demand substitution,
i.e. y > y˜. If the firm protects the total available capacity anyway, additional stock-out-
based demand substitution does not affect the protection level. This result is rather intuitive
as stock-out-based substitution increases Class 1 demand and does not come with additional
penalty costs. Another argument for this result is that the firm’s actual overage costs for
protecting capacity for the higher-value customer class decrease due to increasing demand
substitution.
The above result also holds for p1 · E[I{q1(γ)>y˜}] − p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y˜}] = 0. Hence, also
the optimal protection level under stock-out-based demand substitution is greater than the
corresponding protection level without stock-out-based demand substitution.
4.4.4.2 Optimal Fences
The firm maximizes its expected profit by deciding about y and γ. The optimality equation
for y is given above by Equation (4.4.6). Differentiating the expected profit with regard to
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γ yields
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dγ
=p2 · E[dq2(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y}] + p1 · E[
dqs1(y, γ)
dγ
· I{qs1(y,γ)≤y}]−
dK(γ)
dγ
=p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(NS)− p1 · (p1 − p2) · P(NS, q1(γ) ≤ y)
− p1 · (p1 − p2) · (1− α1) · (P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) + P(S12, qS121 ≤ y))
+
K0
(γ +K1)2
=(p1 − p2) · [p2 · P(NS)− p1 · P(NS, q1(γ) ≤ y)
− p1 · (1− α1) · (P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) + P(S12, qS121 ≤ y)] +
K0
(γ +K1)2
.
(4.4.10)
This first order derivative has some intuitive interpretation. Additional price-driven de-
mand leakage has a positive marginal effect on the revenue from the lower-value product if
q2(γ) ≤ C − y. Regarding the higher-value product, demand leakage only has a marginal
impact on the revenue if qs1(y, γ) ≤ y. Otherwise, demand leakage does not have a marginal
impact as the firm is still able to sell the protection level y. If no stock-out-based substitu-
tion occurs (i.e., q2(γ) ≤ C − y), the (negative) marginal impact equals dq1(γ)dγ = −(p1 − p2).
As soon as stock-out-based substitution occurs, demand leakage has a marginal impact of
dq1(γ)
dγ
+α1 · dq2(γ)dγ = −(p1−p2)+α1 ·(p1−p2) = −(p1−p2) ·(1−α1) ≤ 0 on the firm’s revenue.
In these cases, the impact is lower compared to a situation without stock-out-based substi-
tution. On the one hand, demand leakage still decreases Class 1 demand directly. However,
with stock-out-based substitution, this effect is lower in absolute terms because some of the
leaked Class 1 customers again re-substitute for the higher-value product. Finally, demand
leakage has a marginal impact on the fencing costs.
Making use of P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) = P(S1)−P(S1, qS11 > y) and P(S12, qS121 ≤ y) = P(S12)−
P(S12, qS121 > y) allows for terms to be rearranged in Equation (4.4.10). After rearrangement,
terms in Equation (4.4.10) correspond to terms in Equation (4.4.7). Substituting Equation
(4.4.7) into Equation (4.4.10) after rearrangement finally yields
− (p1 − p2) · (p1 · (1− (α1 − α2) · P(S12, qS121 ≤ y))− p2) = −
K0
(γ +K1)2
(4.4.11)
as the optimality equation for γ.
Compared to the setting without stock-out-based substitution, Equation (4.4.11) differs
from Equation (4.3.25) with regard to the term in brackets on the left-hand side. Both
optimality conditions are equivalent, if the stock-out-based substitution rates are identical
across the customer classes (i.e., if α1 = α2). Therefore, the same optimal fencing decisions
result for α1 = α2 with and without consideration of additional stock-out-based demand
substitution. In this case, the unconstrained decision about the firm’s fences is independent
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of the allocation decision. Sequential planning is optimal in this case and the optimal
protection level follows from Equation (4.4.6).
A firm’s decision on its fences and the allocation decision are interdependent if α1 6= α2
as the left-hand side of the above optimality equation also depends on y in this case. Both
decisions should then be taken simultaneously in order to maximize the total expected profit.
Taking both decisions sequentially would neglect their interaction.
In order to investigate the interaction of the firm’s decisions, we rearrange terms in Equa-
tion (4.4.11), yielding
P(S12, qS121 ≤ y) = [(p1 − p2)2 −
K0
(γ +K1)2
] · 1
p1 · (p1 − p2) · (α1 − α2) . (4.4.12)
First, we investigate how the firm’s decisions and the substitution rates affect the left-hand
side of the optimality equation. P(S12, qS121 ≤ y) denotes the probability that the two events
S12 and qS121 ≤ y occur simultaneously. P(S12) increases in y and is independent of γ, α1
and α2. P(qS121 ≤ y) is increasing in y and γ and decreasing in α1 and α2 (if D2 > C − y).
Thus, P(S12, qS121 ≤ y) = P(qS121 ≤ y|S12) · P(S12) increases in γ and decreases in α1 and
α2. As the two events S12 and q
S12
1 ≤ y are not independent, the overall effect of y on the
common probability P(S12, qS121 ≤ y) is not clear. The right-hand side of Equation (4.4.12)
is independent of y, increases in γ, decreases in α1 and increases in α2.
The left-hand side of the above optimality equation may either increase or decrease with
increasing protection levels while the right-hand side is not affected. For an increasing pro-
tection level, the firm will have to adapt its fencing decision so that Equation (4.4.12) holds
again. As both sides are increasing in γ, no general statement can be made about whether
the firm should define stricter or weaker fences in response to an increasing protection level.
Responding to a greater protection level by setting weaker fences results in lower costs for
fencing, higher price-driven demand leakage and finally higher stock-out-based demand sub-
stitution (for given substitution rates). Due to the greater protection level, a greater share
of the increasing demand after stock-out-based demand substitution can be fulfilled. In con-
trast to weaker fences, the firm can potentially also set stricter fences. Fencing costs then
increase. However, total substitution (i.e. price-driven demand leakage and stock-out-based
demand substitution) decreases. Thus, q1(γ) increases directly compared to weaker fences.
Thus, it boils down to a trade-off between the fencing costs and the total substitution ef-
fects and their impact on fulfillment of Class 1 demand given a greater protection level,
respectively. Several parameters are involved in this trade-off as shown in Equation (4.4.12).
In Equation (4.4.12), both sides depend on γ. In the following, we aim to identify bounds
for the optimal leakage level under stock-out-based demand substitution. Due to the com-
plex second order derivatives, we make use of the fact that the left-hand side denotes a
probability (∈ [0, 1]). This allows for deriving conditions for the optimal choice of γ, which
depend on the problem parameters. Identifying these conditions is particularly interesting
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as these conditions allow for comparison with the optimal inner leakage level γ∗part without
stock-out-based demand substitution. First, we investigate the conditions for the right-hand
side to be greater than zero.
Condition 1: [(p1 − p2)2 − K0(γ+K1)2 ] · 1p1·(p1−p2)·(α1−α2) ≥ 0
This condition holds, if either both terms are non-negative or if both terms are non-positive.
Whether the second term is positive or negative depends on the relation of α1 and α2. Thus,
[(p1−p2)2− K0(γ+K1)2 ]· 1p1·(p1−p2)·(α1−α2) is non-negative, if either α1 > α2 and (p1−p2)2 ≥ K0(γ+K1)2
or if α1 < α2 and (p1 − p2)2 ≤ K0(γ+K1)2 . These conditions result in either
α1 > α2, γ ≥
√
K0
p1 − p2 −K1 = γ
∗
part, (4.4.13)
or
α1 < α2, γ ≤
√
K0
p1 − p2 −K1 = γ
∗
part. (4.4.14)
The locally optimal fencing decision thus results in a lower optimal price-driven demand
leakage compared to the previous setting without stock-out-based demand substitution, if
α1 < α2. The firm should define stricter fences in this case. For α1 < α2, relatively more
actual Class 2 customers request the higher-value product. The share of Class 1 customers
who re-substitute is relatively low, therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to directly pre-empt
stock-out-based demand substitution from Class 1 by limiting price-driven demand leakage.
If α1 > α2, the firm should define weaker fences compared to the previous setting. Higher
price-driven demand leakage is optimal in this case. In line with the previous argument, the
firm can tolerate higher price-driven demand leakage in this case as a higher share of the
more profitable Class 1 customers re-substitutes for the higher-value product. The risk of
actually losing Class 1 demand is then lower.
Condition 2: [(p1 − p2)2 − K0(γ+K1)2 ] · 1p1·(p1−p2)·(α1−α2) ≤ 1
In addition to the above first condition, the right-hand side in Equation (4.4.12) must also
be less than or equal to one. In the following, we investigate the two cases discussed above,
i.e., α1 > α2 and γ ≥
√
K0
p1−p2 −K1 = γ∗part and α1 < α2 and γ ≤
√
K0
p1−p2 −K1 = γ∗part. These
conditions ensure that the right-hand side is non-negative and must therefore also hold.
First, we consider the conditions stated in Equation (4.4.13): α1 > α2 and γ ≥
√
K0
p1−p2 −
K1 = γ
∗
part. Rearranging terms in [(p1 − p2)2 − K0(γ+K1)2 ] · 1p1·(p1−p2)·(α1−α2) ≤ 1 under these
conditions yields
(p1 − p2) · [p1 − p2 − p1 · (α1 − α2)] ≤ K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.4.15)
Depending on the relationship of the prices and the stock-out-based substitution rates, the
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left-hand side in Equation (4.4.15) is either positive or negative. This allows for identification
of additional conditions.
If α1 − α2 < 1− p2p1 , then the left-hand side is positive. In this case, the above condition
in Equation (4.4.15) results in
γ∗part < γ ≤
√
K0
(p1 − p2) · [p1 − p2 − p1 · (α1 − α2)] −K1. (4.4.16)
The right-hand side is greater than γ∗part as (p1 − p2) · [p1 − p2 − p1 · (α1 − α2)] < (p1 − p2)2.
The firm’s fencing decision is thus in the interval γ∗part ≤ γ ≤
√
K0
(p1−p2)·[p1−p2−p1·(α1−α2)] −K1
for α1 − α2 < 1− p2p1 .
If α1 − α2 > 1− p2p1 , then the left-hand side is negative. In this case, the above condition
results in
(γ +K1)
2 ≥ 0 > K0
(p1 − p2) · [p1 − p2 − p1 · (α1 − α2)] . (4.4.17)
As the left-hand side is non-negative, this condition always holds. Therefore, the firm’s
fencing decision results in a leakage level greater than γ∗part for α1 − α2 > 1− p2p1 . Thus, the
firm defines weaker fences.
For α1 < α2 and γ ≤
√
K0
p1−p2 − K1 = γ∗part, rearranging terms in the above inequality in
Equation (4.4.15) under these conditions yields
(p1 − p2) · [p1 − p2 + p1 · (α2 − α1)] ≥ K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.4.18)
The left-hand side in Equation (4.4.18) is positive as α1 < α2. This condition results in
γ∗part > γ ≥
√
K0
(p1 − p2) · [p1 − p2 + p1 · (α2 − α1)] −K1. (4.4.19)
A firm’s fencing decision is therefore in the interval
√
K0
(p1−p2)·[p1−p2+p1·(α2−α1)]−K1 ≤ γ ≤ γ∗part
if α1 < α2. In this case, the price-driven demand leakage resulting from the firm’s fencing
decision is less than γ∗part and bounded below. Table 4.3 summarizes the conditions for the
choice of the fencing decision derived above.
To summarize, it is again optimal to take both decisions sequentially if α1 = α2, otherwise,
the firm’s decisions interact. By analyzing the optimality condition, we find that no general
statement can be made with regard to how the firm should adapt its fencing decision in
order to respond to changes in the allocation decisions. The interaction of both decisions
depends on the sensitivity with regard to the decision variables of the terms involved in
the optimality condition. However, we find that the resulting optimal leakage level under
additional stock-out-based substitution is greater (smaller) than γ∗part if α1 > α2 (α1 < α2).
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Bounds for the optimal leakage level Conditions√
K0
(p1−p2)·[p1−p2+p1·(α2−α1)] −K1 ≤ γ < γ∗part α1 < α2
γ∗part α1 = α2√
K0
[(p1−p2)·[p1−p2−p1·(α1−α2)]] −K1 > γ > γ∗part 0 < α1 − α2 < 1−
p2
p1
γ > γ∗part 0 < 1− p2p1 < α1 − α2
Table 4.3: Bounds for the optimal fencing decisions under stock-out-based demand substi-
tution
4.4.5 Analysis: Nested Allocation Planning
In the remainder of this section, we investigate the firm’s optimization problem as stated
in Equation (4.4.3). In contrast to Section 4.3, we only investigate the necessary first-order
conditions for the setting where the firm decides simultaneously about fences and the nested
protection level. For nested allocations, the standard model has already been shown not to
be concave in y in Section 2.2.1.1. Thus, the extended model, including price-driven demand
leakage and stock-out-based demand substitution, will not be concave in the firm’s decisions
either.
Differentiating the expected profit in Equation (4.4.3) with regard to y yields
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dy
=− p2 · E[I{q2(γ)>C−y}]
+ p1 · E[I{qs1(y,γ)>y,q2(γ)>C−y} +
dqs1(y, γ)
dy
· I{qs1(y,γ)≤y,q2(γ)>C−y}]
=− p2 · P(q2(γ) > C − y)
+ p1 · (P(S1, qS11 > y) + P(S12, qS121 > y))
+ p1 · (α1 · P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) + α2 · P(S12, qS121 ≤ y)). (4.4.20)
Equation (4.4.20) has some intuitive interpretation. The protection level y only has a
marginal impact on the firm’s total expected profit if stock-out-based substitution occurs
(i.e., if q2(γ) > C − y). On the one hand, the firm then loses p2 when increasing y. On
the other hand, the firm gains p1 if the resulting demand for the higher-value product (in-
cluding stock-out-based substitution) exceeds the protection level. Then the firm can sell an
additional unit to Class 1 customers. If the resulting Class 1 demand after stock-out-based
substitution is less than y, the firm gains p1 · αi (i = 1, 2) as increasing the protection level
decreases the available booking limit for Class 2 and thus increases stock-out-based substitu-
tion which again increases demand for Product 1. As demand for Product 1 does not exceed
y, the additional demand caused by stock-out-based substitution can be fulfilled at price p1.
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The first order derivative with regard to γ results in
dE[pi(y, γ)]
dγ
=p2 · E[dq2(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y}] + p1 · E[
dqs1(y, γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)>C−y,qs1(y,γ)≤y}
− dq2(γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y,C−q2(γ)<q1(y,γ)} +
dqs1(y, γ)
dγ
· I{q2(γ)≤C−y,C−q2(γ)≥q1(γ)}]
− dK(γ)
dγ
=p2 · (p1 − p2) · P(NS)
+ p1 · ((P(S1, qS11 ≤ y) + P(S12, qS121 ≤ y)) · (α1 − 1) · (p1 − p2))
− (p1 − p2) · P(NS,C − q2(γ) < q1(γ))
− (p1 − p2) · P(NS,C − q2(γ) ≥ q1(γ)) + K0
(γ +K1)2
=− (p1 − p2) · ((p1 − p2) · P(NS) + p1 · (1− α1) · (P(S1, qS11 ≤ y)
+ P(S12, qS121 ≤ y))) +
K0
(γ +K1)2
. (4.4.21)
Allowing marginally higher price-based demand leakage yields additional Class 2 revenue if
Class 2 demand does not exceed the booking limit (i.e., if q2(γ) ≤ C−y). If stock-out-based
substitution occurs (i.e., if q2(γ) > C− y) and the resulting Class 1 demand does not exceed
the protection level y, the firm on the one hand loses revenue due to marginally lower Class
1 demand (p1 · dq1(γ)dγ ). On the other hand, the firm gains additional Class 1 demand as
the marginally increasing Class 2 demand cannot be fulfilled and partially increases Class
1 demand (by increasing stock-out-based substitution), which can still be fulfilled. If no
stock-out-based substitution occurs, the marginal effects differ, depending on whether the
total demand exceeds capacity or not. If so, higher demand leakage causes lost revenues as
the demand for Product 1 decreases but at the same time increases demand for Product 2.
The last term represents the marginal effect on the substitution costs.
Rearranging terms in Equation (4.4.20), equating them to zero and substituting the re-
sulting optimality condition for y into the optimality condition for γ following from Equation
(4.4.21) yields
−(p1 − p2) · (p1 − p2 − p1 · (α1 − α2) · P(S12, qS121 ≤ y)) = −
K0
(γ +K1)2
(4.4.22)
as the optimality condition for γ. This is identical to the optimality condition for the
leakage level under a partitioned protection level stated in Equation (4.4.11). The main
results obtained for a partitioned protection level discussed above therefore also hold for
a nested protection level: the decisions should be taken sequentially (simultaneously) if
α1 = α2 (α1 6= α2), and no statement can be made with regard to the impact of value of the
protection level on the optimal price-driven demand leakage. Based on the firm’s optimal
decisions in the setting without stock-out-based demand substitution and the analogies of
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the decisions in both settings, this result is rather intuitive. If the value of the protection
level does not affect the firm’s fencing decision for α1 6= α2, the type of protection level
should not affect the firm’s fences either.
4.5 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we provide numerical illustrations for the two settings considered in the
previous sections: price-driven demand leakage both without and with additional stock-out-
based demand substitution. By providing and discussing numerical examples, we aim to
highlight the impact of different parameters on a firm’s optimal decisions and thus on the
expected profit. First, we present numerical examples for the setting which only accounts
for price-driven demand leakage. Afterwards, we discuss numerical examples for the setting
with additional stock-out-based demand substitution. In all numerical examples, we assume
a partitioned protection level.
All numerical examples have been evaluated via MS Excel. They were calculated on a
personal computer with an Intel Core Duo 2.40GHz processor and 2GB RAM, operated by
the Microsoft Windows 7 Professional system.
4.5.1 Price-Driven Demand Leakage
In this section, we illustrate numerical examples of a firm’s optimal fencing and allocation
decisions for the setting discussed in Section 4.3. First, we define a basic parameter set
as the reference case for the following numerical illustrations, then we illustrate the firm’s
optimal decisions, as derived in Section 4.3, for different parameter scenarios based on the
reference case. We compare the investigated setting with two customer classes with a setting
where the firm does not differentiate prices among its customers at all. This allows for an
illustration of how different parameters affect the value of price differentiation itself.
In the following, we assume a capacity of 100 units. For ease of computation and due to its
wide application in the field of revenue management, we model customer demands Di using
Poisson distributions (in contrast to Zhang et al. (2010) who model customer demands with
uniform distributions). We consider λ1 = 40 and λ2 = 80 as the parameters of the respective
Poisson distributions. As for the exogenous prices, we consider p1 = 20 and p2 = 15. We
assume strictly convex fencing costs as defined in Section 4.3.2. As for the cost parameters,
we assume K0 = 1, 000 and K1 = 15. The fencing cost function follows from Equation (4.3.3)
as K(γ) = 1,000
γ+15
. Table 4.4 summarizes the chosen values for the parameters in the reference
case.
Parameter C λ1 λ2 p1 p2 K0 K1
Value 100 40 80 20 15 1,000 15
Table 4.4: The reference case under price-driven demand leakage
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Based on these parameters, we first show how a firm should actually take the optimal
decisions following the approach in Section 4.3. For the given parameters, K0
K21
= 4.44 and
(p1 − p2)2 = 25. Thus, K0K21 ≤ (p1 − p2)
2 and therefore the optimal leakage level in this
case results in γ∗ = 0. A firm should thus define its fences such that no price-driven
demand leakage occurs at all. From Equation (4.3.3), the resulting fencing costs amount to
K(0) = 1,000
15
= 66.67. Based on the demand distributions resulting from the optimal price-
driven demand leakage according to the demand model in Section 4.3.1, the firm determines
the optimal protection level. The firm should reserve y∗ = min(100, yLWpart(0)) = 36 units of
capacity for Class 1 customers. yLWpart(0) = 36 results from Equation (4.3.7). The maximum
expected profit based on the demand distributions and the optimal protection level results
in E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] = E[pi(36, 0)] = 1, 592. The reference case reflects Case 2 from the analysis
in Section 4.3.
In order to illustrate the firm’s optimal decisions (γ∗, y∗) under price-driven demand
leakage, derived in Section 4.3, we determine the optimal decisions for several scenarios. Each
parameter setting reflects one of the cases (except for the Cases 3 and 4, which have been
shown to be never optimal) resulting from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions in Section 4.3.
Table 4.5 shows the investigated scenarios and the resulting optimal decisions. The resulting
Scenario 1 2 3 4
p1 20 20 20 20
p2 15 15 18 18
λ1 40 120 40 120
λ2 80 80 80 80
K0 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
K1 15 15 15 15
K0
K21
4.44 4.44 4.44 4.44
(p1 − p2)2 25 25 4 25
y∗ 36 100 33 96
γ∗ 0 0 0.81 1.50
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,592.30 1,930.87 1,789.44 1935.38
Table 4.5: Optimal decisions for different scenarios
optimal decisions are illustrated in Figure 4.3. The first scenario reflects the defined reference
case discussed above. Increasing Class 1 demand to λ1 = 120 results in the second scenario.
In this case, it is still optimal to select perfect fences as 4.44 ≤ 25. However the firm protects
the total available capacity for Class 1 customers. Thus, the second scenario reflects Case 5
from the analysis in Section 4.3. Increasing p2 to 18 based on the reference case demonstrates
a scenario where an inner solution is optimal. This reflects Case 1 in Section 4.3. The firm
decides on a strictly positive leakage level γ∗ = γ∗part = 0.81 and the corresponding protection
level y∗ = yLWpart(0.81) = 30 < C. Finally, the fourth scenario shows a case where the firm
again protects the total available capacity and a leakage level γ∗C > γ
∗
part = 0.81 is optimal.
This parameter setting refers to Case 6 from the analysis in Section 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Optimal decisions for different parameter scenarios
In line with Zhang et al. (2010), we also compare the above two-segment setting with a
setting where the firm does not differentiate at all. If the firm does not segment its customers,
all customers receive the same service at the same price. We assume that the firm sets the
price p1+2 = p2 = 15 for all customers in this case. Alternatively, the firm could set some
price p˜ such that 20 ≥ p˜ > 15. However, expected demand from the lower-value class would
decrease then as p˜ might be greater than the willingness-to-pay of at least some of the Class
2 customers who would request the lower-value product at p2 = 15. We omit this by setting
p1+2 = p2. The total demand D1+2 for the single customer segment thus equals the sum of
the demands in the above discussed two-class settings. Therefore, λ1+2 = 120. When setting
a single price for both products, fencing is not necessary,and so the firm does not incur costs
for fencing. The expected profit at price p2 equals E[pi1+2] = p2 · E[min(C,D1+2)]. For the
parameters above, the firm’s expected profit from a single customer segment equals 1, 498.
Thus, price differentiation including fencing increases the expected profit by 6.28% for the
reference setting discussed above.
In order to illustrate how the value of price differentiation depends on particular pa-
rameters, we vary customer heterogeneity in terms of price difference and a fencing cost
parameter. In order to illustrate the impact of customer heterogeneity, we vary p2. Table
4.6 shows the expected profit for the two-segment case, the firm’s optimal allocation and
fencing decisions, the expected profit in the single-segment setting, and the resulting value
of price differentiation for varying prices p2.
p2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,466.15 1,528.88 1,592.30 1,656.43 1,721.33 1,789.44 1,874.14
y∗ 38 37 36 35 34 33 16.62
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0.81 18.73
E[pi1+2] 1,298.40 1,398.28 1,498.15 1,598.03 1,697.91 1,797.78 1,897.66
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 12.92% 9.34% 6.28% 3.65% 1.38% -0.46% -1.24%
Table 4.6: Value of price differentiation depending on customer heterogeneity
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The value of price differentiation decreases with decreasing customer heterogeneity as
shown in Table 4.6. It may even be more beneficial for a firm not to differentiate prices
at all for low customer heterogeneity. In particular, for p2 ≥ 18, the expected profit under
price differentiation is less than the expected profit for a single customer segment. With
lower customer heterogeneity, the firm can weaken its fences in order to save fencing costs.
Due to the low price differences, whether capacity is sold at p1 or at p2 does not make a
big difference. Thus, the savings in fencing costs from not differentiating prices at all are
greater than the additional expected benefit from price differentiation from some threshold
price difference.
In order to show the impact of the fencing costs on the value of price differentiation, we
vary the cost parameter K0. This does not affect the expected profit when the firm does not
differentiate its prices. Fencing is not necessary in this case. Thus, the expected profit from
a single customer segment is constant and equals E[pi1+2] = 1, 498.15. Table 4.7 shows the
resulting expected profit for the two-segment case, the firm’s optimal allocation and fencing
decisions and the resulting value of price differentiation for varying values of K0.
K0 50 100 500 1,000 2,000 4,000 8,000
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,655.63 1,652.30 1,625.63 1,592.30 1,525.63 1,392.30 1,142.18
y∗ 36 36 36 36 36 36 22
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.89
E[pi1+2] 1,498.15 1,498.15 1,498.15 1,498.15 1,498.15 1,498.15 1,498.15
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 10.51% 10.29% 8.51% 6.28% 1.83% -7.07% -23.76%
Table 4.7: Value of price differentiation depending on K0
The expected profit for two customer segments decreases with increasing K0. As E[pi1+2]
is not affected, the value of price differentiation also decreases in K0. For particularly high
values of K0 it is beneficial for the firm not to differentiate among its customers at all.
Compared to the customer heterogeneity discussed above, the impact of the fencing costs
on the benefit from price differentiation is larger for the examples illustrated. This is due
to its direct impact in the objective function. Varying K0 affects a firm’s optimal decisions.
While γ∗ = 0 for K0 ≤ 4, 000, it is optimal for the firm to allow price-driven demand leakage
(γ∗ = 2.89) for K0 = 8, 000.
The above results for varying values of p2 and K0 are in line with the results obtained
by Zhang et al. (2010). He investigates the impact of demand uncertainty (under uniform
demand distributions) on the firm’s optimal decisions and also finds that not differentiating
at all may be optimal in some parameter constellations.
4.5.2 Additional Stock-Out-Based Substitution
In this section, we present numerical examples for the setting discussed in Section 4.4. In
this approach, we account for price-driven demand leakage and stock-out-based demand sub-
stitution. The basic setting from the previous section also serves as the reference case for the
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following numerical illustrations. In addition, we consider the stock-out-based substitution
rates α1 = 0.2 and α2 = 0.6. Table 4.8 shows the resulting parameters in the reference case
under additional stock-out-based demand substitution.
Parameter C λ1 λ2 p1 p2 K0 K1 α1 α2
Value 100 40 80 20 15 1,000 15 0.2 0.6
Table 4.8: The reference case under additional stock-out-based substitution
First, we compare the results for the reference case with and without stock-out-based
demand substitution. As above, we determine the optimal decisions according to the op-
timality conditions under stock-out-based substitution or equivalently by maximising the
firm’s expected profit. For the given parameters, the firm’s optimal decisions are γ∗ = 0
and y∗ = 75. Thus, the firm should reserve a larger share of the total available capacity
for Class 1 customers under stock-out-based demand substitution. As discussed above, this
is intuitive as the resulting Class 1 demand under stock-out-based substitution stochasti-
cally dominates Class 1 demand under pure consideration of price-driven demand leakage.
The resulting total expected profit is E[pi(75, 0)] = 1, 706. The firm’s expected profit under
stock-out-based demand substitution is larger than the expected profit under pure price-
driven demand leakage. The expected profit from Class 2 equals E[R2(75, 0)] = 375 and is
thus lower compared to the previous setting. Although the expected underage decreases, the
expected sales decrease due to the lower available booking limit. Class 1 revenue increases
however, due to stock-out-based demand substitution and equals E[R1(75, 0)] = 1, 398. The
firm benefits from additional Class 1 demand compared to the previous setting due to the
higher protection level. The second effect overcompensates for the first effect. Table 4.9
summarizes a comparison of the firm’s optimal decisions and the resulting expected profits
with and without stock-out-based demand substitution.
γ∗ y∗ E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] E[R1(y∗, γ∗)] E[R2(y∗, γ∗)]
Without stock-out-based
substitution
0 36 1,592 700 958
With stock-out-based substitution 0 75 1,706 1,398 375
Table 4.9: Comparison of the results for the reference case with and without stock-out-based
substitution
As for the setting without stock-out-based demand substitution, we vary p2 in order to
show the impact of customer heterogeneity. Table 4.10 shows the resulting expected profit
for the two-segment case, the firm’s optimal allocation and fencing decisions, the expected
profit in the single-segment setting and the resulting value of price differentiation for varying
prices p2.
Again, the value of price differentiation decreases with decreasing customer heterogeneity
as shown in Table 4.6. Compared to the setting where only price-driven demand leakage is
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p2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,677.57 1,686.02 1,705.90 1,734.55 1,770.96 1,823.02 1,898.16
y∗ 99 86 75 67 60 45 27
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 7.65 32.10
E[pi1+2] 1,298.40 1,398.28 1,498.15 1,598.03 1,697.91 1,797.78 1,897.66
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 29.20% 20.58% 13.87% 8.54% 4.30% 1.40% 0.03%
Table 4.10: Value of price differentiation depending on customer heterogeneity under stock-
out-based demand substitution
considered, price differentiation under stock-out-based demand substitution outperforms a
single customer segment in all the numerical examples considered. Under additional stock-
out-based demand substitution, Class 1 demand is stochastically larger than without con-
sideration of stock-out-based demand substitution. The firm protects a higher share of the
total capacity for higher-value customer demands compared to the previous setting without
stock-out-based demand substitution. This confirms the general result in Section 4.4, that
the protection level under stock-out-based demand substitution is greater than the protec-
tion level without stock-out-based demand substitution. The firm therefore also benefits
from stock-out-based demand substitution.
In order to compare the impact of the fencing cost parameters, we also again vary the
cost parameter K0. Varying K0 does not affect the expected profit when the firm does not
differentiate its prices. Thus, the expected profit in this case again equals E[pi1+2] = 1, 498.15,
as in the previous setting. Table 4.11 shows the resulting expected profit for the two-segment
case, the firm’s optimal allocation and fencing decisions and the resulting value of price
differentiation for varying values of K0.
K0 50 100 500 1,000 2,000 4,000 8,000
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,769.23 1,765.90 1,739.23 1,705.90 1,639.23 1,513.62 1,326.81
y∗ 75 75 75 75 75 68 55
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 3.05 8
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 18.09% 17.87% 16.09% 13.87% 9.42% 1.03% -11.44%
Table 4.11: Value of price differentiation depending on K0 under stock-out-based demand
substitution
The expected profit for two customer segments decreases with increasing values for K0.
As E[pi1+2] is not affected, the value of price differentiation also decreases in K0 as under
pure price-driven demand leakage. The benefit through price differentiation under stock-
out-based demand substitution is higher compared to the previous setting without stock-
out-based demand substitution. Again, for high values of K0, it is beneficial for the firm not
to differentiate between its customers at all.
Based on one of the examples in Table 4.11, we also show the importance of taking both
decisions simultaneously instead of taking them in a hierarchical manner. As outlined in
Section 4.3, taking both decisions hierarchically results in γ∗ = max(γ∗part, 0). The optimal
protection level under stock-out-based demand substitution follows from Equation (4.4.6).
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Table 4.12 shows the value of simultaneous decision making for different values of K0. y
∗ and
γ∗ denote the optimal simultaneous decisions while yˆ∗ and γˆ∗ denote the optimal values of
the decision variables when taking both decisions hierarchically. For example, consider the
K0 50 100 500 1,000 2,000 4,000 8,000
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,769.23 1,765.90 1,739.23 1,705.90 1,639.23 1,513.62 1,326.81
y∗ 75 75 75 75 75 68 55
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 3.05 8
E[pi(yˆ∗, γˆ∗)] 1,769.23 1,765.90 1,739.23 1,705.90 1,639.23 1,506.00 1,290.00
yˆ∗ 75 75 75 75 75 75 68
γˆ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.89
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi(yˆ∗,γˆ∗)] − 1) · 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.51% 2.85%
Table 4.12: Value of simultaneous decision making
scenario with K0 = 4, 000. For the parameters given, γˆ
∗ = max(
√
4,000
20−15 − 15, 0) = 0 follows
as the optimal hierarchical leakage level. The optimal protection level for γˆ∗ = 0 results
in yˆ∗ = 75 and yields a total expected profit of 1,506. Thus, an additional 0.51% can be
gained by simultaneously deciding on the fences and the protection level. The benefit from
simultaneous decision making increases to 2.85% for K0 = 8, 000.
In order to illustrate the impact of customer heterogeneity with regard to the stock-out-
based demand substitution rates, we vary α1 and α2. Table 4.13 shows the resulting expected
profit for the two-segment case, the firm’s optimal allocation and fencing decisions and the
resulting value of price differentiation for the resulting combinations of α1 and α2.
The expected profit under stock-out-based demand substitution increases with increasing
values of α2 for a given value of α1. The same holds for the benefit of price differentiation.
This can be explained as follows. With increasing values of α2, the share of customers
substituting for the higher-value product increases. The firm accounts for increasing stock-
out-based demand substitution by further limiting the booking limit. In doing so, most of
the customers requesting the lower-value product face a stock-out and re-substitute. The
firm will therefore sell a greater share of its total available capacity at a higher price.
For a given value of α2, both the expected profit and the value of price differentiation
are non-decreasing in α1. Perfect fences are optimal in all scenarios with α1 + α2 ≤ 0.8. In
these cases, the expected profit equals the expected profit without stock-out-based demand
substitution. Due to the perfect fences, the firm does not incur price-driven demand leakage,
therefore, stock-out-based demand substitution from leaked Class 1 customers does not occur
either. Thus, the expected profit shown in the first column is completely independent of α1.
As soon as α1 + α2 > 0.8, the expected profit increases in α1 for given α2.
The results in Table 4.13 also show that no general statement can be made with regard
to the impact of the parameters on the firm’s optimal decisions, as shown in the analysis in
Section 4.4. Consider, for example, the two scenarios α1 = 0.6 and α2 = 0.2 and α1 = 0.6
and α2 = 0.4. With the increasing value of α1, the optimal protection level slightly decreases
for α2 = 0.2 and increases for α2 = 0.4. However, the optimal leakage level increases for
143
α1 0
α2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
y∗ 36 41 50 75 100
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,592.30 1,610.08 1,637.71 1,705.90 1,869.72
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 6.28% 7.47% 9.32% 13.87% 24.80%
α1 0.2
α2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
y∗ 36 41 50 75 100
γ∗ 0 0 0 0 8
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,592.30 1,610.08 1,637.71 1,705.90 1,887.26
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 6.28% 7.47% 9.32% 13.87% 25.97%
α1 0.4
α2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
y∗ 36 41 50 76 100
γ∗ 0 0 0 8 8
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,592.30 1,610.08 1,637.71 1,723.70 1,929.33
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 6.28% 7.47% 9.32% 15.06% 28.78%
α1 0.6
α2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
y∗ 36 41 49 100 100
γ∗ 0 0 8 8 8
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,592.30 1,610.08 1,657.96 1,816.34 1,948.27
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 6.28% 7.47% 10.67% 21.24% 30.05%
α1 0.8
α2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
y∗ 36 40 62 100 100
γ∗ 0 8 8 8 8
E[pi(y∗, γ∗)] 1,592.30 1,632.78 1,718.70 1,895.32 1,954.55
(E[pi(y
∗,γ∗)]
E[pi1+2]
− 1) · 100% 6.28% 8.99% 14.72% 26.51% 30.46%
Table 4.13: Value of price differentiation depending on α1 and α2 under stock-out-based
demand substitution
α2 = 0.2 and stays constant for α2 = 0.4.
To summarize, the numerical examples show the firm’s optimal decisions and how several
parameters affect these optimal decisions. For the chosen reference setting, both decisions
can be taken sequentially without stock-out-based demand substitution. Under stock-out-
based demand substitution, the expected profit can be maximized by using a non-linear
solver in MS Excel. The considered parameters affect the expected profit in the same way
in the two settings considered both with and without stock-out-based demand substitution.
The expected profits in each setting increase with decreasing customer heterogeneity and
decrease with increasing fencing costs. A firm benefits from additional stock-out-based
demand substitution by (in most of the considered cases) protecting a higher share of capacity
for the higher-value customer class. In this way, a firm ensures the sale of a high share of
capacity at the higher price. Regarding the interface to customer segmentation, we provide
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numerical examples for price differentiation resulting in a lower expected profit compared
to a single segment. Depending on the parameters, price differentiation is therefore not
necessarily optimal at all.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the interaction of a firm’s fencing decision with the firm’s
capacity allocation decision. Typically, the fencing decision is taken prior to the allocation
decision and updated less regularly. Thus, both decisions are taken in a hierarchical manner,
that is allocations are determined for given fences. Fences aim to limit price-driven demand
leakage. Without fences, customers with a high willingness-to-pay might have the motivation
to request the lower-value product and the firm loses revenue.
Price-driven demand leakage and the firm’s related decision about its fences have already
been considered in the field of inventory management. In these approaches, the firm decides
on the order quantities for the different customer classes in a newsvendor setting. Thus,
capacity is flexible and the firm does not face an allocation problem. In revenue management
research, price-driven demand leakage has not yet been considered explicitly. We combine
both streams by integrating the customer demand model including price-driven demand
leakage and thus the firm’s fencing decision into a revenue management model.
We build our modeling approach on Littlewood’s model. Our analysis is divided into two
parts: first, we explicitly consider the impact of price-driven demand leakage on customer
demand, building on the approach by Zhang et al. (2010). We investigate the firm’s decision
problem analytically and find that it is optimal for the firm (at least in practically relevant
settings) to take both decisions sequentially. The optimal fencing decision then yields a
leakage level which is constant for given problem parameters (prices and fencing cost param-
eters) and independent of the allocation decision. The optimal leakage level only depends
on the customer heterogeneity with regard to the willingness-to-pay and the costs of fencing.
For given fences, Littlewood’s rule yields the optimal allocation decision for both partitioned
and nested allocations.
The results are mainly driven by three assumptions: fencing has a deterministic effect
on customer demands, all leaked Class 1 customers request the lower-value product and
customer demands are independent of the allocation decision. The first assumption simplifies
the analysis but does not affect the results structurally as long as price-driven demand
leakage is a fixed amount and does not depend on demand realizations. When relaxing the
second assumption, the properties of the optimization problem are preserved, that is the
properties of the optimal decisions do not change. In order to account for the impact of the
allocation decision on customer demands, we consider additional stock-out-based demand
substitution in a second step. In particular, we modify the customer demands to include
demand substitution in the case of a stock-out of the lower-value product.
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Under stock-out-based demand substitution, the firm should c.p. protect more capacity
for the higher-value customer class, compared to the setting without stock-out-based de-
mand substitution. Class 1 demand under additional stock-out-based demand substitution
is stochastically larger as some of the leaked Class 1 customers re-substitute for the higher-
value product in case of a stock-out. The firm anticipates this substitution and therefore
increases the protection level. Thus, the optimal protection level increases in the stock-out-
based demand substitution rates.
When deciding on both its fences and the protection level simultaneously, a firm’s decisions
can be taken sequentially if the stock-out-based substitution rates are the same across the
two customer classes. The unconstrained optimal fencing decision is identical to the fencing
decision without stock-out-based substitution in this case. If stock-out-based substitution
rates differ across the customer classes, both decisions interact and it is beneficial for the
firm to take both decisions simultaneously. Compared to the setting without stock-out-based
demand substitution, the firm should set weaker fences and thus allow more price-driven
demand leakage if the Class 1 substitution rate is greater than the Class 2 substitution rate.
If the relationship between the substitution rates is reversed, the firm should define stricter
fences.
We illustrate our results numerically by means of several examples. Our analytical results
are confirmed in the investigated examples. We show that price differentiation itself is not
necessarily beneficial for a firm, depending on customer heterogeneity and the fencing costs.
In particular, price differentiation is not profitable for low customer heterogeneity and high
fencing costs. In this case a firm should serve a single customer class only.
For stock-out-based demand substitution, we illustrate the benefit of simultaneous opti-
mization compared to taking hierarchical decisions on fences and the protection level. We
show the impact of the substitution rates on the firm’s optimal decisions and the value of
price differentiation by comparing the resulting expected profits to the expected profit from
a single customer segment. With stock-out-based demand substitution, the value of price
differentiation is substantial. Comparing both the value of price differentiation and the value
of simultaneous decision making yields that the value of price differentiation is significantly
higher (at least for the examples considered) than the value of taking both decisions simulta-
neously. Thus, a large share of the overall benefit can already been gained by differentiating
prices.
We consider a static decision problem where both decisions are taken once, at the be-
ginning of the booking horizon. As discussed above, this is a simplification, which allows
for investigating the setting in an analytically tractable way. In practical applications how-
ever, the allocation decision is typically taken dynamically while the fences are determined
once for the entire booking horizon. Accounting for dynamic decisions therefore represents a
practice-oriented model extension. Modeling dynamic allocation decisions affects the model-
ing approach. While fences are still a single decision variable for the entire booking horizon,
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the booking horizon must be divided into several time steps in order to account for dynamic
allocation decisions. In each time step, the firm updates its allocation decision. Such a
setting could be solved by, for example, a stochastic dynamic programming approach. Com-
pared to our approach, complexity is increased, however, by taking dynamic decisions, the
firm will also benefit.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Further Research
Within this thesis, we have investigated the interaction of other planning tasks with short-
term revenue management decisions. Revenue management decisions are applied on an
operational level and aim to manage demand for a given fixed supply so that the firm
maximizes its (expected) profit.
We have seen that short-term revenue management decisions are affected by many other,
also longer-term, planning tasks. These decisions potentially impact the profitability of
applying revenue management. In order to take optimal decisions, a firm needs to consider
multiple planning tasks on different decision hierarchies simultaneously. This thesis has
brought forward new quantitative approaches, which consider the integration of customer
relationship management and fencing decisions with short-term capacity allocation decisions.
In this concluding chapter, we summarize the main results of our research. We also discuss
several potential areas for future research.
5.1 Results
In this section, we summarize and discuss the key results of this thesis, and therefore return
to the research questions posed in Chapter 1.
RQ1: Which planning tasks have an impact on short-term revenue management decisions
across different industries?
The literature overview in Chapter 2 has shown that several planning tasks, on different
hierarchical levels, affect short-term revenue management decisions. When taking account
of revenue management and another related planning task simultaneously, a firm’s decisions
change, compared to taking both decisions sequentially, in most of the cases. However,
sequential heuristics also yield very good results in some cases.
The relevant related planning tasks (1) differ across the industries considered; and (2) the
same related planning tasks may be on different hierarchical levels in the different industries.
For example, scheduling (or routing) decisions are relevant in the manufacturing and e-
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fulfillment context and also affect the available capacity on a short-term basis. This is not
the case for traditional airline or hotel applications. An example of the same planning task
on different hierarchical levels is route planning. While route planning is a rather long-term
planning task in the airline industry, it is typically performed on a very short-term basis
after the order acceptance decision in an e-fulfillment context.
Based on these findings, we review and evaluate existing frameworks for revenue manage-
ment and related planning tasks. The currently available frameworks are either tailored to
a specific industry or have a rather narrow focus on largely marketing-related decisions. In
most cases, operations-related planning tasks are not considered. This particularly holds for
short-term operations-related planning tasks (such as scheduling decisions) which are preva-
lent in manufacturing or e-fulfillment. Planning tasks from the field of customer relationship
management are only rarely considered.
We discuss whether a single framework can actually cover all relevant planning tasks
across all industries. In general, the trade-off is between the extent to which industry-
dependent characteristics are considered within a framework and its generalizability. Due
to the significantly different role of marketing-related planning tasks in quantity-based and
price-based revenue management applications, we separate these two fields. For both types
of revenue management applications, we conclude that rather general frameworks are able
to describe and to structure the relevant planning tasks on different hierarchical levels.
While operations-related decisions affect a firm’s available capacity on different hierar-
chical levels, marketing-related decisions determine the service (or product) offer itself and
revenue management decisions. In contrast to existing frameworks, we additionally consider
the impact of the rather longer-term focus of customer relationship management on other
marketing-related planning tasks.
RQ2: How can other planning hierarchies and tasks be captured in quantitative revenue
management models in order to support coordinated decision making?
In Chapter 3 and 4 we investigated the interplay of a firm’s capacity allocation decision with
two other related planning tasks: customer relationship management and fencing. Both
planning tasks typically have a longer-term character compared to short-term allocation
decisions.
As for the integration of revenue management with customer relationship management, we
do not explicitly model typical customer relationship management decisions but assume that
customer demand is endogenous and depends on the firm’s allocation decisions. Customers
adapt their repurchase probabilities in subsequent booking periods, depending on whether
their current request has been accepted or rejected. Following the approach to customer
relationship management, a firm maximizes the total expected profit within the complete
planning horizon instead of maximizing the respective expected profits within the single
booking periods as in a pure revenue management approach.
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In Chapter 4 we investigated the interrelationship of a firm’s medium-term fencing deci-
sion with its short-term allocation decision. Again, we built our approach on Littlewood’s
two-class model. In a generalized approach, we do not explicitly model particular fences.
We instead model the firm’s fencing decision implicitly by accounting for the effect of the
firm’s fencing decision on price-driven demand leakage. By setting appropriate fences, the
firm typically aims to prevent price-driven demand leakage. However, this comes at a cost
for managing and enforcing a potentially complex system of fences. As a result, the firm
trades off the marginal impact of stricter fences and the resulting marginal costs for setting
stricter fences.
Building on the setting where we only consider price-driven demand leakage, we ad-
ditionally present an extension where we account for additional stock-out-based demand
substitution.
RQ3: How do short-term revenue management decisions change when interrelated planning
tasks are considered additionally?
As for the integration of revenue management and customer relationship management, we
show by marginal analysis for the two-period setting that a booking limit policy is not
necessarily optimal any more. Thus, the resulting optimal allocation policy differs from
standard allocation planning models for a single booking period. This is because a firm’s
current allocation decision affects future customer demand. After having rejected several
requests, rejecting another request can be too expensive so that firms start to accept requests
again.
Within the numerical study, we investigate the firm’s allocation strategy over time. Here,
we found that a static booking limit policy throughout the entire planning horizon performs
considerably worse than all other allocation policies. While regularly updating the myopic
booking limit yields good results, accounting for the effects of the firm’s allocation policy on
future Class 1 demand performs very close to optimal in almost all scenarios. We find that
the protection level increases over time and approaches the total available capacity as soon
as Class 1 customers react slightly positively towards their requests being accepted. Class
2 demand effects only affect the firm’s allocation policy if this is not the case. Then, the
protection level decreases slightly over time approaching some value.
As for the integration of revenue management and a firm’s fencing decision, we derive
a firm’s optimal decisions under price-driven demand leakage analytically for partitioned
allocations. We find that both decisions can be taken independently. Thus, sequential
decision-making is optimal in this case. The firm can first determine its optimal fencing
decision and then the optimal protection level based on the resulting demand. This is also
true for nested allocations.
The main result under price-driven demand leakage, that a firm can take both decisions
sequentially, does not necessarily hold when additional stock-out-based demand substitution
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is considered. Customer demands then also depend on the firm’s allocation decision. As a
result, both the allocation and fencing decision depend on each other if the stock-out-based
substitution rates differ across customer classes. They should thus be taken simultaneously.
If the stock-out-based substitution rates are the same, sequential decisions are again optimal.
By investigating the firm’s trade-offs from the first order optimality conditions, we show how
different parameters affect the optimal decisions. Compared to the setting without stock-
out-based demand substitution, a firm should set weaker (stricter) fences, if the Class 1
substitution rate is larger (smaller) than the Class 2 substitution rate.
By means of numerical examples we show that price differentiation itself is not necessarily
beneficial for a firm, depending on the fencing costs and customer heterogeneity. For high
fencing costs and a low degree of heterogeneity, the firm should not differentiate prices at
all.
5.2 Further Research
Based on the literature overview in Chapter 2 and the little research identified in some areas
of interaction with other decisions, we see interesting opportunities for further research.
The literature overview and the frameworks derived in Chapter 2 are based on four differ-
ent revenue management applications or industries. Considering other additional industries
would further strengthen the generalizability of our approach and potentially provide addi-
tional insights into relevant planning tasks.
The literature overview in Chapter 2, in combination with the more detailed overview
in Chapter 4, has shown that there is only little research into the interface of customer
segmentation and revenue management. In particular, none of the existing approaches deals
with the question of the optimal segmentation of a firm’s customer base in combination with
revenue management. In the approach of Meyr (2008), increasing the number of segments
results in a better segmentation. This result is in line with general results from cluster
analyses. However, a larger number of customer segments may not necessarily be beneficial
for the firm. In line with the underlying notion of Chapter 4, increasing the number of
customer segments at the same time increases the complexity of managing the customer
base, and the potential effects among the demands of the customer segments due to the
decreasing differences of the segments. Accounting for such effects in a multi-class setting
would result in a counter-effect to the benefits from service differentiation. When deciding
on the optimal customer segmentation, the firm would thus trade off the benefits from an
additional customer segment with the resulting additional costs.
In both Chapters 3 and 4, we investigate monopoly settings, however, it would be inter-
esting to investigate the effects of competition on the firm’s optimal decisions. Consider,
for example, a firm’s fencing decision. If demand leakage and substitution also depend on a
competitor’s decisions, the fencing strategy in the equilibrium (if it exists) might be different.
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We have mainly investigated static decisions throughout the analytical parts of this thesis.
Static decisions are taken only at the beginning of the planning horizon. This assumption
simplifies derivation of the firm’s optimal decisions but does not reflect real-world applica-
tions. Here, optimal decisions may be derived based on a static model but the decisions are
typically adapted frequently (and thus applied dynamically) throughout the booking hori-
zon, in order to account for the available information (e.g., the already realized demand)
at different points in time. Thus, investigating either optimal dynamic decisions or the
performance of static decisions when applied dynamically would be interesting.
Finally, we investigated theoretical models in Chapters 3 and 4 but did not investigate
the underlying modeling assumptions empirically. The core idea behind them both is to
integrate richer models of customer demand. It would be interesting to investigate customer
demands empirically within the settings we studied in order to see how customers actually
react, for example, towards their order being accepted or rejected. The same holds, for
example, for the fencing costs assumed in Chapter 4.
Considering the above issues in this thesis, it is clear that revenue management interacts
with a firm’s other, also longer-term, decisions. This thesis has investigated these interac-
tions, and can hopefully contribute to a broader view on revenue management.
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